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(ESCAS) AND THE UNIVERSITY OF WORLD ECONOMY AND
DIPLOMACY (UWED)
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INTRODUCTION

The University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, hosted the Central Eurasian Studies Society's 7th Summer Conference in June 2022. The European Society for Central Asian Studies and this conference worked together to arrange it (ESCAS).



The Central Eurasian Studies Society has hosted many summer conferences in the Central Eurasian region since 2008, and the 2022 Tashkent conference has been long anticipated. In order to discuss research on all facets of humanities and social science scholarship relevant to the area, the diverse professional conference attracted over 300 participants from institutions all over the world as well as independent writers and academics. In addition to Activism in Central Asia, Colonial Narratives, the Soviet Past, and New Directions in Central Asian Archeology, panel discussions also addressed political economy, education, gender, history, and other subjects.¹

Keynotes were delivered by Senator Sodyq Safoev, the First Deputy Chairman of the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Rector of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy and Dilnoza

¹ <https://www.centraleurasia.org/conferences/summer/>

Duturaeva, a Research Fellow at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris and the National Center of Archaeology of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan.²

In his address, Rector Sodyq Safoev called attention to some of the major changes taking place in the area, the main causes of which are the country's leadership's positive foreign policy stance and extensive domestic reforms, all of which have had a profound impact on the region's political climate, the mutual trust and good neighborliness that characterize Central Asia, as well as the guiding principles of the New Uzbekistan Development Strategy.

“This was a history-making conference for CESS and Uzbekistan,” said Dr. Jennifer Murtazashvili, CESS President and Founding Director of the Center for Governance and Markets at the University of Pittsburgh, “This was the first time such a large-scale academic conference based on global academic norms had been held in post-independence Uzbekistan. The conference represented a new era in the history of that country. It was wonderful to see so many scholars from around the region who had not been to Tashkent make new connections. It was also inspiring to see so many scholars from Uzbekistan participate in this kind of conference for the first time.”³ The environment during the conference was open, friendly, and there was plenty of opportunity for debate, discussion, and the development of new ideas.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

CONFERENCE REVIEW

On Seventh International Conference, jointly organized by the Society for Central Eurasian Studies (CESS), the European Society for Central Asian Studies (ESCAS) and University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) (June 23rd and June 26th 2022) (4)



From June 23 to 26, 2022, the Seventh International Conference of the Society for Central Eurasian Studies and the European Society for Central Asian Studies (CESS) was jointly held at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy. The event was attended by over 250 scientists and specialists from more than 30 countries of the world, including the states of Central Asia, the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, India, Pakistan, and many others. The main panels of discussions were devoted to modern trends and trends in regional development and cooperation, reports and presentations reflected the assessments of the leading schools of political science, international relations, economics, finance, law, history, anthropology, cultural studies, religion, education, media studies, sociology, etc.

⁴ This Review is prepared by **Abduraimov Qudratillo** and **Qobilov Firdavs**, IR Faculty members at UWED

On the first day of the conference, the historical development of Central Eurasia, the cultural characteristics and development of applied arts in the region, and the importance, and priorities of modern transformations in Central Asia and in Uzbekistan, in particular, were discussed. The agenda of many panels and discussions were dominated by the topics of security, sustainable development, stability in the region, development of interconnections and economic potential, development of transit and logistics, as well as improvement of the legal framework in Central Asia.



The Conference's formal opening ceremony was conducted on June 24, and S.Safoev, Rector of UWED and First Deputy Chairman of the Senate of the Republic of Uzbekistan, gave a speech there. In his speech, he drew attention to some of the significant changes occurring in the region, the main drivers of which are the leadership's proactive foreign policy and extensive domestic reforms, all of which have had a significant impact on the political environment of the region, the mutual trust and good neighborliness that define Central Asia, as well as the guiding principles of the New Uzbekistan Development Strategy.

The international team of the Society for Central Eurasian Studies and the European Society for Central Asian Studies (CESS) was

represented by Jennifer Murtazashvili, Director of the Center for Governance and Markets and Associate Professor in the Department of Public and International Relations at the University of Pittsburgh, USA.

MAJOR TOPICS OF PANEL DISCUSSIONS

The Cost of Marriage in Central Asian Societies:

Evolving Norms and Discourses

As part of the discussion, experts and specialists made presentations. Norms and discourses governing social obligations for spending on wedding traditions in Central Asia. Using an empirical approach, the experts examined the new factors and standards, and the social conditions in which they are implemented. The discussion examines the role of moral concepts of dignity and respect in the ritual practices of the indigenous cultures of Central Asia in the era of globalization.

One of the topics of discussion was attention to the wedding traditions of young people from Central Asia who left to study in Russia. As noted, they are mobile and aimed at a successful career, but can a traditional wedding cause conflict between generations of fathers and children?

For years, religious staff at mosques have debated the cost of the ceremony, in line with laws passed by the Uzbek state to cut costs. Based on surveys conducted among the mullahs and believers, there were analyzes of changes in the moral perception of ritual overspending.



Great Powers and Cultural Heritage

As part of the panel discussions, the Geopolitical concepts of Central Asia have discussed: Maritime and land accents of the policy of the Great Powers. The growing influence of China in the states of Central Asia is seen by many geopoliticians as evidence that a great power on the edge of the Eurasian center is becoming a hegemon in world politics.

Franco-German Cultural Institute in Kyrgyzstan: Development and Potential of an Integrated Cultural Institute Adrien Hugué (TSI AUCA) The most recently established Franco-German Cultural Institute in Kyrgyzstan is one of the few integrated institutions in the world and is unique in the field of cultural diplomacy. What are its possible developments and potential in a highly competitive environment in terms of soft power?

China and The Growing Presence of BRI In Central Eurasia: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue on Governance, Markets, and Innovations

This roundtable held a critical interdisciplinary dialogue on China's involvement in Central Eurasia and analyzed various infrastructure projects "on the ground" from different conceptual perspectives. Chinese Foreign Aid and Authoritarianism in Central Asia – D.Niyazbekov (KIMEP University) Is China's Growing Financial Aid Under the BRI Making the Central Asian States More Authoritarian? The role of BRI in Central Eurasia from a geo-economic point of view Valentin Krüsmann (Center for East European and International Studies) During the round table Valentin Krüsmann will discuss the role of BRI in Central Eurasia from a geo-economic point of view with an eye to infrastructure projects.

A panel discussion on the topic: “Revolutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: what they represent. As part of thematic discussions with the report, experts and specialists from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were identified, who spoke about the causes, processes and consequences of prevalence in two cases. The main argument of the speakers: “Progressive forces are the driving force behind revolutionary situations, but cannot subsequently establish social hegemony, since each time they succumb to the rules of “everyday politics” structured by informal networks and the pursuit of personal interests.” The main conclusions made by experts were focused in:

The power of the voices of young activists using the social media space can be heard;

The intention of progressive youth is to purge old voices from politics.

Despite a well-organized presence in the public sphere, progressive movements cannot transform the political regime

The old elites are successful because they pursue their own interests, thus they reinforce the existing system of power and perpetuate the same strategies.

The old elites are involved in collective action

January 2022 Events in Kazakhstan:

Implications for Foreign Policy, Security and Identity

On June 25, 2022, a panel round table (PIR-14) was held at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy as part of the 7th Summer International Conference CESS at the seventh session on the topic: "January 2022 Events in Kazakhstan: Implications for Foreign Policy, Security and Identity".

January 2022 Events in Kazakhstan: Implications for Foreign Policy, Security and Identity/ The organizers of this panel are Aziz Burkhanov, Zhanibek Arynov, Serik Orazgaliev, Dina Sharipova from Nazarbayev University. Helene Thiebaud from Nazarbayev University was the moderator and speaker were a representative of the Soros Foundation - Kyrgyzstan Emilbek Juraev.

This panel examined various aspects and dimensions of the events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan, including foreign policy, security, institutions, public perception and identity, as well as their medium and long-term consequences.

In a report on the topic "Dissonance between the state and citizens: January 2022 in Kazakhstan" Dina Sharipova, the focus was on the official discourse and interpretations of the January 2022 events, on the one hand, and the views/perceptions of the broad masses, on the other. The study is based on a discursive analysis of media reports and presidential messages, as well as interviews with experts. Aziz Burkhanov's presentation on "From the "Listening State" to the "New Kazakhstan": January 2022, Institutions and Identity", discussed the

institutional and identity aspects of changes in Kazakhstan since 2019, the evolution of official and popular narratives, and the consequences of the events of January 2022.

Serik Orazgaliev's new research on "Social Fragmentation and Digital Media in Kazakhstan" shows that digital media can increase social fragmentation and democratic polarization. This research project analyzed the impact of social media group polarization effects on democratization and public policy outcomes in Kazakhstan.

"International reaction to the events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan: how will this affect the country's foreign policy?" Zhanibek Arynov, touches on the external dimension of the January 2022 events in Kazakhstan and shows that the January events do not necessarily mean the end of Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy, and the country will be able to continue the old approach to foreign policy.

***The Political Economy of Non-Western Migration Regimes:
Central Asian Migrant Workers in Russia and Turkey***

The panel discussion was held in the format of a forum for the exchange of views and comments on the book by Rustamjon Urinboev and Sherzod Eraliev "The Political Economy of Non-Western Migration Regimes: Migrant Workers from Central Asia in Russia and Turkey". At the beginning of the event, the author of the book, R. Urinboev, spoke about the essence and content of the book, the ideas of its creation, the base of sources, and methodological and empirical research. The essence of the book about the social and legal problems of a migrant, in which the method of "targetology" was used. The author points out the stages of migration, which he divided into 3 periods, gives a comparative analysis of the migration service of the two countries (Russia and Turkey), noted that the main part of the study was made by Western American experts. The author in the book used an extraordinary approach in the face of the hero, Safar, who is facing difficulties, the Uzbek etymology of the words "kucha", "mahalla" was also used, he brought personal experience from life, a strong socialization of migrants. He also emphasized the development of democracy in countries with different identities, calling the term "non-democracy".

Further, several expert anthropologists made comments, for example, Sergey Abashin (European University at St. Petersburg) He spoke with theses about the book, divided the speech into 2 parts, where in the first he noted the methodological approach of the author, thereby commenting positively on the book. At the same time, S. Abashin emphasized that “Russian researchers are studying external factors, they have access to open migrants (working in the service sector: waiters, taxi drivers, sellers), thus who do not have problems with legalization. In the second part of his speech, he expressed his opinion on the conceptual nature of the issue of the book, migration studies, according to him, cover the United States, all theories come from the West, here he positively noted the binary position of the author. Everyone present at the discussion of the book liked his idea that democracy, as we accept it, “Western democracy and non-Western such a concept should no longer exist, since we cannot divide the essence of theory into types and types according to our culture of understanding”, “the author in the book the world is divided into triplicity, the classification in the book is a bit incorrect, since the world is not divided into parts today, ”based on the results of the statement, he suggested that the author reconsider these concepts. The next speaker, Rano Turaeva (Ludwig-Maximilian University), generally spoke positively about the book, noting that she learned a lot about migration, the author moves on to events making them real and easy for the reader to understand, also noted that “scientific researchers should move away from the concept of West- East”, agreeing with the opinion of S.Abashin.

Central Eurasia in Middle Ages History

On June 25, 2022, a panel round table (HIS-09) was held at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy within the framework of the 7th summer international conference CESS at the seventh session on the topic: “Central Eurasia in Middle Ages History”.

This section was moderated and discussed by Jonathan Brack from the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. The topic of the report is “Ahrari Mansabdar at the court of Shah Jahan: Sufism, Himayat and nostalgia for the Timurids”. Ali Gibran Siddiqi of Princeton University examines petitions to show how Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang (d. 1636), a Central Asian immigrant to Mughal India, changed the Himayat political

practice championed by his ancestor Khwaja Ahrar and exploited his connections in the Sufi network Juibari to challenge existing notions of empire management.

“The Day of Judgment Has Come: The Narrative of Zain ad-Din Mahmud Wasifi about the Occupation of Herat by the Safavids” Robert Dunbar of St. John Fisher's College focuses on the Safavid Qizilbash invasion and capture of the city of Herat, as described in Zain al-Din Mahmud Wasifi's *Bada'i al-Waqai'*, in a work that was completed in Tashkent and dedicated to Abulu. - Muzaffar Hasan Sultan b. Kildi Muhammad Sultan in 1538-1539.

“Authoritarian succession in elections in Central Asia”. Donnacha Ó Beacháin from the University of Dublin looked at the continuity, adaptations, and innovations in elite electoral processes in the states of Central Asia between the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The report “Study and Interpretation of the Four-Language “Inscription of the Border Platform for Greeting” in the Qianlong Era” by Ahmet Khojam examines the Chinese-Manchurian-Mongolian-Turkic four-language inscription in Beijing in 1760. He introduced the participants to the transcription and translations of all four versions. The texts were analyzed for linguistic features and translation features. This report is based on first-hand material.

Difficulties of the Regime in Central Eurasia

In the introductory part of the panel session «Complexity of the regime in Central Eurasia», moderator F.Talipov drew attention to the urgency of studying complex security issues in the context of modern trends and transformations in the Defense Ministry.

In the course of the report by S.Mayer (Kazakh-German University) on «The Complexity of the Regime in Managing Regional Security: An Example of Combating Terrorism in Central Asia» the counter-terrorism strategies of security organizations operating in Central Asia were revealed, including OSCE and SCO programs and institutions. The author noted the similarities and differences of these counter-terrorism policies in Central Asia within these organizations. In particular, the OSCE has established a Border Management College in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and the SCO has established a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RCT) in

Tashkent. However, according to the speaker, concepts, strategies and practices often differ significantly, for example, when the SCO and the CSTO apply too broad definitions of «terrorism» and «extremism». In addition, OSCE links its strategies to rule of law reform and the empowerment of civil society.

A.Umarov (UMED) in his report on «The Mystery of Central Asia's Security: Between South and East Asia» drew attention to the formation of a new independent RCB (RSC) in Central Asia over the past 30 years as part of the development of relations with South and East Asia, which in turn change the Central Asian regional security complex. According to the speaker, in connection with the strengthening of the interests of China, Pakistan and India in Central Asia, the impact of the situation in Afghanistan and the development of regional security complexes of Central, South and East Asia within the framework of the initiative «One Belt, One Way» are becoming increasingly interdependent. It was also noted that Central Asia is no longer in the power of the post-Soviet regional security complex and is becoming more and more.

Diaspora and International Relations in Central Eurasia

On June 26, the CESS 2022 Tashkent Summer Conference held another panel session on political science and international relations. In this panel session on the topic «Diaspora and international relations in Central Eurasia», the participants discussed the relationship between China and Central Asia..

During the event, F.Aminzhanov (University of Zayida, Abu Dhabi UAE) and Li-Chen Sim (University of Khalifa, Abu Dhabi UAE) presented their joint report. The topic of this report is «State Art in the Steppes: Relations of Central Asia with China». It revealed the features of Central Asia's interaction with China.

According to the speakers, the Central Asian countries on the one hand support the economic and regional initiatives of China, such as «One Belt, One Way», but also selectively resist the deepening of relations with China. It has been argued that the ability of leaders in Central Asia to selectively manage, balance, maintain and negotiate their relations with China is an important but often undervalued part of the relationship between Central Asia and China. The Central Asian countries are not

equal to China, but they are not just countries that unconditionally accept China's policies towards them. In the analysis, the rapporteurs used a theoretical "hedging" approach. In world politics, the most active and classic hedge is Singapore, which successfully balances between China and the US. It is noted that Central Asian countries are not classic hedgers in relations with world leaders. They do not always have enough resources, external levers and institutional mechanisms to implement stable hedging policies. However, when it comes to the vital interests of the countries of the region, they have been quite successful as skillful hedgers. According to the speakers, the most important and strong hedge in relations with China is the Kazakh.



Global Policy in Central Eurasia

The panel discussion included presentations by researchers from Uzbekistan, Turkey and Poland. So in a report on the topic «Not beyond my horizon» - rethinking preliminary proposals for the withdrawal of the US base in Uzbekistan» D.Mutalov (Webster University) considered the reasons for the failure of the US proposal to re-establish the military base in Uzbekistan through the prism of international and domestic factors.

The speaker drew attention to the objective and subjective reasons for the US interest in opening a military base in Uzbekistan: the

geographical remoteness of other US bases from Central Eurasia, etc. Kyrgyzstan also closed the US military base, and the US left Afghanistan; through its military base in Uzbekistan, the US would have access to South Asia, East Asia, the North and the South Caucasus, etc. The speaker also drew attention to the history of the US military base in Khanabad (Karshi), and the internal and external reasons for the rejection of the US proposal to open a new military base. The internal reasons are to re-evaluate the Afghan crisis and its impact on Uzbekistan, i.e. Uzbekistan, without external players, was able to establish a sufficiently trusting relationship with the Interim Government of Afghanistan. The country's legislation also stipulates that no foreign military bases will be established on its territory and that Uzbekistan will not join military blocs and the alliance. The international or external cause lies mainly in the presence in the region of other more influential external players like Russia and China, who are not interested in opening a US military base in Central Asia.

A. Dalek from the University of Warsaw made a presentation on «The perception of the concept of neighborhood between Russians and Chinese. The case of Central Asia». In it, the Rapporteur drew attention to the fact that an effective policy of good-neighborliness is one of the most important foreign policy challenges. Cooperation with neighboring regions brings benefits to countries from trade, stimulates mutual investment.

Realism also does not fully reveal the situation in Central Asia and its relations with the Russian Federation; many problems between countries are sometimes not objective and are not connected with national interests. Constructivism is present in the development of relations between Central Asia and the Russian Federation. Questions of identity and culture are directly related to social constructivism. But this theory also has its drawbacks. In the discussion part, the participants noted that security issues in Central Asia, conceptual analysis of inter-state relations in the region are little-studied topics and they are not published in large scientific journals.

In general, as practically all conference attendees noticed, the environment during the scientific forum was open, cordial, and there were numerous possibilities for debates, discussions, and the creation of new ideas.

CENTRAL ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS

Dr., Prof. Sodyq S. Safoev

*First Deputy Chairperson of the Uzbekistan's Senate
Rector of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy*

Abstract: *Over the course of the past three decades, the role of Central Asia has drastically changed, once more in its history. We have witnessed this region's evolution from political non-existence, to becoming an increasingly important actor on international arena again. Located at the very heart of Asia, and being a key midpoint of the Islamic World, Central Asia has become an integral part of Eurasian and global processes.*

Keywords: *New Uzbekistan Development Strategy, Central Asia, Regional Development, Human & National values, Regional Connectivity, Capacity Building, Civil Society, Supremacy of Law, National Resilience, New Neighborhood Policy, Foreign Policy.*

Until just recently, the term “Central Asia” was treated mostly as a historical and geographical definition with quite unclear borders and even more unclear political prospects. These prospects, as a rule, were considered a part of this or that version of the “Great Game”, among big powers competing with each other to gain influence over the region, while the Central Asians were left to act as passive objects in this game.

Even the very name used for the region varied drastically at different period. It was called Transoxiana by the Greeks and Romans, Western Land by ancient Chinese, Maverannahr by the medieval Arabs. Meanwhile Iran distinguished itself from Turon and subsequently the linguistic approach let to the region being called Turkestan. Sometimes it was named Inner Asia, to more broadly link it Mongolia, Western China, northern India and southern Siberia. During the Soviet period, for instance, the region was to the contrary limited to the so called Soviet Central Asia referring only for four republics: Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

It has now become evident that Central Asia is starting to reclaim its geostrategic role in the world, which it once played until the dramatic

change of the major trade routes and then the subsequent expansion of the Russian Empire kept it from playing an active role in international relations. Before that, as it was defined by Arnold Toynbee, “the Oksa-Yaksart basin was like a turning point or a center for all roads of the world to converge. Its natural conditions, - he stated, - helped to turn the region into an international crossroads.”

It was here that the vital interests of the four largest regions of Eurasia – the Middle East, the South-Asian subcontinent, the Rus, transformed in the 17th century to Russia, and China – were interlaced. In between each and every one of them, Central Asia was at the center of highly developed systems of mutual strategic interests in political, economic, cultural, and military affairs.

Mutual correlation and interdependency were so matured that the development of Central Asia often had a fundamental impact on the state of affairs in the aforementioned regions.

Today the countries of Central Asia are forming their identity and building independent policies not only with the countries of these regions, but with other parts of the world as well.

They can no longer be regarded as just an appendage of another nation's idea of statehood.

There is no reason to doubt that Central Asia will become an important element in the balance of power in the very heart of the Eurasian landscape, affecting a wide range of economic and political interests as well as global security considerations. At the same time, an unstable, disunited Central Asia could create severe problems for an increasingly interdependent world.

There is another factor that determines the unique role of Uzbekistan and the other countries of Central Asia in contemporary world. Due to the dramatic turn of history, the original Asian region, with predominantly a Muslim population, became a direct participant of the European process within the framework of OSCE and other intra-Eurasian processes. This is not only creating opportunities for these states, but a gateway of inter-civilizational dialog for the whole world as well.

* * * * *

History unambiguously shows that the golden ages of Central Asia coincided with the times of its most intensive ties with the rest of the world. And to the contrary, when these ties were weakened, Central Asia was doomed to harbor backwardness, obscurantism, bloody feuds, and as a result poverty and vegetation.

At the heart of the previous CA renaissances was the emergence of a common economic, cultural, humanitarian space in a vast region. Long-distance trade played a major role in the rise and prosperity of Central Asia. The Great Silk Roads served not only as a means of trading goods, but also as an exchange of cultures, ideas, scientific discoveries, bridging distant nations and civilizations.

Approximately one hundred years ago, a prominent scholar Wilhelm Barthold, wrote a profound piece dedicated to the history of Central Asia. He analyzed the factors behind the astonishing achievements of the Central Asian civilization in medieval ages. He predicted that there would be a revival of Central Asia's role as an important region, where its distinguished position in history and culture of world civilization would be restored. According to him, Central Asia would rise from its ruins, and take on an integral role once international trade routes restarted to cross the region again.

* * * * *

Hence, the foreign policy of the new Uzbekistan is aimed at cultivating multidirectional dialog and cooperation in foreign relations – with the East and West, North and South. It has started restoring its historical place in world civilization: and a decisive factor of this revival is the country's openness to the world.

Immediately after his election in 2016, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev instigated systemic high-level regional dialogue. It enabled to create a fundamentally new political atmosphere in Central Asia.

The main goal is to turn Central Asia into a zone of stabile and sustainable development, to create an atmosphere of trust, mutual respect and good-neighbourliness. In recent years, Uzbekistan's trade turnover with its neighbours has drastically increased.

If a few years ago Central Asia was considered a “zone of strategic uncertainty”, today we can look at its prospects with a greater optimism.

A number of Uzbek initiatives are aimed at resolving the conflict in Afghanistan. Relations with the other CIS countries, our traditional partners, have reached a new level in all dimension. Together with China – key trade partner – Uzbekistan is an active participant in the Belt and Road initiative. A major step was taken towards building closer ties with Europe. Country attained a beneficiary status in the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences - "GSP+". This was a result of intense work and successful summits in Paris, Berlin and high-level meetings in Tashkent. Across the pond, President Mirziyoyev’s visit to Washington and the meeting at the White House marked the beginning of a new era of strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and the US. Uzbek-Turkish relations have also taken a fresh breath of air. The two states signed strategic bilateral agreements, committing to joint projects aimed at modernizing Uzbekistan’s road infrastructure as well as power and manufacturing facilities. Visits by President Mirziyoyev to Seoul and Tokyo have opened up absolutely new horizons of partnership with the Republic of Korea and with Japan. Intense dialogue with the leaderships of India and Pakistan have paved the way for the development of relations between Central and South Asia. Last July a very successful conference on Regional Connectivity took place in Tashkent where high-level representatives from more than 40 countries took part.

At the same time, the situation in our region and around the world is changing rapidly. This requires a continuous and corresponding adjustment in countries’ foreign policy.

* * * * *

What are the foreign policy priorities of Uzbekistan in the years to come?

First, it is important to consolidate the existing positive trends in the region, to make the process of strengthening mutual trust and broad-based cooperation in Central Asia irreversible.

Second, it is extremely important to continue to solicit the active involvement of Afghanistan in the regional and global processes. Already two generations of Afghans have not seen peace. Long-term peace in that

country can only be achieved through national consensus, public contract, and inclusive government. It is important to keep Afghanistan in the spotlight of the international community. We cannot repeat the mistakes of the past and leave this long-suffering country to the mercy of fate. It is necessary to continue the implementation of strategic economic and infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. This will not only increase the potential for the involvement of the entire region in international economic relations, but also open up new opportunities that can contribute to the peace process in Afghanistan.

Third, a top priority should be green diplomacy. Its essence lies in the promotion of international initiatives and the implementation of multilateral programs in the field of environmental protection and solving the growing environmental problems of the region and the world.

Considering the fact that Central Asia is the region which influences the formation of climate in greater Eurasia, the advancement of ideas on how to influence climate change here will have a global impact.

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So, with respect to CA's geographical crossroads' puzzle, the priorities are more or less clear. It is not a case with respect to paradigm of social development.

According to professor Bernard Lewis, Central Asia and its bordering regions in Eurasia principally can choose between four concepts for development: socialism, nationalism, Islamism or secular democracy. There are no other options, he stated.

Almost two and a half centuries ago, Adam Smith tried to explain why some nations achieve wealth and others fail. Yet, today the gap between rich and poor countries has grown even larger. Still philosophers and economists are trying to find answers to questions such as: Why are some countries developed while others are not? What is "development" all about? How do we measure social "progress"?

According to Max Weber, development is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization, and by "disenchantment of the world". In modern society, he wrote, an individual act based on cost-benefit analysis; there is no room for mystery, and faith, and traditions in governance.

An American economist Walt Rostow developed a conceptual model, according to which progress occurs in five basic stages: and concludes in an “Age of mass consumption”

So, are economic growth and consumption the main signs of modernization?

Of course, not. The process of modernization should not lead to spiritual impoverishment, dominance of consumerism, or, affluenzia, word composed from affluence and influenza, in other words a pandemic of unrestrained pursuit of material goods. As early as in the 14th century, a great scholar Ibn Khaldun, in his monumental work, “Muqaddimah” (or “Prolegomena”), noted that the pursuit of luxury irreversibly carried the seeds of destruction.

Economic growth is vital but not an end in itself. Revenues of society are only a means towards a larger goal. Consequently, the level and even rates of GDP growth cannot be the sole benchmark of progress.

Francis Fukuyama showed that people strive not only for their material well-being; he seeks psychological comfort. The latter is primarily associated with self-respect or recognition of the self-worth of an individual. The right to free elections, equality before the law, system of freedoms are inherent properties of social progress.

According to him, “social trust” is a key feature of a developed society. It is manifested both at the individual and at the social levels: trust toward government, public institutions and the state as a whole, trust toward business and civil society. That is why, the decisive moment in the origin of a modernized world was the emergence of such institutions as private property, social contract, and a stable system of commercial law.

All developed societies are industrial (none of them is based on agriculture), urbanized (having absolute majority of population leaving in cities), educated and inclusive (where all segments of society can and are participating in political life).

Modernized societies meet five criteria: they contain inherent mechanisms that ensure constant dynamic development; democracy is a political form of their very existence; they are mobile in all terms; a person has the ability to adapt to a constantly changing environment and acts rationally, does not focus on traditional or religious ideas.

The theory of modernization assumes that there are some common tendencies around the world, patterns that allow traditional societies to turn into modern ones. But that's is not about a one-size-fits-all transformation of the East into the West.

* * * * *

It is clear that modernization creates a number of serious challenges.

Actually, as the history shows, societies arise in response to challenges: there is triad of social development: challenge-response-development. By identifying and conceptualizing these, one can comprehend the notion of development.

So, what kind of major challenges can Central Asian societies face over the medium-term perspective?

1. The principles of secularism versus the growing role of religion

The role of religion in societies is increasing worldwide. And here the point is not only in the ideological vacuum to be filled in certain states. Religious fervors are one of the most fundamental characteristics of human nature.

After all, religion so far is the only way of overcoming eternal contradictions between the egocentricity of an individual and interests of the society as a whole. The main problem lies in Islam's inclination towards regulating all aspects of social life. This provides fertile ground for political Islam, which by definition hardly might be combined with the principles of secularism.

The state's rigid regulatory policy towards religion has proven to have been counterproductive. Today, the Uzbek government appeals to promote Enlightened Islam. Thus, the burning issue is: what does that mean? Does it mean that modern Islam should evolve, somehow adapt to the environment of the modern world and learn to exist in the fourth technological revolution era?

2. Hard requirements of globalization versus national interests

For millions of people, globalization is associated with hopes of a

better life, with the right to have their own choices and freedoms by means of obtaining firsthand information, with possibilities to travel freely, and with opportunities to receive better education in the best universities, to get better employment abroad with higher salaries and motivation.

At the same time, we all are perfectly aware that globalization has its cost and these are not cheap. Increasing the role of supra-state international institutions weakens national statehood, its democratic institutions. Anti-globalists are convinced that globalization contributes to such problems as global warming, environmental pollution, scattershot migration, unemployment, and the erosion of traditional values.

But globalization is a process that cannot be ignored, stopped or deferred. The choice is either you put up with the “hard jacket” of globalization or you are sidelined from current global trends, which will make you suffer the consequences.

3. *National interests versus necessity of regional integration*

In the modern world, only voluminous markets can encourage substantial and sustainable flow of investments and secure high economic growth. Moreover, it is obvious that in CA no country can capitalize its natural endowments on its own. Equally, no country is able to solve major problems such as transportation, ecology, energy, etc., by itself; all of them today need concerted multilateral efforts.

But regional integration means not only gaining but giving up as well. The governments must be ready to delegate some of their exclusive prerogatives to newly formed organizations and reduce some of their regulatory functions. It is not always easy, but there is no other way.

A vital factor of successful regional cooperation is shared principles and values. So, on the one hand, there is an understanding of absolute inevitability of regional integration and, on the other, – reluctance to share power.

4. *A conflict between the needs of political modernization and the needs of ensuring sustainable development.*

All countries of our region are undergoing systemic political and economic changes – namely, modernization. It is a highly challenging, painful process breaking the very foundations of traditional societies and

way of life. There is no other path toward for progress, but it cannot pass smoothly. There will unavoidably be resistance.

Modernized societies without exception are based on the values of democracy and open society. The question is: can we be “tolerant towards intolerance”, can we be liberal and democratic towards fatal enemies of liberalism and democracy?

How the countries of the region will handle this paradox will show their level of maturity and their real potential for modernization.

5. The challenge of sustainable development versus generational change of political elites

Generational change is inevitable. The new always replaces the old.

Today the very demography of our region preordains the fact that the majority of the electoral constituency are young people. They are at the social and cultural forefront and are driving force behind massive changes. The new generation wants more openness and transparency, accountability and engagement. They are challenging key values and ideas that defined the previous status quo.

Generational change is inevitable, but it comes at a price. What worked well for one generation may fail for another. The political instincts shaped by the previous generation’s experience may ultimately be of great value to them. This is one of the major controversies that CA societies will face in the near future – how to manage generational change while ensuring continuity and consistency.

There is old wisdom that say: science without the young is a tragedy and science without the older generation is a farce.

6. Industrialization versus ecology

The reality is that most of the CA countries are falling behind the curve with respect to industrialization. History does not know any prosperous country relying primarily on agriculture. But there is again the price to pay. There cannot be industrialization without harm on ecology.

In Central Asia, the rate of global warming is twice that of the world average. The growing shortage of water resources in the region is an acute problem and it can and must be solved collectively.

What is left of the Aral Sea has become the epicentre of an ecological catastrophe. I am convinced that the problem of the Aral Sea should be classified as one of the greatest challenges to the planet.

* * * * *

How is modernization going on in present-day Uzbekistan?

Uzbekistan, under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has embarked on ambitious reforms aimed at ensuring genuine political and economic modernization. No doubt, it is changing the political environment in all of Central Asia and will have an impact far beyond.

The main objective is obvious – to build a secular, democratic state based on the rule of law, open civil society and socially oriented market economy.

The main driving force behind this aspiration is a clear understanding of the following fundamental factor: in order to address the challenges of these turbulent times, political and economic reforms must be accelerated, not reversed.

As the recent developments in many regions have demonstrated, non-modernized states are weak and vulnerable.

More than ever before, there is a systemic understanding in Uzbekistan that no long-term sustainable development is possible without deep political changes and without profound modernization of the political system.

At the core of all this, lies the concept of decentralization of the state governance system. It has four main dimensions of redistributing power and functions.

1. From executive – to other branches of power.

This means overcoming one of the most prominent features of the previous system – an unlimited domination of a single political force, manifested in a monopoly of power.

Much needed actions have already been taken to ensure transparency and accountability of the authorities. The composition of Government has drastically changed. Younger, more open-minded and reform-oriented individuals, many of whom are graduates of the world's top universities, have been appointed to key positions in Government.

At the center of these renewals is the expansion of the Uzbek Parliament's influence.

2. *From the centre – to the regions.*

The task of this aspect of decentralization is to redistribute powers and functions between different levels of the power structure.

Functions of the state governance system in such areas as education, health care, environmental management, protection of cultural heritage, local transportation, and social utilities have been delegated to the local authorities. The division of fiscal responsibilities among the different levels of government has accompanied this redistribution.

3. *“From government – to business”.*

The main goal of this aspect of reforms is to limit direct state intervention into the economy through liberalization, support of entrepreneurship, improvement of investment climate.

Renunciation of using the levers of direct control over the economy is perhaps one of the most serious challenges from the point of view of governmental officials.

During the last few years, Uzbekistan's economic growth has outpaced the world average despite internal and external shocks, and current reforms will build on that strong foundation.

4. *From government – to civil society.*

Over the administrative-command system period, institutions of civil society were practically crushed by the totalitarian regime. Important resources of social progress and human development such as energy and activity of population were non-existent.

Meanwhile, the experience of developed countries has clearly demonstrated that a society's modernization demands political and economic pluralism, a developed civil society, and strong institutions of democracy.

As a matter of fact, the transformation of political and economic systems in transitional countries has undermined the ability of governments to carry out important social programs and roll-out sustainable human development projects. Obviously, a state cannot

address social issues of all varieties without the support and involvement of society. The role of non-governmental organizations should rise. They must be viewed as full-fledged partners of government.

In present-day Uzbekistan, political engagement of the population and non-governmental organizations is increasing. Mass media is becoming more active and independent. Top priority is given to the issues of culture and education. The main asset of Uzbekistan is its people – bearers of the traditions of an ancient civilization, a civilization of Creativity, Entrepreneurship, Trade and Openness. Our civilization relies on the simple presumption that trade is something that benefits all, but which in turn requires one simple thing – unrestricted flow of people, ideas, goods and services.

In the very blood of our nations there lies interest in other cultures, faiths, and languages, as well as respect for other people regardless of their ethnic or religious origin.

THE COLLAPSE OF AFGHANISTAN⁵

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Abstract. *Conventional wisdom suggests that the Afghan republic fell because societal values were incompatible with democracy and the country was simply ungovernable. This article traces the state's collapse to the highly centralized political institutions imposed after the 2001 U.S. invasion. Instead of offering citizens an opportunity to oversee their government in a meaningful way, Kabul-centric institutions – holdovers from the country's authoritarian past – undermined citizen trust in government. Flooded with vast amounts of foreign aid, the post-2001 system fostered corruption. After twenty years, Afghans were unwilling to fight for a distant government that did not treat them with dignity.*

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ended on 15 August 2021. That afternoon, President Ashraf Ghani fled the capital city by helicopter to neighboring Uzbekistan. Just days earlier, he had sworn never to leave and said that he would die before abandoning his people. With Ghani gone, the Taliban offensive, which had captured dozens of provincial capitals in the preceding weeks, easily entered Kabul. Within hours, the insurgents sat comfortably at Ghani's desk.

Why did the Afghan republic collapse so completely and so quickly, spurring tens of thousands of desperate people to run to the Kabul airport in hopes of escaping the Taliban's harsh rule and potential retribution? Conventional wisdom says that the U.S.-backed republic fell because the country's government and society were hopelessly corrupt, and its values were incompatible with democracy. In other words, Afghanistan was ungovernable and would always be a lost cause for the outside world – a graveyard of empires.

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Such views are widespread and even understandable, but also completely wrong. Rather, the policy choices made by the United States and its partners in Afghanistan over the past twenty years are largely to blame. The international community made many avoidable mistakes in its attempts at state-building. Painting Afghan society with a broad brush only obfuscates missteps made by those in power – in both Washington and Kabul. Unless there is soul searching about what went wrong, the international community and the United States are likely to repeat the same mistakes somewhere else.

In April 2021, U.S. president Joseph Biden announced that the United States would leave Afghanistan by 11 September 2021. This would end the long drawdown initiated by President Barack Obama, who in December 2009 announced a temporary military and civilian surge and promised to begin withdrawing troops in 2011. Despite the surge, the security situation in the country worsened, and the Taliban movement was emboldened as it had made territorial gains throughout the countryside. In hopes of brokering a negotiated end to the war, Obama began informal negotiations with the Taliban to find a political solution to the quagmire. His successor, Donald Trump, was determined to leave Afghanistan completely, and his administration engaged the Taliban in formal negotiations, culminating in the February 2020 Doha Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan. The Taliban agreed to prevent al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations from operating in Afghanistan in return for the withdrawal of all NATO forces from the country.

The Afghan government collapsed before the 31 August 2021 withdrawal deadline. Images from across the country of Afghan soldiers quickly surrendering to the Taliban led many foreign analysts to focus on the ability of the United States and its allies to build armies. In Washington and European capitals, military experts began fretting about “right-sizing” armies and pointing to the centrality of logistics and the loss of crucial U.S. air support. These analyses reflected a misunderstanding of what happened. The collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) was not due to technical issues; it fell to pieces for political reasons. No amount of technical assistance or better-targeted logistical support would have sustained this fighting force, because these soldiers believed they had nothing left to fight for.

The Afghan state collapsed because it lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The sources of this legitimacy crisis were multiple and interwoven. First, the 2004 Constitution created a system of governance that provided Afghan citizens with few opportunities to participate in or have any meaningful oversight of their government. As a result, the gap between the rhetoric of the U.S. intervention and citizens' realities widened with each passing year.

Second, the international coalition was focused on fighting an insurgency and consolidating power – missions distinct from and often at odds with democracy-building. International donors desperate for quick fixes poured vast resources into Afghanistan with minimal monitoring. And rather than reforming dysfunctional state institutions, they created parallel ones, further undermining state legitimacy.

Third, the intemperate rule of President Ashraf Ghani (2014–21) hastened state collapse. Ghani, who kept a tight, close circle and had only a narrow base of support, micromanaged both the economy and the state, and he discriminated against ethnic minorities. Many had expected that the erudite president, who has a doctorate in anthropology and had worked for the World Bank, would rule as a technocrat. Yet his behavior was more authoritarian than democratic.

Finally, it was only with the support of Pakistan that the Taliban could reemerge as a political and military force. After the Taliban government collapsed in 2001 in the wake of the U.S. invasion, its leaders fled to Pakistan, where they would remain for the next two decades. Yet, had the Afghan state not been considered illegitimate by the people, the Taliban would not have had a fighting chance inside of Afghanistan. In other words, without the kindling of poor governance, the fire of insurgency would never have been lit.

Afghanistan has been caught in a four-decade-long cycle of state collapse. In that time, five regimes have been overthrown and replaced by subsequent governments that each resembled the last, with the same centralized political institutions that have characterized the Afghan state's modern existence. Thus the Taliban are for a second time ruling over one of the world's most centralized states. If the past forty years teach us anything, it is that without devolving some authority away from the capital, the Taliban's current reign will be both violent and short-lived.

A Republic Without the People

It is easy to believe that Afghanistan was not prepared for democracy given the rapid fall of its democratic government. But the country's 2004 Constitution included few provisions for democratic decision-making, and many that were included were never implemented. That was a policy choice made by Afghanistan's political leaders with little opposition from U.S. and NATO patrons.

Convergence of the rules of society and the state is essential for political stability and development as well as for the provision of public goods and services [1]. When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it found a highly fragmented society whose regions had distinct experiences and allegiances formed from decades of conflict. Yet rather than incorporating and building on these diversities, the formal rules of politics established after 2001 aimed to transform Afghanistan into a highly unitary system [2]. The original sin of this intervention was to resurrect old institutions that had their roots in the country's authoritarian past rather than giving Afghans the opportunity to build something new that embodied the norms of self-governance which characterized most parts of the country. The post-2001 republic inadvertently re-created the maladies that drove instability in past governments. Beginning with the violent reign of "Iron Amir" Abdur Rahman Khan (1880–1901), Afghan rulers have repeated the same pattern: They have used central-government authority to impose a new vision on society with little input from citizens.

The UN-sponsored Bonn Conference of 2001 established the political foundations of the Afghan republic, reinstating the 1964 Constitution as the interim basic law and selecting Hamid Karzai as the interim political leader. That constitution was the product of Afghanistan's experiment with constitutional democracy under King Muhammad Zahir Shah (1933–73). Although it had democratic elements, it was an authoritarian document designed merely to provide citizens some breathing room. It featured a king and a prime minister. Modifications made in Bonn fused the powers of the monarch and premier into a very powerful president.

Most at Bonn believed the old constitution to be a source of much-needed continuity during a period of instability [3]. Some factions of the Northern Alliance (one of four Afghan groups to participate at Bonn),

however, resisted and asked for a more decentralized system to accommodate Afghanistan's diverse ethnic makeup. But the old unitary system was alluring to the Afghan leaders as well as to the international community. The newly appointed interim-president, Hamid Karzai, and those around him preferred a system of strong control because it allowed Karzai to concentrate his power vis-à-vis potential rivals. Similarly, the United States preferred such a system because it cultivated unity of command, making it easier to monitor its investments in Afghanistan and to coordinate with the new government.

In 2004, a Constitutional Loya Jirga (Grand Council) promulgated a new basic law that departed from the 1964 Constitution most significantly in calling for a democratically elected president. The 2004 Constitution not only reinstated an old system of government, but it also resurrected the old administrative regulations governing public finance, the bureaucracy, the police, and other key elements of a functioning state. Many of these regulations had been strongly influenced by the Soviet Union, whose own attempts at institution-building in Afghanistan began in the 1950s and were not democratic. These top-down rules, which went mostly unnoticed by the international community, also severely limited the state's ability to project power outside the capital.

Democratic development was also hindered by the country's electoral law, which used the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system with provincial, rather than district, multimember constituencies to elect members of parliament. This system was chosen in part to blunt the strength of the *mujahideen*, who, it was widely feared, might resist submitting to a new central authority. In the 2005 elections for the 249-seat parliament (Wolesi Jirga), candidates were banned from affiliating with political parties. Although that regulation was subsequently modified, the SNTV system weakened political parties, thereby stymieing the formation of a healthy opposition to the president and denying citizens an important link to the government and voice in policy development.

Consequently, parliament was much weaker than the president, who possessed vast constitutional powers, including the power to appoint ministers, Supreme Court justices, and all provincial- and district-level officials. Although parliament occasionally emerged as a veto player, rejecting ministerial appointments and even budgets, it never managed to

play a constructive role in Afghan society – largely because viable alternatives to political parties, frozen out of politics as they were, never developed.

The country's first presidential election, won by Interim President Karzai, took place in 2004. Karzai recognized that to build some sense of national unity – and weaken potential rivals – he would need to bring former *mujahideen* commanders into the government, so he used his extensive appointment powers to give them important positions: Ismail Khan was named governor of Herat Province and then minister of energy and water, a position he held from 2005 to 2013; Atta Muhammad Nur, a Northern Alliance commander, was appointed governor of Balkh Province in northern Afghanistan, a position he held from 2004 to 2018, when he was ousted by President Ghani; Gul Agha Sherzai, a commander from the south, became governor of Kandahar Province and then was moved by Karzai to rule Nangahar Province from 2003 to 2013; and Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek general from the north, was appointed deputy defense minister in 2001 but was removed in 2008 after allegedly kidnapping and torturing a political rival. Ashraf Ghani brought Dostum back as his vice-president (2013–20).

Many of these figures had risen to prominence from their performance on the battlefield and had reputations for violence. Yet a number of them managed to generate higher levels of development in the regions that they controlled than were seen elsewhere, partly by eschewing the formal rules in order to get things done [4]. Because the “warlord governors” hailed from the regions that they ruled and had a connection to the people there, they often were more dedicated to their provinces and communities than were other appointees who rotated from province to province. Many of the latter developed reputations for extreme corruption, as they tended to siphon off whatever they could before moving on to their next assignment [5]. That said, corruption was a problem among all governors in Afghanistan, not just the rotating ones. Yet despite the corruption of the warlord governors, their success in delivering public goods for their communities is one indication of how a decentralized system would have given the country a chance for better incentives – based in local preferences – to take root.

For most of Afghanistan's modern history, leaders used state institutions to engineer political outcomes rather than to govern the highly diverse country. The post-2001 period was, in that regard, very similar to the past. During the early days after the fall of the Taliban government in 2001, there was a groundswell of support for the international effort and the United States in Afghanistan. The hope for democracy was even greater: After two decades of fighting, citizens were no longer content being subject to a distant government in Kabul. In the end, however, Afghans were served a stale set of institutions that concentrated power in the center, weakened the role of political parties, denied the people a say in who governed them at the local level, and generated enormous obstacles to organizing meaningful political opposition. In short, the new Afghan government and the international community had revived the rotten political system of the authoritarian era and simply slapped a veneer of democracy on it. Although there were civil society organizations supported by the international community on the ground, few made a direct impact on policy, especially not those outside the capital.

The International Effort

The international community's strategy in Afghanistan centered on consolidating a Weberian state, and this rested on the belief that outsiders could help the new government to achieve a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence [6]. To do so, the United States and NATO made a set of assumptions about the way political order should be established.

The first assumption was that unity of command under a centralized government would produce an effective state. According to Weberian ideals, the Afghan state's lack of a monopoly on violence was the fundamental root of its problems. Despite the country's ethnic diversities and the fact that the regions had for years been governing themselves in the absence of an effective state, there was no effort to reform the highly centralized system that had been a source of Afghan instability for generations.

Although the United States promised that decisions about the constitution would be left up to Afghans, it signaled its preference for a centralized presidency. When pressed about the need for a weaker executive, such as a prime minister, or greater decentralization of

authority, U.S. ambassador Robert Finn said that “Afghanistan needed a strong president given all the vectors of power.” When pressed by other ambassadors on the matter, Finn claimed that replacing a strong president with a weaker prime minister “would only lead to endless crises of power” [7]. Thus the United States looked unfavorably upon a parliamentary system led by strong parties, or a decentralized system led by strong provinces, as such a system would threaten efforts to consolidate the state.

Just as Karzai had allowed his governors to work around the formal rules of the game, international donors quickly began to build parallel structures to get around the lethargic and dysfunctional governance structures that they had helped to put in place. For example, the U.S. military created Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that operated as parallel provincial governorates from 2003 to 2013. PRTs worked closely with the NATO military operations in each district to channel development projects to the provinces. Provincial and district governors had no say in decisions about resource allocation, nor did citizens. NATO worked with a multitude of international NGOs and contractors to implement development projects, which were often in conflict with the military operations conducted in these regions, ostensibly on behalf of the government [8]. The second assumption was that international aid, through the provision of public goods, could win hearts and minds and thus allegiance to the state. To this end, donors poured billions of dollars into infrastructure, institution-building, and community-development projects. There is little solid evidence that these efforts worked, although Afghans clearly understood that the aid was being provided by foreigners and not their own government [9]. Moreover, the provision of aid, rather than leading to greater inclusion, gave rise to a state bureaucracy and myriad ministries, but granted no formal role for citizens to oversee what was happening.

Donor efforts were undermining governance and stability in communities. For example, the World Bank–funded National Solidarity Program, one of the largest and most celebrated aid programs in Afghanistan, aimed to build local-governance structures across the country in order to sideline the informal traditional structures that were already in place and to channel donor aid to communities. In the mid-2000s, when I first looked at the program, it was promising to build social

capital and reconnect Afghans to their government by creating more than thirty-thousand Community Development Councils. Through ostensibly participatory processes, these councils would decide on community priorities and then receive large block grants to solve the problems that citizens identified. My research found that communities with these councils were more likely to have disputes and less likely to be able to solve them than were those without the councils [10]. The World Bank's own evaluation of the program found that governance outcomes in communities with the councils were worse than in those without them [11]. They were ineffective because they fostered corruption and created parallel processes of decisionmaking that undermined longstanding social norms about community governance. Yet over years, donors pumped more than US\$2 billion into the project.

The third problematic assumption was that state-building and counterterrorism were compatible goals that could be achieved simultaneously. Yet even as the international community preached human rights and self-determination, thousands of Afghans in the south and east were being subjected to night raids by U.S. forces and NATO-supported militias [12]. The carelessness of these campaigns laid bare the chasm between the rhetoric of democracy and the reality that Afghans faced [13]. Moreover, although the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction detailed the immense corruption in U.S. government programs – both military and civilian – the United States did not change course or significantly reduce aid. And as the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated over the last ten years, it became impossible for the United States and other foreign donors to monitor their work in the country. Not surprisingly, then, U.S. funds sometimes ended up in the wrong hands. To many Afghans, what at first seemed to be incompetence started to look intentional.

A final assumption common among both the international community and many Afghan authorities was that Afghanistan's traditional decentralized political order, rich in customary governance and tradition, was anathema to the normative underpinnings of a modern state, such as gender equality and formal democracy. At the community level, Afghanistan maintained a robust system of informal governance that provided a range of public goods and services, and – most importantly –

a forum for communities to deliberate on issues of common concern. Most typically, these were organizations rooted in custom, such as *shura* or *jirga* (community councils), and led by community leaders known as *maliks*, *arbabs*, or *wakils* [14].

Through decades of war, customary authority proved strong and resilient, reinventing itself rather than withering away [15]. In villages across the country, communities began to demand more of their customary leaders, who in turn adapted to meet citizen demands. Trust in customary authorities was highest, and surpassed trust in other authorities in the country, at the apogee of U.S. state-building efforts [16]. In Herat Province in 2007, for example, I found a community that was electing its traditional leaders via secret ballot. This was ironic given that after 2001, citizens were never granted the opportunity to elect their formal local leaders, who were all appointed by Kabul. I even found women who had climbed the ranks of traditional authority structures. Yet rather than create space for these customary bodies that were actually engaging in democratic practices, the international community instead intentionally sought to undermine customary authority – for example, with the creation of the National Solidarity Program – to allow for greater state control over society.

Land reform is another example. Donor programs sought to help Afghans obtain legal titles. When offered the opportunity to do so, however, few Afghans took it because the government had not promised meaningful reform of property governance, which was so bad that for some, even the Taliban was an improvement [17]. The vast majority of Afghans held customary legal titles and were unwilling to trade them in for deeds backed by a state that they did not trust.

The country's recently resurrected formal bureaucratic structures were inherently dysfunctional, as they had been designed for authoritarian rule. For example, the public-finance system gave provinces and districts almost no say in spending decisions. Instead, these decisions were all made in Kabul by distant authorities who were not accountable to citizens at the local level. Moreover, the budgetary system – a relic of the Soviet era – was not working. Donors therefore spent significant resources trying to fix it. I saw Western consulting companies get paid millions of dollars to train Afghans on its implementation. But no amount of technical

assistance could have made a system based on a discredited central-planning model work effectively [18]. While conducting research in Afghanistan, I met people who were deeply disgruntled about foreign aid, but felt that the money was not theirs and that they therefore had only a limited right to complain about corruption or malfeasance. It was as if donors had created a parallel universe in order to rebuild Afghanistan that had little to do with the people of the country. Project planning happened in Washington and Kabul, and funds trickled to the local level through often corrupt webs of contractors and NGOs that were accountable to their headquarters and not to the people. Once again, donors had created a rentier state in Afghanistan.

The Isolated Ghani Presidency

By 2014, the Afghan state had almost no legitimacy, and violence blanketed the country as a resurgent Taliban gained ground. President Karzai left office that year at the end of his second term, and U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan came to a close, with the United States transitioning to an advice-and-support role for Afghan forces.

The 2014 presidential election was mired in so much corruption that the actual winner still remains unknown. Abdullah Abdullah, a former advisor to the late Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, came in first among eight candidates in the first round on April 5. The results of the June 14 runoff between Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani were not clear, however. U.S. secretary of state John Kerry therefore went to Kabul and brokered an agreement between Ghani and Abdullah: Ghani became president, and Abdullah became chief executive officer, an extraconstitutional position created during the negotiations. The agreement also called for constitutional reform, including the possibility of greater decentralization through the convening of a new Constitutional Loya Jirga, but neither ever happened.

Ghani had campaigned on his technocratic bona fides. He promised to reform the government, strengthen the public sector, and tackle other key challenges. His rule was met with great enthusiasm from Washington, who saw Ghani as someone who could relate to the international donor community and U.S. patrons far better than had Karzai, whose relationship

with the United States had soured over Karzai's dissatisfaction with civilian casualties and U.S. outrage at corruption.

Ghani, together with Clare Lockhart, had founded the Institute for State Effectiveness, a Washington-based NGO, in 2006, and penned *Fixing Failed States* (2008) [19]. The book's guidance, however, is ill-suited to Afghanistan, focusing almost entirely on technical issues such as budgets and procurement while saying little about how to build legitimacy or address people's everyday challenges.

Ghani appointed many women and young people to important ministerial and government positions, impressing the United States and NATO partners and giving young Afghans hope that he would sideline the warlords who had been so prominent in Karzai's government and usher in wider changes. Ghani would disappoint those hopes. For example, although he initially tolerated public protest, when it reached his doorstep he clamped down. Beginning in late 2015, a number of Afghan youth movements formed and, during the next two years, staged protests over various issues, including ethnic discrimination against the Hazara minority. In May 2017, after a truck bomb killed more than 150 people in a Kabul square, an organized rally of frustrated citizens marched toward the presidential palace. When they came face to face with security forces, the protesters were fired upon and at least six of them died [20]. Shortly after, Ghani proclaimed that the demonstrations "harmed public order and the economy" and put restrictions on the freedom of association in apparent violation of the constitution. Many of the young people who had enthusiastically supported the president early on now no longer backed him.

Ghani repeated the mistake of so many Afghan leaders before him who were ultimately chased out of power. He centralized control in order to speedily realize his vision of reform. But by doing so, the president alienated almost everyone around him, including the people. Ghani's tendency toward "overcentralization and micromanagement" severely damaged the Ministry of Finance [21]. His overbearing management style led to increased accusations of corruption and the resignation of key ministry staff.

Rather than strengthening state institutions, Ghani again mimicked his predecessors, creating parallel bodies and decisionmaking

mechanisms to get around the levers of government. For example, he created presidential commissions that answered to him on issues such as procurement. Critics charged that Ghani was wasting time micromanaging decisions that should have belonged to the ministries. Just a week before Kabul fell to the Taliban, Ghani famously convened his National Procurement Commission to grant permission for a dam to be built in Kunduz Province, even though Kunduz by then was no longer under government control [22].

Ghani became increasingly paranoid over time, which led him to trust only a select few and kept him always maneuvering to protect his power. This had important consequences. The president, a Pashtun, was accused of ethnocentrism. In 2017, a leaked memo from inside the presidential administration appeared to show government jobs being awarded expressly to keep control in the hands of Pashtuns. This was viewed as evidence that a narrow “clique” was trying to rule the country [23].

In addition, Ghani saw regional powerbrokers, many of whom belonged to ethnic minorities in the north, as an obstacle to his conception of a modern state and a threat to his technocratic ambitions. He therefore set out to weaken them soon after he became president. Ghani’s focus on consolidating power over Northern Alliance leaders by removing the Karzai-appointed warlord governors, whom Ghani perceived as rivals, worsened a security situation in the north that had begun to unravel as soon as he came to power in 2014. In 2017, Ghani fired Balkh Province governor Atta Mohammad Nur, which almost caused an armed standoff between the government and local commanders. Ghani replaced these leaders with loyalists, including many Pashtuns from the south and the east whom he installed in the north, often sparking protests and violence.

When Ghani first took office, he recruited talent from the country’s new, educated generation. But as his rule grew more authoritarian, many of them resigned. During his final years in power, the embattled president limited his inner circle to only two advisors, chief of staff Fazel Fazly and national-security advisor Hamdullah Mohib. Together they were known as the “Republic of Three.”

In these later years, Ghani focused far more time and attention on subduing the *mujahideen* commanders who opposed him than he did

either on governing or on fighting the Taliban. Ghani did eventually succeed in defanging his foes. And this, ironically, was his undoing, as the commanders and warlord governors were his strongest source of protection against the Taliban offensive. Thus, as they became weaker, more districts in the north fell to Taliban forces. By early 2021, the government had uncontested control of just 30 percent of Afghan territory. From May to August 2021, district after district fell to the Taliban, many without a fight.

Taliban 2.0? The New Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

There are many questions about how the Taliban will govern Afghanistan in the months and years ahead. The Taliban leaders themselves are still figuring this out, as they too seemed shocked by the rapid collapse of the Ghani government.

The Taliban offensive was so effective in part because its messaging was crystal clear: It understood the people's grievances. When Taliban forces seized control of provincial capitals, their commanders took videos of themselves sitting in the lavish palaces of *ancien régime* warlords. Upon taking the presidential palace in Kabul, the Taliban commanders posed in front of Ghani's expensive gym equipment. Outsiders largely saw these videos as proof of the Taliban's backwardness. But to many Afghans, the footage exposed the gulf between the government and the people.

The Taliban took control of Kabul on August 15, but it would take three more weeks for them to form an interim government. They appointed Mullah Hassan Akhund as interim prime minister and also named two deputy prime ministers, Mullah Abdula Ghani Baradar (who had led the Taliban's political office in Doha) and Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi (a member of the Doha negotiating team). The movement's spiritual leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, would continue as the Amir al-Mominin (commander of the faithful).

While the Taliban remained unified as an insurgency, there is increasing tension between the groups that led negotiations in Doha under Baradar, who seem to be more willing to work with the international community, and more hardline factions under the leadership of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the interim interior minister. Haqqani led the eponymous

Haqqani Network, which launched some of the most brutal terrorist attacks against Afghan civilians, the ANDSF, and NATO forces over the past twenty years. The Taliban seems uninterested in moderating its image for international audiences, as twenty of the regime's 33 officials are on the UN sanctions list [24].

While many Northern Alliance leaders fled the country, Ahmad Massoud, the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, cobbled together the National Resistance Front from his home base in the Panjshir Valley. As it became clear that his forces were losing badly, Massoud tried to negotiate with the Taliban, asking for positions in several ministries and for a decentralized government in which the provinces would have a say in who ruled them. The Taliban rejected these demands, and he soon fled to neighboring Tajikistan, where he remains today.

The Taliban have not consolidated their rule and, for now, are doing things differently from when they last held power (1996–2001). They have not banned women from public life. They are allowing elementary schools for girls to remain open, although they have closed secondary schools and universities to women, a measure the regime says is temporary. They have not required women to wear a *burqa*, nor have they insisted that women travel with a male companion (*mahram*). They also have not banned music or required men to wear beards.

Currently the only internal opposition to Taliban rule is coming from the Islamic State–Khorasan (IS-K), which staged a suicide blast at the Kabul airport during the height of the evacuation, killing thirteen U.S. soldiers and at least 170 civilians trying to flee the country. Dozens of former ANDSF officials once loyal to the government have proclaimed allegiance to IS-K, as it is the only source of opposition to the Taliban.

The Taliban now hold the keys to one of the most centralized governments in the world. As an authoritarian movement, they have no desire to decentralize authority to regions or to allow meaningful opposition. The Taliban have long said that they believe that democracy, as it is implemented and promoted by the United States, is not in line with Islam.

The Taliban leadership seems quite willing to maintain the large government that it inherited from the fallen republic, including most ministries (except for the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which was

incorporated into the resurrected Ministry for the Prevention Vice and Propagation of Virtue). This stands in contrast to some of the Taliban's more minimalist views of government that emerged during its two decades in exile and is a departure from their previous time in power. They are even bargaining with the United States for aid and recognition in return for a more inclusive government. Although the government has some appointees in place, it has no clear decisionmaking hierarchy. The Taliban have yet to decide how they will navigate within the structures they inherited. Thus, enormous uncertainty looms over the country.

The Roots of Collapse

Diagnosing what went wrong in Afghanistan is important not only to understand the country's future trajectory but also to prevent the same foreign-policy mistakes from happening again. Clearly, the government of Afghanistan was deeply corrupt. But that corruption was not rooted in Afghan society or culture. Rather it was incentivized by the rules governing society combined with the absurd amount of money being pumped into an economy that could hardly absorb such sums. By the time the Afghan republic disappeared, almost 80 percent of the government's budget came from the United States, and nearly 40 percent of the country's GDP from foreign aid.

The United States had no clear strategy in Afghanistan. One constant, however, was the billions of dollars in aid that it poured into the country to keep the government afloat. Yet that huge investment was not subject to monitoring or meaningful constraints on how it was used, and this contributed to corruption and ultimately state collapse. Rather than develop a new approach, the United States seemed to bank on resources alone sustaining a government and a military force.

When the republic fell to the Taliban, the United States immediately stopped this aid, devastating the Afghan economy. Afghanistan is now suffering a banking crisis and a humanitarian disaster, as the new regime has stopped paying hundreds of thousands of government employees and famine is sweeping the country. As of this writing in December 2021, no country has recognized the Taliban government.

Corruption undermined the Afghan republic. But that was only possible because the central government was completely unaccountable to

society. It was beholden only to international donors and therefore lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Money cannot win hearts and minds. Gaining trust in Afghanistan did not require vast resources, complicated plans, and sophisticated military strategies. It required treating people with dignity and giving them a role to play as citizens. The U.S.-led state-building effort prioritized strengthening state capacity but did not bother establishing effective constraints on state power. Constraints are the key to accountability. The Afghan people never had a real say over who ruled them or how. The U.S. adventure in Afghanistan repeated the mistakes of so many of the country's earlier overseers, who sought to rule from the center without making society a key pillar of the state. The tragedy is that Afghans were largely left as onlookers, never granted a genuine chance to put their country on a better course, and the future appears as grim as it does familiar.

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WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN; RIGHTS AND REALITIES

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ABSTRACT: *This paper focuses on the women rights in Afghanistan after the fall of America in August 2021. The basic rights of Women are confiscated by the Taliban regime and their survival is at risk in this Islamic state. The basic argument in this paper is Afghan women are stuck between the abuse of the Taliban state and action of the international community which is pushing Afghan government to minimize the desperation of the Afghan women. Taliban government is depriving women from jobs in education sector. Workplaces are segregated and even what kind of mobile phones women must use if they are working declared by the organizations. I argued that Afghan government is hiding the actual situation in Afghanistan by circulation the fake news on international media that women can continue their jobs and continue their educational activities in a usual manner in Afghanistan. Women are becoming virtual prisoners in their homes and Taliban is taking basic rights of the half of its population (Women). The reports of human rights watch, the interviews of human rights activities are the source data of argument in this paper. The interviews common Afghan women who are facing problems in their daily life and interviews of working women provides the picture of insecurities in general and workplaces. This paper is also based on information of the Newspapers and digital media. In the end the efforts of NGO funded by international community will also highlight.*

KEYWORDS: *Taliban, Hijab, Mahram, Ghazni,*

Introduction

American troops left Afghanistan after 20 years of its occupation. After declaring this all men who shared hands in hands are happy with the

transfer of power to Taliban. Women who comprised half of the Afghan population were not seen anywhere. How this take over conveys the true idea of representation? With the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the nightmare has started for Afghan women. 20 years back when American took over, Laura Bush, the first lady launched the idea, “to fight for the dignity of Afghan women.” Through this agenda women got education, right to work and participate in the public sphere. Women rights faced many bumpy strikes in Afghanistan. Government introduced many developments program during 1960. Women were allowed to travel freely. They could enter their homes with strangers and able to make choice of their education and work life. Girl scout scheme was introduced during 1970 but it disappeared as Taliban took over in 1990. Most of the racial form of Islamic regime was imposed by Taliban. Human rights especially women right were brutally violated.

In 2001 Taliban issued an order to ban the women who drive cars and women were harassed as they publicly appear. Women were restricted to wear full clothes especially the socks. Those women who wore black gloves and socks were beaten and public with AK47 and sent them to home to wear white socks which were less visible in public. The situation changed after American occupation. Although this came under the western mission of civilizing the uncivilized people. Women participation in the public life of Afghanistan was visibly seen in the 2005 when Khotal Mohammadzadi became the first women general in Afghan national army and Malalai Joye became woman parliamentarian in the national assembly and Azra Jafri became the country mayor in 2009. In 2008 35% of girls were enrolled in the schools but this led to the acid attacks on women by Taliban in many provinces of Afghanistan. But women got something out of it in all these years. (Masoma, 2002)

All rights of getting education, to move freely, to do their jobs and get equal share in the state mechanism is about to ruined by the Islamic imposition of *Amar bil Ma,aruf wa nahian un Munkir*. The state orders of wearing Hijab on all public places is implemented by zeal and zest. Women in Afghanistan are facing violence, work harassment, restriction on public mobility. The liberalism which is the complete agenda of modernity not required in the country like Afghanistan. Women hold a press conference recently in Kabul. The participants were parliamentarian,

Director of Afghan women network (1996), representative of Afghan women educational center (1991) and group of educated Afghan women was there. These women demanded “an immediate and permanent killing of civilians, sexual slavery of women, practice of forced marriages” and the women organizations demanded the development and empowerment of women. Women leaders in Afghanistan will not remain invisible. The women asserted that there must be gender equality in the peace negotiation otherwise it will bring disasters results in Afghanistan. Taliban policies hammering the women rights are:

Taliban put ban on the primary and secondary education of women.

Higher education and its curriculum are more focused towards religious studies.

Gender segregation on workplaces.

Women are not allowed to use their cell phones.

Women must wear hijab on all public places. (The Taliban,s war on Women, 2021)

The future looks very dark, narrated by a woman who worked in a government organization. I have seen many dreams to get my master’s degree and to work for the betterment of my family. But at that time, Taliban do not allowed girls to finish their high schools. Already many of the girls left their schools due to public announcement of the Taliban commandos that women should not leave their houses without guardian and there is no need to go to schools and jobs. Taliban dismantled police force in the ministry of women affair and created more insecurity. They are targeting those Afghan women who were working in foreign organizations and previous government. Most of the women are facing serious mental health conditions like fear, anxiety, hopelessness, insomnia, and sense of loss. (Dupree, 2022)

Women in Afghanistan are a soft target to kill. According to Afghanistan security and defense department, 20 international militant groups are present in Afghanistan and most of them are attached only on soft targets through which they are gaining their target of fear and insecurity. In 2020 many of the human rights activities, parliamentarian and negotiators were attached including Fawzia Koofi but she survived, and she participated in the peace talks of Doha. In American regime women got more training skills and expertise and Palwasha Hussain

indicated that women in Afghanistan have more experience than 1990, and there is more awareness about women rights. This awareness is not limit among Elite classes now the women are more aware on grass root levels. They are striving for their right especially the right to education and freedom of mobility. Taliban recent decree is to cover the faces of women in public places and even on media, “The women must wear chador(head to toe Burqa) , it is traditional and respectful” Afghan supreme leader Hibatullah said, in order to avoid provocation . Women have no important work outside the home its better to stay in home, he further added. When Afghan interior minister was interviewed by Christian Amanpour of CNN about imposing ban on women to go outside their home then he replied that “we keep naughty women at homes”. It is very controversial to define naughty women in the words of interior minister. After explaining the naughty women those who are controlled by the outsiders. He further cleared that Taliban want the Islamic law as the soul of the government as “national, cultural and traditional principles”. According to this decree if women should not cover their faces outside the home, their close relatives and father could be imprisoned or fired from the government jobs. Daud Naji, who is former government official wrote on twitter, Taliban had introduced such Hijab which is not suitable for working in offices and in public fields. The official of the Taliban announced that women in Afghanistan are expected to stay in homes and if they want to go out, they must use loose clothing and Burqa is preferably good for them. Taliban has imposed the ritual to wear hijab by women. It abolished women identity, the issue is not veil but the elimination of women from public sphere. (George, 2021)

Nahid Farid, former parliamentarian comments, Veil is symbol of gender apartheid. Veil is not the end, now Taliban has a strict and larger plan to subjugate women in Afghanistan like in March a woman can board in the plan only when she has the company of a male. The dress code of female after the age of 14 also introduced in the female educational institutions and ministry of education issued a statement for the dress-code, promotion of virtue and prevention of vice”. In Kabul Taliban seem to be more tolerant but in other cities they become violent in the case of dress code. The guardian (Mahram) is required for the movement in public. Those women who have the guardian home they can travel through

transport. During the Afghan crisis many of the male migrated to Iran and other neighboring countries. Now many of women who do not have mahram in their homes, their public movement is restricted. In the health department where female and both are working Taliban has issues certain restriction like; the dress of the nurses, to work separately from male health worker, to talk with the male in angry tone and not to evoke sexual desires in them. In the recent announcement all female journalist and anchor person on TV must wear veil or hijab on TV screens. This decree is created insecurity among women either this decree is only for TV, or they are going to lose their jobs soon. The ministry of Voice and Virtue clearly conveyed that it is a final verdict and there is no room for discussion. According to Afghan press most of the women have seen to cover their faces and many of their male colleagues donned face masks to show solidarity with women. In Kabul only 700 female journalists formally working in private TV and radio stations and international federation of journalist announced a march which showed 87% of women journalist are facing discrimination in Afghanistan and 60% of women journalists lost their job under Taliban regime. (Taliban orders Female Afghan TV presenters to cover their faces, 2022)

Taliban have worsened the crisis for women. The women who were in army and police are targeted. In the province of Ghazni, they have to leave the place. The lives of the women activities are in danger. Taliban killed 2 female police officers in Ghazni two days before when the province falls in the hands of Taliban. Taliban has issued orders to those organizations worked for the women rights, not to engaged with human rights, women rights, and other issues. They can only work in the health sector. In the official meetings the Taliban leader do not talk to women. The asked male personnel to convey them, whatever problem women have, don't raise your voices, don't talk to us, write your problems, so we can read them men should not hear women voice." Women are not allowed to get access to technology. Women are not allowed to carry smart phones as it polluted the minds of women. A health worker said that they conveyed if phone is very much necessary than women should keep Nokia phone without any application. Male shoppers and trailers are not allowed to interact with women, and it is conveyed to the women that they should sew their clothes by themselves. Women are allowed for the socialization

outside their houses and this decree is communicated to every mosque. Taliban is not only issuing the orders but checked its implementation. The guards in schools, hospitals and Imam in mosques convey their feedback to Taliban. In health care doctors are scared from female patients. Even in the case of lady doctors, they are not allowed to work in private clinics. Female health workers which were double under American regime, now it is hard to find them out. Every woman patient needs Mahram even in the case of emergency. Male doctors are allowed to ask the condition of women from their guardians. A medical student conveyed if a woman is pregnant and she does not have guardian with her, she would not be able to get treatment in the hospitals. (Harrison, 2021)

In the field of education, Taliban is depriving girls of education. There are 27 girls secondary schools in the 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Teachers are concerned about the girl's attendance, but girls asked that their schools would reopen soon. Girls from 7 to 12 must stay at their homes. The date of the opening of universities is still not clear. Many universities in the different cities are still closed. Only the girls in primary schools are allowed to go to schools but they are worried about their future. Private schools are opened but they are a bit expensive, and parents are not able to pay the fee of their children due to the economic crisis in the country. Teachers did not get their salaries. This crisis also affects the learning abilities of the students as teachers told, many of the students come to schools hungry. Many of the girls do not afford to buy schoolbooks and stationaries. (Taliban Impose gender Segregation at universities in Afghanistan, 2021)

Taliban also changed the curriculum in schools. Religious texts are made compulsory and physical education, sports, civil rights, fine arts, and social studies are removed from the school's curriculum as it is considered unnecessary. Soraya Peykan, a female professor in Kabul university gave an interview to international media and said that Taliban deliberately confiscate the basic rights of the women and they want to use Afghan women as bargaining chip for the better negotiation to international community but Afghan conflict is no longer receiving the international spotlight. (www.ohchr.org, 2021)

All universities in Ghazni province are closed. Many of the female students studying medical are at their homes, and they do not know

what happened in future. Primary and secondary schools are opened but girls' attendance in these schools are very low after the orders of Taliban to stay women in their homes. Private schools in Afghanistan are also opened but parents are not able to send their children at schools due to the financial crisis in the country. Taliban took the control of many academic institutions that's why students are very much scared. The teacher said that we were very afraid of Taliban in the beginning but now we are used to it.

The working women have to face different kinds of difficulties as they are on low profile now. Preventing women from will increase the economic issues in families as Afghan women are working in government institutions, health care, education and even in state capacity. Former senior judge Fawizia Amini gave an interview to Hard Talk BBC in which she said , The Taliban had institutionalized discrimination again Afghan women and they are denying our fundamental rights. Former women police officer Zala Zazia said, the international community put pressure on Taliban to ensure the rights of women in Afghanistan and they must do everything to for the women participation in Taliban government. The Taliban cannot ignore the half of the population of Afghanistan. The women who are doing their business must shift it to some male. Women are not allowed to go outside without their father, brothers, and husband. They are not allowed to go outside with their friends. Women are missing their professions, their work, and their freedom as they are so much isolated in the society under Taliban. The violence against women and girls is increasing in Afghanistan. For the last twenty years under the sway of American control women right organization built up a courtyard support system. Now it has totally collapse. Those who were involved in women right activities are receiving threats. There were 27 women safe houses in working conditions but now few are working but under extreme pressure. Girls are forced to marriage even before the age of 16 now. The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan is at on highest peak especially for those who are losing their families. Due to huger large families are adopting patriarchal structure to offer their daughter into marriage and receiving something in return. (Koofi, 2022)

Women who led their household and do not have any male member receiving the demand of a bride for the Taliban fighters and they are able

to get good social status in return. The right to work is subjugated since Taliban got power. The definition of the work is again interpreted by Taliban. Those women who are journalist and women who are working on Radio and TV station are out of job now. Women entrepreneurs who are doing their work in the market forced to shut their business. Women lost their freedom of expression. A protest session was led in Kabul in the recent past demanding the basic rights of women. Financial bottle neck and insecurity after Taliban regime reached 65%. Those who demonstrate in this procession were torture, imprisoned and murder. This led to poor mental health and traumas in life of many Afghan women, and they are not providing them the physiological help to come out of it. The young girls who are victims of these incident are not able to survive. Those girls who are married at the age of 14 and 16 are not able to bear the burden of childbirth and the mortality rate is increasing. It is sticking to 638 cases per million in case of still births in 2020 and it is highest in the world. In Afghanistan 4 out 10 children die before their first birthday. (Reid, 2021)

In this social set up women are desperately in need of their basic human rights. All international organization, NGO, and UN should pressurize Taliban to at least meet the international standards of human rights in Afghanistan. Donor countries must insure the rights of girls and women. This humanitarian crisis will lead towards the collapse of basic right in Afghan society. Mostly the institutions of human rights, women protection and women empowerment like human rights commission, the ministry of women affairs and civil society organization are abolished by Taliban. In fact, the basic right to choose, express, to work and move are banished, and women are not able to take part in the public life, but women are not ready to give up as it is expressed by female activist Zohra Zaheer. The provincial women network (PWN) is a key partner in the gender equality in work since 2015 and it is financed by the Dutch Ministry of foreign affairs in Afghanistan recently reviewed that this organization need the support of international community and donor's countries to safeguard the rights of Afghan women. In every province of Afghanistan this network is tackling violence against women and boosting the participation of women in very sphere of Afghan life. As in the Herat province government has announced that women should stay inside their homes, but women are still trying to be organized themselves. The funds

for the outdoor activities are not sufficient. In the province of Qandahar, individual women are helping each other, I am not allowed to support the cases of violence against women, abused women are not able to go anywhere. Currently they do not have legal support. In this scenario we are doing what we can do best possible, added by the woman activist. In Daikundi, the Central Afghanistan, the situation is better as they said, we feel free as compared to the other provinces of Afghanistan. Women have right to move and speak freely. All human rights organization are facing the problems of lack of funds even the program of PWN is on the verge of collapse although it must be end in 2024. Director Marco Savio of Cordaid Afghanistan said, “we want to use very opportunity big or small to keep alive our women empowering activities to support Afghan women in these hard times”. They are in all places in Afghanistan if they disappear it would be a blow for woman and overall, for civil society. If they shut down once than it would have been very difficult to restore, he added. In Paktya, another province of Afghanistan one women said that we have achieved a lot in the past 20 years. Now we need the support of international organizations and donors to save all these achievements, said Najla Ayoubi, former judge, and chief of coalition program. (Jamshaidi, 2022)

The high representatives of European Union and G7 ministers expressed their strongest opposition against the Taliban restrictions in Afghanistan especially for closing girls’ schools and abolishing women rights. Human rights watch is arguing people mostly diplomats to show their support in favor of women rights in Afghanistan. Taliban assured international law to respect the women rights in Afghanistan and they will provide them humanitarian assistance including education and health care. But this task will not be necessarily fulfilled by the religious groups in Afghanistan. Under international law Afghanistan ratifies the provisions of CEDAW (the convention on the eliminations of all kinds of discrimination against women 2003. Donors should put political pressure and monitor it during the time of their aids timeline to fulfill the targets of women rights. Through this they can insure equality in this region.

Recommendations:

Women should be given the right to educate themselves. All schools,

colleges and universities must reopen with the permission that women can continue their education.

Women can move freely in the society in the dress which they like.

Women should take part in all kinds of work and employment.

Women seats in all institution will reinstate and women ministry should be reactivated.

The harassment of Taliban on all level must be stop immediately.

The condition of guardian especially for health facility must be removed.

Donors can play their role in such conditions:

Support for the livelihood of the women especially create opportunities for the women of employment for women.

Community based education programs must be introduced by the NGO, s and international donor's agencies.

Mental health services for the women in Afghanistan for those who are really in need of these services.

Protection from the gender-based violence and discrimination.

Support for the women who are facing persecution in and outside Afghanistan.

Conclusion

A new chapter of women resistance is emerging in Afghanistan by women and the members of the civil society who are protesting the Taliban regime. Women aren't quiet now they were 20 years back. They know their rights and they are calling for them. Women are comprised the half of the population of Afghanistan, and it is very difficult for Taliban government to ignore them. Taliban must review all the orders issued for the restrictions and stop this fake propaganda that women freedom is the agenda of the west. It is for the better future of Afghanistan is that women should participate in the public life, she must get education, she has the freedom to express and move freely in the society. She can work for her and the future of the family. It is not the agenda of west. It is agenda of a human society.

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RUSSIAN PRIORITIES IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER 9/11: TRANSITION FROM COOPERATION WITH THE WEST TO RESISTANCE⁶

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Abstract: *The article examines the evolution of Russia's foreign policy in Afghanistan over the past 20 years after the events of 9/11 in New York. It is noted that the initially constructive cooperation between Russia and Western countries to resolve the situation in Afghanistan gradually turned into a kind of rivalry and clash of interests. The priority directions of Russia's foreign policy approaches in Afghanistan, as well as the main challenges and threats from this country, have been studied.*

B.Buzan and O.Wæver believe that Russia is the dominant power in the post-Soviet Regional Security Complex, which links several subcomplexes of this RSC. The use by Russian officials of the term “near abroad” in relation to the former Soviet republics demonstrates the centring of the RSC on the Russian Federation. The preservation of the status of a great power by Russia depends on keeping the CIS countries in its sphere of influence, which dictates the vigorous activity of the Russian leadership within these limits. Russia has constantly pursued an active foreign policy towards Afghanistan⁷, since it considered its location near the Central Asian region, which it considered to be its “strategic soft underbelly”⁸. It was interested in maintaining the “buffer status” of Afghanistan, dividing the spheres of influence of the USSR, and then Russia and the West. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia, as a result of the reduction of its military-political and financial capabilities, for some

⁶This article was initially published in the Edited volume by Amina Khan “Evolving Situation in Afghanistan: International and Regional Perspectives”, Center for Afghanistan, Middle East and Africa at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, June 2022.

⁷ Buzan B. and Waever O. Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. – P.397-439.

⁸ Skalamera M. Russia's Lasting Influence in Central Asia, *Survival*, 59:6, 123-142, 2017. DOI:10.1080/00396338.2017.1399731

time did not pay sufficient attention to the development of the situation in Afghanistan.

Russia and Afghanistan in 1990s and 2000s: rupture and revival of relations

In 1992, after the termination of financial and military-technical support from the Russian Federation to the government of M. Najibullah, power in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) passed to a political group headed by B.Rabbani and A.Massoud. However, after the capture of the capital Kabul by the Taliban in 1996, the Russian Federation re-established cooperation with the leaders of the Northern Alliance, B.Rabbani and A.Massoud, in order to keep the north of the country out of the control of the Taliban⁹. The interests of the Russian Federation at that time were limited to the goals of maintaining security and stability in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the countries of Central Asia, since the leadership of the Russian Federation was afraid of possible Taliban aggression in the countries of the region and the spread among their population of ideas of fundamentalism, religious extremism and terrorism. It is noteworthy that after the start of the US and NATO operation in Afghanistan in October 2001, Russia became one of the first countries in the world to support these actions¹⁰. This can be explained by several factors.

1. Expectation of a successful confrontation and expulsion of representatives of various terrorist groups from the territories of the IRA bordering the Central Asian region. The events in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and in the Sariosiyo and Uzun regions of Uzbekistan in 2000 clearly demonstrated the relevance of the threat of terrorist groups' infiltration from the territory of Afghanistan.

2. The possibility of destroying the training camps for terrorists from the North Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation in order to ensure the stability and security of these subjects of the federation. According to the UN, Chechen illegal armed groups had close ties with the Taliban and

⁹ Dobbins J. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan // February 26, 2009. www.rand.org

¹⁰ Hill F. The United States and Russia in Central Asia: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran // August 15, 2002. <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-united-states-and-russia-in-central-asia-uzbekistan-tajikistan-afghanistan-pakistan-and-iran/>

al-Qaeda units in Afghanistan; Chechen terrorist groups received financial assistance and had the opportunity to train new fighters on Afghan territory¹¹.

3. Interest in strengthening the positions of the representatives of the Northern Alliance, with whom Moscow unofficially maintained contacts in order to limit the spread of the influence of the Taliban in the regions of the country bordering the republics of Central Asia.

4. Expanding cooperation with the US and the West in bilateral and multilateral formats. V. Putin, who took office as President of the Russian Federation in 2000, at that time considered it expedient to develop relations and establish multifaceted cooperation with the West.

At the first stages, the Russian Federation did not express dissatisfaction with the American military presence in the countries of Central Asia. Perhaps the leadership of the Russian Federation considered it inappropriate to prevent the creation of American logistics points in Central Asia, since the benefits of cooperation with the West seemed attractive compared to the prospect of a confrontation with the US and NATO over their military presence in the region.

Let us consider the measures taken by Russia in resolving the situation in Afghanistan. In 2008, Russia and NATO signed an agreement on the transit of non-military goods for the needs of the international coalition through Russian territory¹². In 2009, Russia opened its airspace to US aircraft carrying military supplies for Afghanistan¹³. In August 2012, it was planned to start using the airport in Ulyanovsk as a transshipment point for the return transit of ISAF cargo¹⁴. However, later the parties could not come to a compromise on the conditions and cost of operating this facility. In this regard, the head of the NATO and US

¹¹ Anand Vinod. Export of holy terror to Chechnya from Pakistan and Afghanistan, *Strategic Analysis*, 24:3, 539-551, 2000. DOI: 10.1080/09700160008455231

¹² Weitz R. *Global Security Watch-Russia: A Reference Handbook* // – California: Greenwood, 2010. P.121

¹³ United States-Russia Military Transit Agreement // June 6, 2009. www.whitehouse.gov

¹⁴ Von Twickel N. NATO Afraid Of Russian Snooping At Ulyanovsk? // Atlantic Council, 22 February 2013. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-afraid-of-russian-snooping-at-ulyanovsk/>

representatives said that they do not intend to use the transit point in Ulyanovsk during the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan¹⁵.

By stepping up its participation in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) of goods to Afghanistan, the Russian Federation sought to solve several problems.

Firstly, cooperation within the framework of the transit of goods could smooth out a number of acute issues between the Russian Federation and the West. These include the following: the creation of position points for US missile defense system in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the stabilization of the situation in Syria, the solution of the Iranian nuclear program, the prevention of a new crisis wave in the global economy and overcoming the negative consequences of the 2008 crisis, energy export routes in space CIS and others.

Secondly, the transit of goods through the territory of Russia could bring financial dividends; According to Western media, by the end of 2014, the US military planned to transport approximately 100,000 containers and 50,000 vehicles from Afghanistan, a third of which could be carried out through the NDN¹⁶. The US Department of Defense stated that the transit of one container through this route might cost about 17.5 thousand US dollars¹⁷.

Russia, like other countries of the world, was interested in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan and neutralizing threats to national security due to the military conflict. Participation of the Russian Federation in settling the situation in Afghanistan was diverse. In order to support the IRA government, Russia wrote off the country's debt for a total of \$12 billion¹⁸. For several years, Russian companies have been unsuccessfully negotiating the restoration of 142 facilities created in Afghanistan during the Soviet period. As part of these negotiations with the Afghan side, projects are being discussed for the reconstruction of the Salang Tunnel,

¹⁵ NATO seeks cheaper alternative to Russian transport hub – official // April 2, 2013. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-seeks-cheaper-alternative-to-russian-transport-hub-official/>

¹⁶ Whitlock C. Northern land routes to be crucial in U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan // Washington Post, 05.07.2012

¹⁷ Tynan D. Central Asia: Who's the Big Winner in the NDN Sweepstakes? // EurasiaNet, 07.02.2012. www.eurasianet.org

¹⁸ Chandra V. Russia's Growing Afghan Re-Engagement, *Strategic Analysis*, 35:4, 552-558, 2011. DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2011.576091

hydroelectric power plants in Naghlu, Sarobi and Mahipar worth \$500 million, as well as programs for the construction of wells and irrigation systems, also worth \$500 million¹⁹.

Afghan personnel were trained in various fields of activity, including civilian and military specialists. Thus, from 2005 to 2013, about 3,000 representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia were trained in the Russian Federation as part of a joint program with NATO to train drug police officers²⁰. In addition, Russia considered projects to support the Kabul Polytechnic University, restore and equip auto-mechanical technical schools in Kabul and Khost province, as well as an oil and gas technical school in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif²¹.

The Russian Federation continued to provide military-technical assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan. In 2002-2005 it provided \$200 million worth of gratuitous military technical assistance to the Afghan army. In 2009, together with the Federal Republic of Germany, two helicopters with medical evacuation equipment were handed over to Kabul. At the end of 2010, a gratuitous supply of Russian small arms for the needs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the IRA was carried out, including 20 thousand Kalashnikov assault rifles and 2.5 million cartridges for them²². In May 2011, the Rosoboronexport company and the US Department of Defense signed a contract for the supply of 21 Mi-17V5 military transport helicopters to Afghanistan in the amount of 367.5 million US dollars²³. Russia was supportive of initiatives to expand military-technical cooperation with Afghanistan, so, it intended to give a positive response to the IRA's request for additional supplies of small arms. However, after the imposition of Western sanctions due to the

¹⁹ Nemtsova A. Russia Invades Afghanistan—Again // *Newsweek*, 02.04.2010

²⁰ Malik, Nadeem. "Overview and Prospects for Energy Resources in Afghanistan: Measures for Improvement and Sustainable Development." *The Journal of Energy and Development* 35, no. 1/2 (2009): 141–64. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24812717>

²¹ Menkiszak M. Russia's Afghan Problem: The Russian Federation and the Afghanistan problem since 2001 // The Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 2012. https://aei.pitt.edu/58389/1/prace_38_en_0.pdf

²² Tsygankov A. Russia's Afghanistan Debate, *Problems of Post-Communism*, 60:6, 29-41, 2013. DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216600603

²³ US DoD orders additional Mi-17 helicopters from Rosoboronexport // *Army Technology*, 17 June 2013. <https://www.army-technology.com/news/newsus-dod-orders-additional-mi-17-helicopters-from-rosoboronexport/>

Crimean annexation in 2014 and the situation in the Ukrainian Donbas region, the implementation of these plans was suspended.

NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014: opportunity and challenge for Russia

The participation of the Russian Federation in resolving the situation in the IRA is not limited just to providing transit opportunities for the countries of the international coalition within the framework of the NDN. Considering the withdrawal of the international coalition troops in 2014, Moscow began to intensify its foreign policy activities in the Afghan direction and touch upon the problem of stabilizing Afghanistan within the framework of multilateral cooperation formats (UN, SCO, CSTO).

For a more accurate and complete description of the threats and challenges to the national security of the Russian Federation arising from the ongoing tension in Afghanistan, several factors can be identified.

1. Drug trafficking. According to UN estimates, in 2000s annually from 75 to 80 tons of heroin entered the Russian Federation, the main part comes from Afghanistan²⁴. There were approximately 2 million drug addicts in the country, most of whom use heroin, with more than 100,000 deaths each year²⁵. In connection with these horrendous indicators, Russia called on NATO member countries to fight more actively against drug crops directly on the territory of the IRA. However, the forces of the international coalition feared that the active destruction of such crops would lead to a significant increase in the discontent of the inhabitants of Afghanistan, since the production of drugs is one of the main sources of their livelihood.

To limit the spread of drugs, Russia, together with the CSTO member countries, annually conducted “Channel” joint operations to intercept drugs from the IRA. Afghan officers were trained at the training centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in the city of Domodedovo, Moscow Region. In addition, the government of the Russian Federation

²⁴ World Drug Report 2010 // UNODC, 2010. https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf

²⁵ Kramer John M. Drug Abuse in Russia, Problems of Post-Communism, 58:1, 31-43, 2011. DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216580103

provides financial and technical assistance to the anti-drug services of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

In our opinion, the situation in this area will not change radically in the short term for the following reasons:

- low level of coordination between the activities of law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation and a number of CIS countries in detecting drug trafficking;
- high level of corruption in government and law enforcement structures of certain CIS countries;
- lack of a systemic action plan and a well-established structure to combat the spread of drugs in the Russian Federation.

2. Terrorism. It is known that members of terrorist groups operating in the North Caucasian republics of Russia have contacts with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, are trained and participate in clashes with the forces of the international coalition on the territory of the IRA. Russia feared that if NATO failed and withdrew troops from Afghanistan, then it would face an extremely negative development of the situation with neighbouring countries: the Taliban and other religious extremists, encouraged by success, will begin to spread in all directions, including to the north, overflowing the countries Central Asia, as well as to the west in the direction of the North Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation²⁶. The emergence of sources of instability in individual countries of Central Asia as a result of the actions of terrorist groups can lead to the creation of conflict centres in the border areas of the Russian Federation.

3. Military bases. The presence of US and NATO military forces on the territory of Afghanistan worried Moscow, as it views Central Asia as a “region in which there are privileged interests of Russia”²⁷. Consequently, the presence of other powers in the region limits Moscow's ability to influence the development of the situation in the region. In this aspect, one can consider the Moscow-influenced decision by Kyrgyzstan not to renew the agreement on the operation of the American base in

²⁶ Aliyev Nurlan. How Russia Views Afghanistan Today. // War on the Rocks, 19 October 2020. <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/russias-contemporary-afghan-policy/>

²⁷ Jensen Donald N. Russia and its Neighbors: the Limits of the Kremlin's “Privileged Interests” // Institute of Modern Russia, 2 October 2013. <https://imrussia.org/en/politics/563-russia-and-its-neighbors-the-limits-of-the-kremlins-privileged-interests>

Bishkek and to close the cargo transit centre at the Manas airport on July 11, 2014²⁸.

4. Moscow's cautious approach to the US initiatives of “Greater Central Asia” and “New Silk Road”, which proposed the activization of trade, economic and infrastructural reorientation of the countries of Central Asia to the South Asian region. In view of the fact that a number of Central Asian countries demonstrated interest in the implementation of infrastructure projects (TAPI gas pipeline, CASA-1000 power lines) within the framework of the US New Silk Road concept, Russia, through participation in these projects, sought to some extent control the stages of construction and further operation of these facilities. It is supposed to prevent attempts by the countries of the region to diversify the routes for the supply of energy resources and other goods, thereby reducing dependence on the Russian Federation.

Since Russia did not have effective leverage of influence on the course of events in the IRA, in 2000s it considered the United States and other countries participating in the international coalition forces as priority partners in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. A sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the West could lead to curtailment of cooperation on the Afghan problem. Russia preferred to observe the actions of the government in Afghanistan after the presidential elections in 2014 and the withdrawal of the main part of the international coalition troops, its attempts to keep the situation in the country under control, the activation of the Taliban throughout the Afghan territory, and also to observe the development of events in IRA. Only since 2016, the Russian Federation began to take more active actions on Afghanistan and organized a series of negotiations in Moscow to resolve the Afghan problem with the participation of Pakistan, China, Iran, India and the Central Asian state.

Deterioration of Russia-West relations in Afghanistan

Developments in Syria after 2011 and Ukraine after 2014 considerably undermined cooperation between Russia and the NATO forces in Afghanistan. The increasing mistrust and misunderstanding led

²⁸ Marat E. Kyrgyzstan's Decision To Renounce Manas Transit Center Favors Russia // 26 June 2013 www.cacianalyst.org

to the revival of competition between these powers on the Afghan territory. Against the backdrop of difficult relations with Western countries, Russia tried to become more actively involved in the processes in Afghanistan and demonstrate its influence and capabilities in the region. At the same time, the reduction of the military presence of the US and NATO countries in Afghanistan after 2014 was perceived as a convenient chance to consolidate the Russian presence in Afghanistan.

As the presence of the US and other Western countries in the IRA was reduced, the Russian Federation pushed to strengthen its own military-political presence in the Central Asian region. For the Russian leadership, maintaining and strengthening the military presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is of particular importance, as Russia seeks to strengthen its position mainly in this area, without giving priority to strengthening the economic component of cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. Therefore, in 2012 Russia reached an agreement with Tajikistan to extend the hosting of its military base until 2042²⁹. Kyrgyzstan decided not to prolong the hosting agreement with the NATO base on its Manas airport in 2014³⁰.

Confrontation between Russia-US reached to the extent that Washington concluded that a Russian military intelligence unit secretly offered bounties to Taliban-linked militants for killing coalition forces in Afghanistan – including argeting American troops³¹. However, later US officials acknowledged that these assumptions were not based on specific evidence³². Complete withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 has been a positive development for the Moscow interests in Central Asia.

Upon taking office, Russian President Vladimir Putin adopted a hard line against the Taliban. In March 2000, senior Kremlin officials

²⁹ Kozhevnikov R. Russia, Tajikistan strike outline deal on military base. // Reuters, 17 July 2012. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-tajikistan-russia-base-idUKBRE86G0OV20120717>

³⁰ Dzhuraev S. Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Change: Kyrgyzstan's U-Turns on the U.S. Air Base at Manas Airport, Central Asian Affairs, 8(2), 175-202, 2021. doi: <https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-bja10018>

³¹ Savage Ch. et all. Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S. Troops, Intelligence Says. // The New York Times, 26 June 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/us/politics/russia-afghanistan-bounties.html>

³² Myers M. There may not have been Russian bounties on US troops in Afghanistan after all. // Military Times, 14 April 2021. <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/04/15/there-may-not-have-been-russian-bounties-on-us-troops-in-afghanistan-after-all/>

warned the Taliban that Russia was prepared to conduct airstrikes against Chechen training camps in Afghanistan. In 2003, the Russian Supreme Court designated the Taliban as a terrorist organization banned from operating on Russian soil³³. However, under new circumstances Putin urged the international community to unfreeze Afghanistan's central bank reserves, restore financial aid programs for the country and gradually welcome the Taliban into "the civilized family of nations." Such measures, the Russian leader argued, were necessary to prevent the "disintegration" of Afghanistan. He also said that Russia is moving towards excluding the Taliban from its list of extremist organisations³⁴. However, the activation of internal power struggle between Taliban and some other groups area making the relations between Moscow and Taliban is causing the reconsideration of the Russia's positive approach to the current government in Kabul.

Russia's more active cooperation with the countries of Central Asia and other states neighbouring Afghanistan could increase the effectiveness of Moscow's role in settling the Afghan conflict. In the short term, it is possible that Russia will strive to implement infrastructure projects in the territory of the IRA, for example, it will try to get the opportunity to conduct geological exploration, and subsequently, the extraction of minerals in Afghanistan, especially in the north of the country.

It seems that the Russian Federation has not yet developed a clear strategy in relation to Afghanistan, its policy is dominated not by systemic and strategic decisions, but more often by situational and tactical response to developments in this country. Russia's actions to resolve the Afghan problem largely depend on the level of relations with the United States and other NATO member countries.

It is obvious that building the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in relation to the IRA in close cooperation with the countries of Central Asia on an equal footing with mutual consideration of interests

³³ Simes D. Russia puts Taliban on 'probation' with Central Asia on knife edge. // Nikkei Asia, 26 October 2021. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Russia-puts-Taliban-on-probation-with-Central-Asia-on-knife-edge>

³⁴ Putin says Russia is mulling excluding Taliban from list of extremist groups. // Reuters, 21 October 2021. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-russia-is-mulling-excluding-taliban-list-extremist-groups-2021-10-21/>

is beneficial for all parties. A balance in Russia's cooperation with the United States and the West on the Afghan settlement and interaction with regional countries on the issues of stabilizing Afghanistan can give positive results in the short term.

Conclusion

Russia's Afghanistan policy is closely linked to its interests in Central Asia. The presence of the Western military coalition in Afghanistan was perceived by Russia positively before the degradation its relations with the US and EU. The level of cooperation between Russia and China in Afghanistan is increasing. However, the credibility and long-term nature of this partnership is unclear. At the same time Russia will be cautious of military involvement or financial investments in Afghanistan. Taliban movement's takeover is used to increase the alarmism in Central Asia and to strengthen Russia's military and political presence in the region. Long term confrontation between Russia and the West may bring new complications to Afghanistan. Usage of the Afghan territory in the new great power competition will further complicate the revival of the country and its economy. Without compatible security improvement the expectation of any kind investments into the country might be too risky for many international corporations and financial institutions.

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THE ROLE OF ETHNOCULTURAL TRADITIONS IN THE NEW CENTRAL ASIAN POLITICS

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ABSTRACT: *The fall of the Soviet Union led to the clearest expression of the ethnocultural peculiarities of the territories it controlled or depended on it, and this also applies to those of Central Asia. Although there were particular cultural preservation policies applied already in the Eastern Bloc, the ethno-cultural factor seems to become of vital importance in this historical period for this geographical-political context. This paper wants to trace a limited perspective of how important this aspect is in this portion of the globe, and how it can influence the future of the politics of the actors that determine its existence.*

KEYWORDS: *Central Asia; Ethno-cultural traditions; Politics; Nations; Eurasia*

In the Soviet Union and in the so-called Eastern Bloc there was a paradox, which was that of the development of nationalities and territorial cultures. On the one hand, the Soviet Union promoted cultural difference and the preservation of national peculiarities, on the other hand it implemented a process of homogenization typical of modern forms of statehood. Obviously, this type of contradiction must be conceptualized in its dialecticity, and must be compared with the historical context and the political-strategic options that the decision-makers had to take. In line with the Machiavellian distinction between means and ends³⁵ which has always undergone political mechanics, the relationship between real socialism and the national question has been multifaceted. In very general terms, we can say that the preservation of cultural differences could have been the aim of the politics of the USSR, where the power of the Soviet state and the communist geopolitical sphere which tended to standardize cultures were the means. Even more, this paradox can also be found within the communist doctrine, where (for Lenin and Stalin) the battle for

³⁵ Niccolò Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, in *Opere*, Biblioteca Treccani, Rome 2006, p. 58.

national independence seems to be defined sometimes only as a means for the defeat of bourgeois imperialism. At other times, however, it seems clear that the people, in their Marxian meaning, are such only according to their ethno-cultural characteristics. Thus, as always in the field of politics, this type of stratification of means and ends, and this continuous reversal between one and the other, produce a difficult understanding of historical events and the nature of political phenomena. Paradoxically, Marx himself, with his distinction between the structural and superstructural element of socio-economic-political formations, attempted to extricate himself from this type of hermeneutic tangle³⁶. This complexity, however, cannot be reduced solely to the production of superstructural justifications of structural productive organizations, as also claimed by Engels³⁷: everything is much more complex, especially when one confronts the question of nationality.

On the one hand, the national question was a fundamental starting point for the Marxian discourse, as well as an element of great importance in the subsequent development of this school of thought. Roman Szporluk was able to describe communism as the continuation of the nationalistic ideology of the nineteenth century by other means, a continuation that paradoxically eventually consolidated itself to Soviet nationalism³⁸, the phenomenon that Mikhail Agursky will call “national-Bolshevism”³⁹. In short, at the time of Marx it was neither possible nor conceivable to operate a division between people and nation, even if the anti-capitalist vulgate often suggests that these two subjects are opposed since the nation is necessarily a transversal corporate and interclass concept. In reality, the “classic” Marxist option was to exclude the bourgeoisie from national membership, since its interests were inherently transnational and anti-popular.

Leninism, by relating Marxian communist theories with the ethno-cultural mosaic of the Russian Empire, had to take the national question

36 Karl Marx, *Per la critica dell'economia politica*, Editori Riuniti, Rome 1979.

37 Friedrich Engels, *Engels to J. Bloch in Königsberg*, in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir I. Lenin, *On Historical Materialism*, Progress, Moscow 1972, pp. 294-296.

38 Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1993.

39 Mikhail Agursky, *The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR*, Westview, Boulder 1987.

seriously, elaborating for it an even more complex vision than that developed in Central Europe by Marx and Engels, given that the social reality of the Russian imperial space was very composite and largely untouched by modernization and therefore by those political structures and institutions that instead existed in the West. Lenin took very seriously the question of the nationalities that made up the Soviet Union, going so far as to ask Stalin to continue this work through a systematic theoretical elaboration⁴⁰. The Soviet dissident of Georgian origin Michel Mouskhély wrote in this regard:

«Russia, wrote Lenin, is the prison of the peoples». The October Revolution gave the signal for an uprising: one after another the alien peoples broke away from the dying empire to form independent communities. It was the case of Ukraine, the Baltic countries, the nations of the Caucasus, Belarus... Engaged in the civil war, the Bolsheviks ran the risk of having other parts of their national territory torn apart. To face all these dangers, to unite the dispersed peoples, to decide to regroup them again, there was only one way: to make the revolution the instrument of liberation of the enslaved peoples. One of the first acts of the leaders was the «declaration of the rights of the peoples of Russia» (November 15, 1917). The declaration set the following four principles:

- 1) Equality and sovereignty of all peoples of Russia;
- 2) Right of the peoples of Russia to dispose of themselves until separation and the establishment of an independent state;
- 3) Abolition of all privileges and restrictions of a national or national-religious nature;
- 4) Free development of national minorities and ethnic groups established on the territory of Russia. »⁴¹

Stalin, disputing the ideas in the socialist world that believed that the role of communism was to amalgamate the nations, wrote thus, in response to a letter he received:

«The Russian Marxists have long had their theory of nations. According to this theory, a nation is a historically evolved, stable

⁴⁰ Cf. Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, Foreign Press, Paris 2021.

⁴¹ Michel Mouskhély, *Il paradosso della Federazione Sovietica*, in *Il Federalista – Rivista di politica*, i. 5 y. 2, 1960: <https://www.thefederalist.eu/site/index.php/it/saggi/1355-il-paradosso-della-federazione-sovietica> [translated from Italian].

community of people, based upon the common possession of four principal attributes, namely: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifesting itself in common specific features of national culture. This theory, as we know, has received general recognition in our Party.

[It is] a grave error in putting an equal sign between the period of the victory of socialism in one country and the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale, in asserting that the disappearance of national differences and national languages, the amalgamation of nations, and the formation of one common language are possible and necessary not only with the victory of socialism on a world scale, but also with the victory of socialism in one country. And you furthermore confuse entirely different things in "abolition of national oppression" with "elimination of national differences," "abolition of national state partitions" with "dying away of nations," with "amalgamation of nations." It must be observed that for Marxists to confuse these diverse concepts is absolutely impermissible. National oppression in our country was abolished long ago, but in no wise does it follow from this that national differences have disappeared and that nations in our country have been eliminated. National state partitions, together with frontier guards and customs barriers, were abolished in our country long ago, but in no wise does it follow from this that the nations have already amalgamated and that the national languages have disappeared, that these languages have been supplanted by some one language common to all our nations».42

This type of concept was, whatever may be said, closely related to the ideas of Lenin43. Nonetheless, the paradox we spoke of at the beginning, according to Mouskhély, is to be considered produced by a certain Leninist pragmatism:

«Even in matters of nationality, Lenin adopts and follows the ideas, moreover schematic, of his illustrious predecessors. Should national aspirations be encouraged or stifled? Marx and Engels could perhaps have overlooked this question, but Lenin, a contemporary of the era of

42 Joseph Stalin, *The National Question and Leninism*, International Publisher, New York 1929, pp. 1-10.

43 Joseph Stalin, *The National Question: April & May 1924*, in *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, Foreign Press, Paris 2021, pp. 183-184.

nationalities, could not avoid it if he did not want to compromise the success of the revolution he was preparing. And it is precisely in function of the revolution that he fixes his positions as a man of action and not as a theorist. He cares very little about the question of the nation itself and of national values themselves. What interests him in the first place is the use of national dynamism in the service of the struggle against capitalism.»⁴⁴

This type of predisposition to the primacy of administrative and government techniques would have led, in the long run, to a loss of sight of the protection of national identities, according to Mouskhély, who, in a particularly harsh way, thus condemned these outcomes:

«Philosophers elaborate a communist morality made up of absolute loyalty to the Soviet homeland and to its leader, the Communist Party. Writers create a communist literature, a synthesis of all national literatures, but under the predominant influence of Russian literature. The works of art are dedicated to the glorification of «socialist realism», far from any «petty-bourgeois idealism» or the decadent forms of Western art. Sociologists boast the new socialist traditions, such as «socialist emulation», «socialist cooperation», socialist festivals and folklore, etc. The architects build modern-style homes that progressively replace the previous national-type homes. Even in furniture and clothing, a common style gradually replaces the diversity of indigenous styles.

Thus, thanks to a common effort, a new culture is created and spread, the «communist culture», with an identical background of values, ideas and traditions that Soviet men share, whatever nationality they belong to. What then remains of the national form? «Language as a way of expression and development of the communist culture of peoples».⁴⁵

This type of criticism, of course, suffers from a certain political enmity between the Author and the Soviet state, and these tendencies, even real, did not replace the fact that many of the national and popular traditions were preserved, east of the Curtain of Iron. In reality, in our opinion, the Soviet state was prey to those mechanics of cultural uniformity that were put in place for administrative and bureaucratic needs

⁴⁴ Michel Mouskhély, *Il paradosso della Federazione Sovietica*, in *Il Federalista – Rivista di politica*, i. 5 y. 2, 1960: <https://www.thefederalist.eu/site/index.php/it/saggi/1355-il-paradosso-della-federazione-sovietica> [translated from Italian].

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

in the construction of modern states⁴⁶. It is therefore interesting to note how, paradoxically, in the doctrine of its builders the Soviet Union should have avoided, as far as possible, the dissolution of national differences.

Given that politics constitutes the field of the heterogenesis of ends, it is interesting to note how Lenin himself had theorized the very important role of nationalities in the multiform chessboard of Central Asia. Mouskhély himself also noted:

«Finally, it was necessary to deal with the latent nationalism of the peoples of Asia. Lenin turned out to be a seer here. In his «Imperialism the highest stage of capitalism» he foresaw the defeat of colonialism and the sudden uprising of the liberated masses. What a boon for the communist revolution this immense miserable and ignorant «proletariat». But to take him on its side, shouldn't it begin by respecting the national sentiment that animates him and which is all the more hostile the younger he is?»⁴⁷

Obviously Mouskhély's tones are vehemently anti-communist, and his analysis is affected by his political positions. In reality, Lenin had not “prophesied” a phenomenon by mistake, but on the one hand he grasped the discrepancies of power between the world of advanced capitalism and the economically backward one, on the other – also through national liberation struggles – he was the first to theorize an uprising of the economically exploited peoples against the capitalist powers. Be that as it may, the link between Asian nationalism and twentieth-century historical communism is, as we have said, dialectical. The identity of the peoples of Central Asia obviously existed before communism, but communism has helped these nations to modernize, so that this process has produced modern nationalistic forms⁴⁸. With the fall of the Soviet Union, however, these national and ethnic identities saw a new period of flowering. We

46 Cf. Zygmunt Bauman, *Intervista sull'identità*, Laterza, Bari 2003, pp. 15-16.

47 Michel Mouskhély, *Il paradosso della Federazione Sovietica*, in *Il Federalista – Rivista di politica*, i. 5 y. 2, 1960: <https://www.thefederalist.eu/site/index.php/it/saggi/1355-il-paradosso-della-federazione-sovietica> [translated from Italian].

48 The case of Tajikistan is emblematic: «At the beginning of the 20th century, it had been Russian scholars who took up the cause of the Tajik nation. When in 1924, the Soviet government decided on the “National Territorial Delimitation”, it was exclusively Russian “orientalists” who contributed to the exhaustive study of the Tajik nation that was to promote the realisation of the Tajik “ethnie”.»

Paul Bergne, *The Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and the Origins of the Republic*, I. B. Tauris, London / New York 2007, p. 127.

reiterate once again that we must keep in mind this type of dialectic between Soviet heritage and the overcoming of culturally centralistic elements in order to fully understand the nature of the post-communist transition in these countries.

Bernard Chavance, in his text with an economic-institutionalist approach on the reforms that took place in the Soviet Union and in the Eastern Bloc, highlighted how the process of autonomization (in economic and political terms) can be described as a process of de-Stalinization⁴⁹. This process took place (especially in countries such as Poland or Hungary) with the questioning of the models of economic interpretation generally spread from universities. For the countries of Central Asia the cultural element was perhaps more important than the economic one, considering how they simply sought to deepen and further distinguish the elements that made up their specific identity.

Writing for the peculiar case of Kazakhstan, Ayşegül Aydıngün notes how the reconstruction of national identity started from an objective fact, which was the feeling of generalized anomie that constituted the dominant atmosphere of the end of the Soviet Union:

«A situation of anomie became visible in Kazakhstan beginning in the Gorbachev period and increasingly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which necessitated a search for a new social order. [...] It is within this atmosphere of anomie that the cultural revival project has been launched. »⁵⁰

The same factor can be considered – where more and where less – as influential in the processes of ideological reorganization of the other Central Asian states, which tried to become autonomous since the times of Glasnost and Perestroika⁵¹.

According to the author herself, a prominent role was exercised by Islamic religious identity in the case of Kazakhstan:

⁴⁹ Bernard Chavance, *The Transformation of Communist Systems: Economic Reform Since the 1950*, Routledge, Abingdon / New York 2020.

⁵⁰ Ayşegül Aydıngün, *Islam as a symbolic element of national identity used by the nationalist ideology in the nation and state building process in post-soviet Kazakhstan*, in *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, vol. 6 i. 17 y. 2007, p. 69.

⁵¹ Payam Foroughi, *Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Socio-economic Disparities – Sources and Solutions*, in *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, i. 2 vol. 22 y. 2002, p. 39.

«The revival of Islam is expected to play a significant role in this project and Islam is being used as one of the basic elements of culture that will contribute to the integration of the new Kazak national identity. Islam, in this context, is also used as a tool in the struggle against the Russian and Soviet heritage and is expected to play an integrative role. This integrative function is perceived as necessary for the construction of Kazak national identity.» 52

If on the one hand the sponsorship of Islam has served the new Kazakhstan to distinguish itself from Russian culture (predominantly Christian) on the one hand, and from Soviet history on the other, the dialectic we spoke of earlier comes into play where the religious and national elements assume a role of ethical structuring of social relations in a condition of absence of an order of this type due to the collapse of the USSR:

«The new Kazak political power attempted to fill the vacuum left by the Soviet ideology at the beginning of the period of Perestroika through promoting ethical values within an atmosphere of insecurity. In other words, the careful promotion of religion that is under strict control of the government plays two significant roles: firstly, it fills the ideological and moral vacuum as a result of the disappearance of the Soviet system causing an important environment of insecurity, and secondly, it offered people an alternative to political parties that based their activities and projects on political Islam being in complete harmony with the position of the government.» 53

As has been noted, there is an attempt on the part of the Kazakh political hierarchy to fill the organizational and planning void left by the Soviet Union, and also in this sense the projects and development plans of the country should be read⁵⁴. Secondly, it must be remembered that the President of Kazakhstan until 2019, Nursultan Nazarbayev, came from the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and from those of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

52 Aysegül Aydıngün, *Islam as a symbolic element of national identity used by the nationalist ideology in the nation and state building process in post-soviet Kazakhstan*, in *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, vol. 6 i. 17 y. 2007, p. 69.

53 *Ivi*, p. 81.

54 Diana T. Kudaibergenova, *The ideology of development and legitimation: beyond 'Kazakhstan 2030'*, in *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 34 i. 4 y. 2015, pp. 440-455.

«From a humble village background, Nazarbayev trained as a steel worker before climbing through the ranks of the Communist Party. He obtained the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan in 1989 just prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Elected president in 1990, he emerged as the central figure responsible for guiding Kazakhstan through its incipient years of independence». 55

The political-economic proximity of Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation, as well as participation in the Eurasian Economic Union project (the only Central Asian country together with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), do not separate the Central Asian country from Soviet history. Simply this, as we have already seen, is subject to revision, in a similar way to what happened in the Russian Federation itself. This type of rethinking of the historical past, the distancing from excesses, the revision of some elements are at the basis of the neo- and post-communist tradition in the post-Soviet space – especially as regards the question of religious identity⁵⁶.

In this sense, Kazakhstan, under the leadership of Nazarbayev, has fully embraced its Eurasian dimension. This is not only for geo-economic reasons, as has also been pointed out⁵⁷: its membership of EurAsEc (Eurasian Economic Union) and its political proximity to Russia in the shared regional space. Although there are those who support a new purely techno-economic dimension of Eurasianism, in its post-Soviet revival⁵⁸, we can say that this is not the case in Kazakhstan. In fact, Nazarbayev has

55 Rico Isaacs, 'Papa' – Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Discourse of Charismatic Leadership and Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, in *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol. 10 i. 3 December 2010: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2011.01089.x>

56 Gennadij Zjuganov, *Stato e potenza*, Edizioni all'Insegna del Veltro, Parma 1999.

57 Maria Lagutina, *A concept of Eurasia: From classical Eurasianism to pragmatic Eurasianism*, in AA.VV., *Regional Integration and Future Cooperation Initiatives in the Eurasian Economic Union*, IGI Global, Hershey 2020, pp. 1-15.

58 «Post-Soviet Eurasian integration should focus on the economy. The collaboration between the Customs Union (a common customs space) and the Common Economic Space (dozens of agreements to establish uniform rules in the economy; in effect, it is a Eurasian common market) establishes a solid groundwork for integration. This focus will help strengthen the technocratic element and dedicate integration instruments to resolving the main task – economic modernization and increased global competitiveness.»

Yevgeny Vinokurov, *Pragmatic Eurasianism: Prospect of Eurasian integration*, in *Russia in Global Affairs*, vol. II i. 2 April-June 2013, p. 93.

made explicit his belief in the Eurasian theses of Lev Gumilëv⁵⁹, but not only: he has repeatedly reiterated how the Kazakh identity is determined by the encounter of the various religious cultures that characterize it⁶⁰. Not only the pre-eminent role of Islam which provides the guarantee of the maintenance of a public ethics, but also other traditions and cultures in a harmonious coexistence.

«The challenge was to promote Kazakh identity, thus strengthening the ethnic integrity of the nation, while ensuring other ethnic groups, especially the Russians, were not marginalised. [...] This commitment to a multi-ethnic and multi-faith Kazakhstan has been the cornerstone of Nazarbayev's nation-building policy.»⁶¹

Kyrgyzstan, instead, if it shares with Kazakhstan the membership of the Eurasian Economic Union⁶², it also shares its common nomadic identity⁶³ so dear to Eurasianism (which openly refers, already with the thought of Leont'ev, to the conjunction between the Slavic sedentary heritage and nomadic identity of the Tatar invasions⁶⁴) and its re-propositions in a contemporary key. This conception, in open contrast to the previous Soviet ambiguous vision on nomadism⁶⁵, takes on a religious and political dimension in the space of Kyrgyzstan in the phenomenon of

59 «Beyond academic circles, the acknowledgment of Gumilev's theories extends to the political authorities. Thus the new Kazakh State University founded in 1996 was named after him, and the Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev is proud to display his familiarity with Gumilev's works.» Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An ideology of empire*, Woodrow Wilson Press / Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington D.C. 2008, p. 10.

60 Yerzhan Saltybayev and Lidiya Parkhomchik, *The Eurasian idea of Nursultan Nazarbayev*, in AA.VV., *Regional Integration and Future Cooperation Initiatives in the Eurasian Economic Union*, IGI Global, Hershey 2020, pp. 193-208.

61 Rico Isaacs, 'Papa' – Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Discourse of Charismatic Leadership and Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, in *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol. 10 i. 3 December 2010: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2011.01089.x>

62 Membership that increased the country's import and export levels: Kubanychbek Sagaliev, *Kyrgyz Republic: Effects of joining the EAEU*, from Center for International Private Enterprise: <https://www.cipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/04-Kyrgyzstan-EAEU-report-ENGLISH.pdf>

63 Cf. Rico Isaacs and Erica Masat, *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Central Asia*, Routledge, Abingdon / New York 2022.

64 Konstantin Leont'ev, *Bizantinismo e mondo slavo*, Edizioni all'Insegna del Veltro, Parma 1987.

65 Aysegül Aydıngün, *Islam as a symbolic element of national identity used by the nationalist ideology in the nation and state building process in post-soviet Kazakhstan*, in *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, vol. 6 i. 17 y. 2007, pp. 69-83.

“tengrism”⁶⁶, which recovers the proto-Turkish identity of the inhabitants of the nation⁶⁷.

«Among the newer tendencies in Tatar society connected with Turkism, the form of neo-paganism known as Tenrgism stands out (Tengre was the pre-Islamic sky god of the Turkish peoples and in old Tatar simply means 'God'). Tengrism became widespread in the second half of the 1990s [...]. Tengrists see the meaning of life as living in harmony with the surrounding natural world. They regard tengrism not as the religious doctrine of Turkic nations but as a central element of the Turko-Mongol historical way of life and worldview now essential for the contemporary consolidation of the Turkic nations.» [68]

The Tajiki, for their part, claim their ancestral Persian origins, having clashed with the lack of recognition of their particularity for decades. Specifically, Tajikistan and its political authorities struggle to assert their difference from the generically Turkish roots of most of the rest of Central Asia⁶⁹. The panturk discourse was so strong, especially in Soviet times, that even some hierarchies of the local Communist Party allowed themselves to be influenced by this narrative⁷⁰. In any case, it is precisely because of the revitalized Persian identity that relations between this Central Asian country and Iran are very close, even when particularly lively. In fact, Tajikistan and Iran have gone through a phase of fairly important diplomatic disputes in the last period, despite the fact that Iran itself was the first country to open an embassy in Dushanbe. To date, relations between the two countries are optimal and are substantiated in exchanges and large commercial agreements⁷¹.

The case of Turkmenistan, on the other hand, is slightly different: as in Kazakhstan, in Turkmenistan the Soviet political legacy is very strong. The country's life president (deceased in 2006) Saparmyrat Nyýazow was

66 Harun Güngör, *Tengrism as a religious and political phenomenon in Turkish world: Tengriyanstvo*, in *Karadeniz Uluslararası Bilimsel Dergi*, i. 19 y. 2013, pp. 189-195.

67 Cf. Rico Isaacs and Erica Masat, *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Central Asia*, Routledge, Abingdon / New York 2022.

68 Roland Dannreuther and Luke March (edited by), *Russia and Islam: State, society and radicalism*, Routledge, Abingdon / New York 2011, p. 106.

69 Paul Bergne, *The Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and the Origins of the Republic*, I. B. Tauris, London / New York 2007, p. 15.

70 *Ivi*, pp. 18-19.

71 Francisco Olmos, *Busy times in Iran-Central Asia relations*, on *The Diplomat*: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/busy-times-in-iran-central-asia-relations/>

also from the ranks of communism as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan. When Turkmenistan acquired effective independence, he endowed it with a strong nationalistic political import, of a more secular character than the ethno-primordialist or religious forms that have taken hold in the other countries of the region. However, this constituted the fundamental imprint of Turkmen politics in the new phase of global politics inaugurated with the end of the Cold War. In fact he said:

«Our ancestors formulated the principles which allowed the Turkmens to not merely preserve, for many centuries, their traditional features, but also face the challenges of time with dignity. The Turkmen people are a direct heir to the ancient world civilizations. Throughout the centuries of their history brimming with dramas, triumphs, and tragedies, the Turkmens have accumulated a powerful spiritual potential and preserved their national identity.»[72]

Nyýazow explained the statist nature of the Turkmen national identity thus: «Unlike for people in the West, the state is not a ‘night-watchman’ for Turkmens. They see it as a paternalistic organ, which displays father-like care for them, transforms the population into a single nation. It also takes care of its unity, ensures its security, makes them happy, and provides them with a free life. This is the reason why the Turkmen people adore with devotion the state and its President, believe in it, support it, and are willing to die for it.»⁷³

Finally, Uzbekistan represents with its recent history the exemplary case with respect to the mechanics of distancing and proximity that have reconstituted the cultural map of Central Asia. On the one hand, it has freed itself from Soviet identity by claiming its national roots⁷⁴, on the other it is part of a shared regionality with Russia which sees it as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization⁷⁵. Uzbekistan has recently entered the EurAsEc, and the economic-political results seem to

72 Quoted in Maxim Kirchanov, *Turkmen nationalism today: Political and intellectual mythologemes*, in *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, i. 11 vol. 1 y. 2010.

73 Quoted in Т. Халыев, *Концепция Сапармурата Туркменбаши об обществе переходного периода. Демократия и право*, in *Журнал Туркменского национального института демократии и прав человека при Президенте Туркменистана*, i. 25 vol. 3 y. 2000.

74 James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty*, Routledge, Abingdon / New York 1991.

75 Cf. Embassy of Uzbekistan in Tokyo, *Uzbekistan's SCO leadership: Effective partnership, tasks, prospects*, on *The Japan Times*: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/2022/06/23/special-supplements/uzbekistans-sco-leadership-effective-partnership-tasks-prospects/>

be very good for the country⁷⁶, nevertheless it will be necessary to see how much this turning point will affect the ethnocultural narrative, compared to the common Eurasian roots with Russia. Certainly, however, the influence of Turkism in Central Asia has been strongly guided, in recent history, by Uzbekistan itself⁷⁷. We must also remember the case of a particular independentist type of nationalism that has awakened in the Uzbek state, and that is that of the Karakalpak, an ethnic group that would like to affirm its identity even with the secession from Uzbekistan (despite the requests for now are predominantly those of greater autonomy)⁷⁸.

To summarize this brief and certainly not exhaustive discussion, it is necessary to reiterate how the role of ethnocultural traditions and their rediscovery or reinterpretation within the Central Asian scenario from the period from the end of the Soviet Union to today is of no small importance. This type of role is not only self-representative, for a context where a unity of general sense was missing. Rather, there are major political derivations from this type of phenomenon. Sometimes, in reality, it is difficult to distinguish between the socio-political element and the identity element, since policies of this nature are often justified in this way. It is evident how the counterweight of the rediscovery of national traditions can favor autonomist policies, just as embracing the Eurasian theses can favor collaboration with Russia or at least with neighboring countries. However, this does not affect either the originality or the bona fide with which these cultural elements have been brought to light or revived. Rather, in our opinion, this represents a trend of no small importance in contemporary international politics, which is starting to take into account the multiplicity of territorial and cultural identities below, above and within the historically determined structure of the national state.

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⁷⁷ Paul Bergne, *The Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and the Origins of the Republic*, I. B. Tauris, London / New York 2007, pp. 15-19.

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CENTRAL ASIA IN SEARCH OF NEW PATTERNS OF INTERACTION

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ANNOTATION: *The factors that led to the development of a new strategy, significant changes in regional policy, the priorities of the strategy, and the likelihood of their execution in the nations of the region will all be examined. There will be research done on the region's common problems and how the EU experience could be used as a guide. It addresses the requirement for EU expertise in promoting regional integration while considering the various developmental stages of the region's countries. The outcomes of the EU's neighborhood policy and the shift in foreign policy from normative power to principled pragmatism are particularly mattering. This transition was sparked by the emphasis on how close neighbors affect the security, immigration, terrorism, and economic health of Europe while also offering a practical plan for addressing more pressing issues of regional and global security.*

KEYWORDS: *Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, Model of Development, Capacity Building, Regional Connectivity, Economic Resilience, Geopolitics, International Cooperation, Regional Integration, Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States.*

Introduction

The Central Asian states, as well as the broader post-Soviet region, were charged from the start with addressing some of the most difficult problems that affected almost every part of their daily lives. Naturally, the leaders of the nations that made up the former Soviet Union attempted to draw on existing world experience when performing this job within the framework of integration goals.

One way or another, the hard situation in those years pushed the post-Soviet states to create various forms of integration. If only for this reason, it is too early to make definitively negative assessments of the prospects

of this process. Definitely, we can only say that in the way of its implementation according to the European model, there are so far insurmountable objective and subjective obstacles.

In the post-Soviet space, processes of different significance and direction were taking place, negatively affecting the integration of the Commonwealth states. The Commonwealth states had to overcome the severe consequences of the political collapse of a single state and the all-Union national economic complex, the rupture of established production, technological and economic ties between enterprises, the destruction of a single financial and monetary system, etc. The process of establishing state institutions of power and management was complex, reforming economic and social relations.

Market reforms in the Commonwealth states, considering their national specifics and orientation, further strengthened the negative results of the collapse of a single state and a common economic space, since their target was fundamental changes in the socio-political system and the system of economic relations [79].

With the general focus of reforms on the creation of a socially oriented market economy, the change of economic relations in the post-Soviet states is carried out according to various scenarios based on different approaches to the choice of priorities, stages and timing of their implementation, the mechanisms and tools necessary for this. This circumstance objectively reflects the differences in the socio-economic situation of states, the correlation of socio-political forces, national characteristics and traditions, the expectations of the population and the degree of its readiness for reforms.

Institutional transformations in the states of the Commonwealth are limited mainly to the tasks of power and strengthening of existing political regimes, bringing the economy out of the crisis into a phase of stabilization and recovery, and reducing social tension in society. Market transitions are carried out to the extent that the leaders of states and part of the emerging national elite understand the potential dangers of conservation of the old or new, but deformed, flawed political and socio-economic relations, and at the same time are limited by the fact that these

⁷⁹ Shumsky N. Prospects for Post-Soviet Integration and the Commonwealth of Independent States. - Society and economy. 2015, No. 11-12, p.274.

reforms seriously affect the interests of existing and emerging new elite groups, and are also fraught with tendencies to destabilize society.

Unsettled interstate and interethnic, or even military conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia (Nagorno-Karabakh), in Georgia (Abkhazia, partly Adzharia), Moldova (Transnistria), Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan⁸⁰ do not contribute to the integration processes in the post-Soviet space. In its current state, the CIS is unable to resolve them either by economic or political means. Russia, without claiming to be the only peacekeeper, provides the main assistance in maintaining peace and stability in the zone of these conflicts, while not always receiving proper support and understanding from other Commonwealth states.

On the one hand, in economic terms, most of them cannot exist in isolation. Specialization, participation in the international division of labor and, consequently, trade with other states is the only way for them to economic well-being. On the other hand, it is in Central Asia, for example, that a capacious common market can be created, especially given the significant reserves of most types of natural raw materials, the existence of a single transport network, the experience of creating and operating a single electric power system, and main oil and gas pipelines.

Regional segments

The Central Asian region of the Commonwealth consists of five Central Asian republics that were part of the USSR: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan with a total area of 4 million square meters. km, with a population of over 50 million people, including about 5 million Russian-speaking population. The new states of Central Asia have common historical roots in terms of belonging to the Eastern civilization. The peoples inhabiting them, except for the Tajiks and related ethnic groups, mainly belong to the Turkic-speaking group.

Historically, it is difficult enough to draw boundaries between these peoples, and the ethno-national situation in the region was largely

⁸⁰ See Sébastien Peyrouse, Jos Boonstra and Marlène Laruelle, "Security and development approaches to Central Asia. The EU compared to China and Russia," EUCAM Working Paper 11, 2012, 16. An example in this regard is the 'Community Security Initiative', which has been launched jointly with the OSCE in the aftermath of the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan.

complicated precisely by the arbitrary establishment of administrative boundaries in the Soviet period. The peoples of the Central Asian countries, for the most part, profess the Islamic religion. At the same time, it should be noted that despite the important role of Islam in shaping the cultural community of this region, the degree of Islamization of the republics is very different.

The problems of acquiring state identity, maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity, as prerequisites for integration, were common to all states of the Central Asian region. In the current post-Soviet configuration, these republics never existed as independent states. Since in the USSR the borders between them were established according to the administrative principle, and for centuries the territorial formations that had been formed were in the nature of valley-oasis associations there is a danger that the process of sovereignization may develop further into separatism, reinforced by ethnic and clan conflicts.

In fact, even during the period of Soviet power, the ruling elites in the Central Asian republics were very sensitive to the question of which historical regions representatives get access to the levers of real power. In principle, what is happening here is a kind of paradoxical fusion of the system of completely feudal and clan-based views on power, which was established back in the Soviet period, with nationalist mindsets. To the greatest extent, this issue escalated in Tajikistan, where "localism", coupled with clan struggle and confrontation between various ethnic groups, led to the civil war of 1992-1997, which practically destroyed the economy of the republic and affected the situation in neighboring states.

In principle, the republics of the region face a common task: to prevent any violation of territorial integrity, including on the territory of neighboring states, which would be very dangerous in terms of setting a precedent. Of particular importance in this regard is the destruction of one of the important "Soviet" pillars of the political and economic stability of the states of Central Asia - the system of protecting strategic security from external and internal threats.

As analysts from Central Asia note, "in the early years of independence, the picture of the foreseeable future of the Central Asian states was, for their governments and, to a certain extent, for public opinion, more or less clear. For the states of the region, the Turkish version

of development was attractive, where a society with a Muslim population chose a secular path of development, a democratic political system and a market economy”⁸¹. However, the weakness of Turkey itself revealed over the past period, primarily in the economic and civilizational fields, has led to a gradual weakening of the attractiveness of the image of Turkey and the Turkish model of development in the region. Largely under the influence of the specified sum of factors and, we repeat, the consequences of socio-political development during the Soviet period in the Central Asian states, with the exception of Tajikistan, a rather uniform political system has now developed. It manifests itself as “authoritarianism with fragments of political pluralism and some freedoms” in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and as totalitarianism in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.”⁸²

The crisis phenomena of the 1990s, which engulfed the economy and social sphere of the Central Asian states in the conditions of disruption of the economic ties established within the former USSR and the search for optimal models for reforming national economies, turned out to be deep and protracted, as in the CIS as a whole. Quite indicative are some statistical data that very clearly characterize the social processes of those years. Throughout Central Asia in the 1990s, there was a serious general economic breakdown and a decline in production, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were in the worst position in terms of macroeconomic indicators. In Kyrgyzstan, the republic's GDP was 1995. 50% of level 1990. There was a decline in both industrial production (in 1995. - 35% of level 1990), and agricultural (by 43%). In Tajikistan, the decline in material production in 1991. amounted to 12.5%, in 1992. - 33.7%, and in 1993 and 1994. there was a catastrophic recession: the damage from the civil war was estimated at 7 billion dollars, and the fall in industrial production in various industries was 50-80% ⁸³. Gross capital formation decreased in all countries, especially in Kazakhstan - in 1991-1996 gross fixed capital formation decreased by 2.8 times ⁸⁴.

⁸¹ Esenov M. Central Asia on the Threshold of the 21st Century. Central Asia and the Caucasus. // www.ca-c.org/datarus/esenov3/1998-shtml

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Annakulyeva G. Trends in the Development of the Central Asian Society. Central Asia and the Caucasus. www.ca-c.org/datarus/annakulyeva/1998-shtml

⁸⁴ Ibid.

In addition, the collapse of the Soviet administrative system deprived the new states of their usual “backdoor” ways in solving emerging problems. Thus, in Turkmenistan, the program "Grain" put forward by the leadership of the republic, the implementation of which assumed the achievement of grain independence and the provision of free bread in 1997, was failed. But if in the past the problems of the created deficit were solved by directives with supplies from state reserves, then in independent Turkmenistan a wave of bread riots swept due to the lack of bread. Tension in society was relieved by large supplies of flour from Iran. ⁸⁵

As for the realization of the foreign trade potential for solving the problems of economic development, in this area the Central Asian states faced the same difficulties as the rest of the post-Soviet countries. In the former USSR, the economies of the republics were heavily dependent not only on inter-republican ties, but also on allied state subsidies. The trade turnover of the Central Asian republics with other former Soviet republics accounted for an average of over 87% of their total exchange with the outside world⁸⁶. Naturally, the countries of the region tried to overcome the difficulties that arose in connection with the rupture of inter-republican ties primarily by expanding mutual trade, searching for new markets and trading partners, as well as attracting foreign capital to implement large projects for the construction of new and reconstruction of existing enterprises. Nevertheless, we note that their initial hopes for serious financial support from Western countries and international economic organizations were far from being fully realized, which, at a difficult stage in the formation of young states, preferred to take a wait-and-see attitude.[⁸⁷]

Soon after the Soviet Union was destroyed in 1991, the idea of a Central Asian union was born. Even though all nations joined the newly established Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), further regional cooperation was deemed necessary.[⁸⁸] They were unable to take part in

⁸⁵ Dzhabiev A. N. Economy of Turkmenistan: ways and directions of development

Central Asia and the Caucasus. www.ca-c.org/datarus/dzhabiev/2013-shtml

⁸⁶ European Commission, Central Asia. DCI Indicative Program 2011–2013, Brussels, 2011, 14–15

⁸⁷ Esenov M. Central Asia on the Threshold of the 21st Century. Central Asia and the Caucasus. // www.ca-c.org/datarus/esenov3/1998-shtml

⁸⁸ Rumer, Boris; Zhukov, Stanislav (1998). [Central Asia: The Challenges of Independence](#). New York: M.E. Sharpe. p. 104. [ISBN 9780765632982](#). Retrieved 5 April 2018

the integration process because Tajikistan was engulfed in the Tajikistani Civil War (1992–1997), which was fought between government forces and different Islamist rebel organizations backed by the Taliban. Turkmenistan chose against joining the CIS or Central Asian integration in favor of maintaining its neutrality. On September 23, 1993, the remaining three republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a pact to construct an economic union. On February 10, 1994, a "one economic space" was declared, and on July 8, 1994, an Interstate Council with an Executive Committee was established. The Central Asian Union is open to all CIS members, in theory.⁸⁹ The Union was given a military component as well. Tajikistan joined the CAU as an observer in 1996 while still engaged in civil conflict. A Council of Defense Ministers was established, and a peacekeeping force was established under the auspices of the UN. In September 1997, the peacekeeping force conducted its first training exercises on the soil of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The five former Soviet Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan would form a new Central Asian Union, according to a proposal made by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev on April 26, 2007, to create an economic and political union akin to the EU⁹⁰. The presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have thus far signed a document establishing an "International Supreme Council" between their two countries. A Treaty of Eternal Friendship has also been signed between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. A free trade zone will also be established by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Even though the planned new union had the support of the presidents of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan by 2008, former Uzbek leader Islam Karimov flatly rejected it. But integration was once again discussed after Karimov's passing in 2016. Organizer and host Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan, Sooronbai Jeenbekov of Kyrgyzstan, Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan, and Akja Nurberdiowa of the Turkmen parliament participated in the new Central Asian Summit on March 15 in Astana. The meeting was hosted at the Aqorda Presidential

⁸⁹Ibidem

⁹⁰ Ibidem

Palace by President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. The leaders of Central Asia met for the first time in nearly ten years at this summit.[91]

It is impossible to deny the existence of objective prerequisites that determine the necessity and reality of the integration of the Central Asian republics. There are a number of objective prerequisites that dictate the need to expand cooperation between the Central Asian republics. From the point of view of geographical position, all the republics are located in the central part of the Asian continent, far from the seas and oceans, as a result of which their geopolitical position is equally unfavorable, since they are completely dependent on neighboring states in terms of access to trade routes. In any perspective, the well-being of these countries will be linked to the stability in certain states and the nature of relations with them.

In addition to the above-mentioned prerequisites for the integration of the Central Asian republics, economic prerequisites play perhaps the main role. Despite the fact that the economy of the republics, within the framework of the all-Union division of labor, had a largely one-sided agrarian and raw material specialization (taking into account their natural and climatic conditions) and served primarily the needs of the Union and other republics, many experts believe that in the course of the country's economic integration could largely complement each other: Turkmenistan was mainly focused on gas production, Uzbekistan - on cotton growing, Kyrgyzstan - on sheep breeding, Tajikistan - on hydropower.

On the other hand, it should be noted a number of factors that also have an ambiguous effect on the development of foreign economic relations of regional states, their economy as a whole and, accordingly, on the implementation of integration. For example, the region has rich reserves of such minerals as oil, gas, gold, uranium, zinc, etc., but they are unevenly distributed throughout the region: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have the largest reserves. This circumstance, as well as the high costs associated with the process of extraction and processing of resources, should have pushed the countries of the region to strengthen cooperation in this area, but so far, rivalry is more likely to be seen in this area, as, for example, the development of the situation on the legal status of the Caspian Sea shows.

⁹¹<https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/news/fri-astana-hosts-little-publicised-central-asia-summit/>

The creation of the Central Asian Community, and especially the Treaty of Eternal Friendship, in principle, laid the necessary legal basis for the development of integration in the region.

It appears that the region is moving toward unification at the moment, which will enable the Central Asian states to quickly find solutions to their challenges, especially those related to bolstering security. According to last year's data, Kazakhstan's GDP at purchasing power parity was \$460.7 billion, Uzbekistan – \$202.3 billion, while Turkmenistan – \$94.8 billion, Tajikistan – \$25.8 billion, and Kyrgyzstan – \$21 billion. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have had mutually complementary economies since Soviet times, including such industries as water use, energy, transport, agriculture, telecommunications, etc. All this creates a good basis for the revival of the Central Asian Union, which will allow Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to create a kind of "safety cushion" in the economy. Moreover, unlike the EAEU, it will be possible to try to involve not only Tajikistan in this association, but also Turkmenistan, with which Uzbekistan has developed good relations in recent years.[92]

However, recent efforts to advance regional integration did not exclude the creation of fresh foreign policy trajectories. The OSCE, Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Economic Cooperation Organization all accepted new members from the region's five states (it also includes Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan). With other international financial institutions like the Asian Bank, Islamic Development Bank, World Bank, IMF, and EBRD, communication has been established.

After 2016, the foreign policy and good neighborliness of Uzbekistan opened the door to regional cooperation, which became an important impetus for further strengthening relations with the regional countries. For example, over the past period, many changes have taken place in and around the region, while some issues have come to the fore, and some have lost their relevance. Such changes in the political, economic, social, cultural and other.

Regional cooperation helps the Central Asian states to better manage their interdependence, unlock and increase their potential for economic

⁹² Shustov A. Will Tashkent and Astana revive the Central Asian Union? / Eurasia Expert, February 21, 2017 <https://eurasia.expert/vozrodyat-li-tashkent-i-astana-tsentralno-aziatskiy-soyuz/>

growth, influence in international affairs, and assert their independence and uniqueness.

The countries of the region, being traditional and natural parties to the negotiation process, maintain balanced and constructive relations with representatives of the Afghan government, which determines it as the main force in the international security system, where Central Asia has occupied and will continue to occupy an important determining position. In particular, this is clearly seen on the example of several international platforms: The International Contact Group on Afghanistan, the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, the 6+2 and 6+3 Contact Groups initiated by Uzbekistan and rehabilitated by the head of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev in the framework of the High-Level International Conference on Afghanistan: "Peace Process, Security Cooperation and Regional Interoperability", held in March 2018.

Most likely, the Trans-Afghan logistics project "Termez - Mazar-i-Sharif - Kabul - Peshawar" promoted by the Republic of Uzbekistan in the near future can become the main transport route connecting the states of Central Asia along the shortest route (only 760 km.) to the Karakorum corridor and further to the Pakistani to the seaports of Karachi-Qasim and Gwadar, thereby reducing the length of almost all existing transit networks in the region by 30% with a projected throughput volume of cargo transportation of at least 15-20 million tons per year. The significance and effectiveness of the trans-Afghan project is associated with the synchronization of the construction of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railway, which connects China with the countries of Central Asia along an alternative trans-regional route (433 km), in which the international community is heavily interested.

Conclusion

The closely coordinated efforts of countries in the international arena in collaboration with such entities as the European Union on such matters as the peace and sustainable development of Afghanistan will undoubtedly strengthen the stability in Central Asia. Describing the regularity of such trends, S.Safoev, First Deputy of the Senate of the Republic of Uzbekistan noted that today there is "... the need to create a legal and, in the future, an institutional framework for interaction on key issues of the international

agenda and, first of all, to promote the socio-economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. The main factor in making the favorable environment in Central Asia irreversible is the strengthening of confidence-building measures. It is important to formulate principles, conceptual foundations for understanding the essence of processes, in the development of which a significant role is assigned not only to state and non-governmental, but also to private, business structures"⁹³.

The emergence of a new political environment in the area shows that the Central Asian nations' process of closer involvement in bolstering peace and stability in the region has become an objective reality, and openness in relations with one's nearest neighbors lays the groundwork for sustainable development throughout the entire world.

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⁹³ <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2022/05/13/afghanistan/>

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THE WEIGHT OF THE STATE IN THE SHAPING OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF THE WORLD OF KAZAKHSTANI STUDENTS

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Abstract: *Territories rely heavily on spatial representations. They allow to know and to understand space extent and limits but also to construct individual and collective belonging to territories. Representations are partly determined by individual knowledge and practices of space. But they also are collectively elaborated through the assimilation of discourses produced by actors, notably the State.*

This is a study organized by French colleagues, which we supported and helped. and today we will present the results

In the framework of a research project conducted in Kazakhstan in 2018-2020 seeking to address issues on mental representation of regionalization process, we found that the weight of the state in representations of global space was greater there than what we had previously observed in other countries of the world. In this proposal of communication, we will show to what extent the case of Kazakhstan illustrates the weight of ideologies and political discourses in the construction and the structuring of the mental representations of the world space, with regard to the construction of the State itself and its relation to the rest of the world.

The paper is based on the results of a survey conducted in 2018 and 2020 among 540 Kazakh students interviewed in 3 cities: Astana, which has meanwhile become Nursultan, Karaganda and Almaty. This survey focused on spatial representations of world regions based on the realization of a map of world regions.

The analysis of the regions drawn by the students on the world map is characterized by a strong presence of the state, whether it is the Kazakh state or the other states of the world, which are identified much more often

than in previous surveys conducted elsewhere. Kazakhstan itself is identified as a region in its own right, with an explicit discursive and graphic apparatus (hearts drawn on the map) showing the attachment of the students interviewed to their country. Moreover the country is placed at the center of a large Eurasian region and student's discourses insist on the role of the country in the regionalization construction process: beyond the usual centering that can be observed, this Eurasian positioning includes large parts of the government's discourse on the country's regional role.

Almaty and Astana (now Nursultan) are respectively the economic capital (and former political capital) and the political capital of the country. A large industrial center, Karaganda is marked by a strong Soviet heritage. The questionnaire was mainly distributed at three universities - the Kazakh national pedagogical university Abai in Almaty (295 students), the Eurasian national university in Astana (157 students) and the private Bolashak university in Karaganda – and marginally at two other universities in Almaty, the Kazakh national university Al Farabi and Kimep in which the samples collected are small because of the difficulty of maintaining contacts between the two field missions there. The student populations of these universities have varied profiles, from the point of view of their geographical origin, their social class or their ethnic identity: the Kazakh national pedagogical university Abai and the national university of Eurasia recruit students from all over the Kazakhstani territory, with, however, an overrepresentation of students from the northern regions in Astana and an overrepresentation of students from the southern regions in Almaty ; at Bolashak University, students mainly come from the Karaganda region.

Our sample has characteristics that make it impossible to generalize to the entire Kazakhstani population and even the Kazakhstani student population. This is a predominantly female sample (85%). It is also overwhelmingly Kazakh-speaking (85%). This figure exceeds that of the share of Kazakhs in the total population – almost 70% in 2020, according to the National Statistics Agency - but it is closer to the share of Kazakhs in the younger generations. It should also be noted that 64% of them also declare that they speak Russian in their daily lives. They are also mostly people born in Kazakhstan to parents who were themselves born in

Kazakhstan. We can also detect in the sample the presence of some Oralman ("those who return") or Kandasy (those of the same blood), that is to say ethnic Kazakhs who have migrated to Kazakhstan since independence, in particular as part of a repatriation program for co-ethnic minorities from abroad (Mongolia, China, Uzbekistan, etc.). About 5% of the respondents finally declare that they do not hold Kazakhstani citizenship. These are either recently immigrated Kazakhs who are waiting to obtain their Kazakhstani citizenship, or Central Asian students who are studying in Kazakhstan.

The following results are also classic from a theoretical point of view, but to some extent they contradict the empirical results obtained from students from other countries. While the countries of Central Asia were among the countries most rarely included in a region in the Eurobroadmap project, this is not the case for Kazakhstani students who (due to the centralization mentioned above) do not forget themselves, with the exception of 5% of them.

Although the share of Kazakhs has been steadily increasing since the 1970s, Russian-speaking populations still represent a significant part of the population, especially in the northern, central and eastern regions. This diversity, which is also religious, leads Kazakhstan to be thought of as a meeting place between two worlds - Asian and European, Muslim and Christian, but also nomadic and sedentary (Alekseenko, 2016) -, which the students express by cutting their country. This conception is spreading all the more in Kazakhstani society as the national rhetoric promotes the idea that the country is at the "junction" or is a "bridge" between Europe and Asia, just as it resorts to the notion of "Eurasia" (see below). This vision is also reflected on the geopolitical level by Kazakhstan's participation in Asian but also European institutions in various fields (politics, economy, sport, culture, etc.)

One of the specificities of the representations of the world of Kazakhstani students is the weight of the states, and in particular the Kazakhstani state. Indeed, although the instructions were clear and widely respected, a significant number of students identified countries as regions of the world. Thus, among the names of regions cited by more than 20% of students, there are 5 names of regions of the world (in descending order of frequency: Africa, Australia, South America, North America, Europe)

and 4 country names (same: Russia, Kazakhstan, China, USA). In addition, country names account for almost half of the toponyms associated with the spatial entities drawn, while continent or macro-region names account for only about a third of the citations. The other types of names (geographical expressions, economic situation or level of development, cultural references, etc.) are marginal (usually less than 2% of names). In addition to Kazakhstan, which is mentioned by more than 35% of students, the countries identified as regions and named in the questionnaire are often countries with a large area (Russia, Canada, China, USA, Brazil, Mongolia). Other much smaller countries are also mentioned, especially in Europe where several students classify territories by distinguishing a region/continent and, within, countries or subregions (document X, Yessimova, Panarin, 2019).

It should be noted that the "Asia" region is named by barely more than 15% of students and that it is fading to a certain extent under the weight of the largest states identified by Kazakhstani students, especially since they are countries bordering / close to Kazakhstan (Russia, China, Mongolia). The low visibility of Asia corroborates what we observed in the Eurobroadmap project, Asia being the most blurred and the least stable of the major regions of the world in the mental representations of students. But, in the case of Kazakhstani students, it is likely that the discretion of Asia reflects less a lack of knowledge or remoteness from the region than the awareness they have of the great diversity of this continent and the overrepresentation of state links in their regionalization of the World.

This weight given to states in the representations of the world can certainly be linked to the recent geohistorical trajectory of Kazakhstan. Since 1991, for the first time, the country has existed as a modern, independent and sovereign state, having been integrated for several centuries into imperial political entities. Since the demise of the USSR, the official discourse has constantly put forward the Kazakhstani nation-state-territory, these three dimensions not being dissociable, in the narrative of national construction. The social sciences have thus been mobilized to produce a rhetoric historicizing, legitimizing and consolidating the nation-state, extending a work begun since the Soviet period (Fourniau, 2019). At the same time, like other Central Asian countries, the state mesh has established itself in territorial practices and

representations, as a result of the "territorial construction of independence" (Thorez, 2007). Concretely, the functionalization of the new borders - recall that Kazakhstan has 12,000 km of continental international borders, of which about 10,500 km appeared on the political map of the world in 1991 and that it shares with Russia the longest continental dyad (6,846 km) - has given substance to the state and national territory, individualizing it in relation to the new neighboring states. This state vision of the world, which applies not only to Kazakhstan, is disseminated in the media, taught in schools and universities. It is therefore not surprising that it is assimilated and reproduced by students of the "Nazarbaev generation" (Laruelle, 2019).

Within the identified states, Kazakhstan, named as such, has a special place. It is only the second most named state, just behind Russia, but next to the toponym "Kazakhstan" there are many references to Kazakh culture, society, history or geography among the names proposed by students. Students thus evoke major historical figures (Kerei Khan and Janibek Khan, the "fathers" of the Kazakh Khanate, Abylai Khan), tribes (Aday, Naiman, Dulat, etc.), as well as famous contemporary figures (the singer Dismash Kudaibergen or the boxer A. Golovkin). In addition, tender words were written and small hearts drawn at the location of the country, testifying to the specific place it occupies in the representations of the world of Kazakhstani students.

Another specificity of Kazakhstani students is the regional positioning of Kazakhstan. The latter illustrates the psychological tendency to center the mental map, but also the influence of the national discourse on the place of Kazakhstan in its regional environment. This is how Kazakhstan not only thought of itself as an interface between Europe and Asia, but also as the "heart of Eurasia", according to the title of a book by the first President of the Republic, N. Nazarbaev, published in 2005. This conception nourishes the Kazakhstani geopolitical doctrine, which places regional integration at the heart of its projects. A concrete realization of this orientation lies, for example, in the country's participation in the Eurasian Economic Union, an entity whose outlines N. Nazarbaev had outlined at the beginning of the 1990s. In Kazakhstan, references to Eurasia are still numerous today, especially through different place names (university, bank, shopping centers, etc.).

The analysis of the maps drawn by Kazakhstani students highlights the influence of this notion in their representations, because the region in which their country is inscribed is less Central Asia than a large Eurasian region. If there is a clear tendency to associate with Kazakhstan the countries considered to be part of Central Asia to constitute the same region (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and even Afghanistan and Pakistan) (or even the XX-green card), the expression "Central Asia" and its close equivalents "Turan", "Turkestan" are used only marginally (11 times for Central Asia). On the contrary, the name "Eurasia" is used by more than 15% of the students surveyed. The boundaries of this region roughly follow the coastline, with some hesitation as to the position of Europe, sometimes separated, sometimes included and presented as a western periphery of a Eurasian continent. This positioning is in total contradiction with the representations of the regions of the world of the students interviewed in the Eurobroadmap research project, where the countries of Central Asia were often forgotten from the map or included as European or Asian peripheries more or less battered by the drawn cut-outs.

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LABOR PROTESTS IN KAZAKHSTAN: DYNAMICS AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS IN 2008-2021

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Abstract: *This article attempts to describe some of the parameters of workers protest movements in the Republic of Kazakhstan for the last years. For this purpose, author compiled a dataset with use of protest event analysis (PEA), based on digital newspapers archives and labor activists' reports, as well as OXUS society Central Asia Protest tracker and Protest Event Database by Heiko Pleines. it shows how the number of labor protests have changed over the period from 2008 to 2021, how they distributed over the country and by sector, what forms of protests workers used, how state and companies responded to these protests and other characteristics.*

Keywords: *labor protests, Kazakhstan, protest event analysis, social movements*

Introduction

This article attempts to describe some of the parameters of workers protest movements in the Republic of Kazakhstan for the last years. Based on dataset compiled the author, it shows how the number of labor protests have changed over the period from 2008 to 2021, how they distributed over the country and by sector, what forms of protests workers used, how state and companies responded to these protests and other characteristics.

Kazakhstan is seen as fragile and institutionally weak by international human rights organizations, particularly when it comes to protections of workers' rights. Domestic labor unions are often criticized for the lack of independence and weak performance in protecting employee rights (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

According to Global Index of the International Trade Union Confederation, Kazakhstan has been among the 10 worst countries for protecting workers' rights.

Holding a legal strike in Kazakhstan requires an extremely complicated procedure, requiring a considerable amount of time, the completion of a large number of documents, and carrying out complex warning measures. Almost no one can meet the requirements of the law, so the majority of strikes are spontaneous and therefore not recorded by the official statistical office.

Very few studies have provided a thorough analysis of labor movements in Central Asia.

Sanghera and Satybaldieva (2021) indicate that despite the frequent clashes at extracting enterprises, there is strikingly little analysis of the relationship between labor and capital that engenders so much violence. Although Zhanaozen case garnered some attention, the role of transnational corporations has often been overlooked in shaping labor politics and state responses. The cause of the workers' grievances is often blamed on the autocratic state without understanding how the state is intertwined with transnational corporations. Sanghera and Satybaldieva state that most scholars tend to pathologise the state, and portray corporations either as innocent bystanders or benevolent actors.

Sorbello (2021) states that workers and their organizations have seldom been the scholarly focus in the literature on industrial relations and have rarely been treated as a diversified unit of analysis. One of his main arguments is that trans-national companies (TNCs) have translated their global standards and practices into their projects on Kazakhstan's territory, dramatically changing the lives of oil workers used to Soviet-era industrial relations.

Protest event analysis as an analytical tool

Protest event analysis (PEA) has become a key method of social movement research over the past decades. PEA is a key methodological innovation that emerged within the social movement itself. It is a variety of quantitative content analysis, to systematically assess the amount and features of protest across various geographical areas and over time. PEA allows for the mapping of the occurrences and characteristics of protests

across geographical areas, across issues/movements and over time. As textual sources newspaper articles are used, but police reports, digital media and activists' reports can also be included (Hutter, 2014).

A researcher starts with choosing a range of events to be covered by coding unit, then decides on time frame and geographical area, delimits a series of events; chooses sources and gathers information. For selection and coding main steps are: selecting articles that definitely refer to protest events; sorting articles according to protest themes and campaigns; reading articles over a period of several weeks or months; coding protest events; putting aside problematic cases for further discussion or a decision to be taken by the supervisor.

PEA is traditionally employed to study citizens' protests against government actors, but can also be used in labor conflict research (Bizyukov, 2021).

The dataset is based on materials of online newspapers and labor activists' websites, such www.socialismkz.info, as well as the Oxus Society Central Asia Protest tracker, covering the 2018-2021 period and Protest Event Database, 2010-2019 by Heiko Pleines available at www.discuss-data.net.

The dataset covers labor protest actions in Kazakhstan from 2008 to 2021. In overall, 282 cases were registered for the entire period. The collection is ongoing and will be supplemented by printed press. The reason for collecting printed press is that online sources used in this study start to appear in the second half of 2008 and after. If available, information is extracted on the time, location, industry, number of participants, company ownership, type of protest, issues raised by workers, bargaining gain, state and company response.

The scale and dynamics of labor protests

Preliminary results show that from 2008 to 2011, there was a sharp decrease from 5 protests in 2008 to 22 protests in 2009 and then 26 protests in 2011. The protests mainly took place in western Kazakhstan and were connected with consequences of crises in 2008, as well as adoption of the new Labor Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan which made hired-workers voiceless. The main issues raised by workers were connected with low wages, changes in the way salaries were calculated, independence of

trade unions, as well workers were against companies' privatization. The most long lasting and violent protest took place in this period, when in 2011 a six-month strike ended up in massacre and 16 workers were killed, protesters were dismissed, prosecuted and arrested.

From 2012 to 2019, the indicators stay almost on the same level. The lowest indicator is in 2015, when 6 protests took place. This can be attributed to adoption on new laws on trade unions and peaceful assemblies, which restricted workers to organize new trade unions, or re-register existing ones and express their grievances. During this period another violent protest took place. In 2016, workers of goldmining enterprise Kazakhaltyn JSC in Stepnogorsk were injured in a shooting by security guards. As a result, more than 300 people had gathered outside the mine administration, who had no intention of leaving in spite of the shooting. The miners were supported by their fellow villagers, many of whom were their close relatives. The miners openly blame the incident on the management of the company, which tried to introduce a virtually prison system in the mines.


In 2020, the number of protests accounted for 24 versus 14 in 2019. This is mostly attributed to Covid-19 pandemic consequences. In this year, workers raised issues regarding worsening working conditions and low wages.

There is a sharp increase in labor protests and strikes in 2021. This is the highest indicator in the whole studied period, which accounts for 104 protests out of total 282 protest or 36.8 percent. Bus drivers, livestock farmers, couriers, oil workers were protesting against low wages and bad working conditions. The strikes were primarily related to low wages, which are now depreciating as a result of the tenge devaluation. The strikers also demanded freedom of trade union activity and the right to establish their own independent organization (Kurmanov, 2021).

The number of participants varied in accordance with the type of protest. The highest indicator is in 2011, when 42,653 workers participated in the longest 6-month strike in western Kazakhstan. This is followed by previous years 2010 and 2009 with 17,550 and 17,183 protesters correspondingly. The decline in number of participants can be attributed to adoption of new law on peaceful assemblies and new forms

of protest workers used, like recording video appeals to authorities and posting them in social networks. Figure 1 shows these figures.

Figure 1 Number of labor protests and participants



Oil and gas extracting Mangistau region is in first place in terms of the numbers of labor protests from 2008 to 2021, with 93 protests, accounting 33 percent of the total. This is followed by two regions Aktope and Karaganda and Almaty city with the same indicators of 28 protests in each, accounting to 10 percent each of the total. Atyrau region was the fourth, with 20 protest accounting for 7 percent of the total. Table # 1 shows these figures.

Table 1 Geographic distribution of labor protests in Kazakhstan by regions, 2008-2021 years

#	Region	Number of protests	Percentage	#	Region	Number of protests	Percentage
1	Mangistau	92	33 %	9	West Kazakhstan	12	4%
2	Aktobe	27	10 %	10	Almaty	6	2%
3	Almaty city	27	10 %	11	Akmola	5	2%
4	Karagandy	27	10%	12	North-Kazakhstan	4	1%
5	Atyrau	22	7%	13	Pavlodar	2	1%

6	East Kazakhstan	17	6%	14	Zhambyl	1	1%
7	Nursultan city	16	5%	15	Kyzylorda	7	2%
8	South-Kazakhstan	14	5%	16	Kostanay	3	1%
Total						282	100%

Distribution of labor protests by economic sector

From 2008 to 2021, labor protests in Kazakhstan were distributed across a number of economic sectors. Labor protests in oil and gas extraction accounted for 27 percent of total or 76 protests, putting this sector in first place. This is followed by oilfield services, which comprised 21 percent of total or 56 protests. Metal and coal mining accounted for 12 percent of total or 33 protests. The transportation sector comes in fourth place, comprising 11 percent of the total protests or 32 protests. This is followed by construction sector with 7 percent of the total protests, comprising 20 protests. The remaining 22 percent include healthcare and utility services, self-employed, precariat and unemployed workers.

The issues raised by workers

Out of 282 protests, 73 percent of protests had multiple aims. In total the dataset distinguishes 12 issues: low salaries, changes in system of payment,

The main issues raised by the workers are connected mainly to salaries. Demands to increase salaries account for 197 protests out of total 282 protests or 70 percent. The workers disagreed with non-payment of wages and delays, and this issue account for 132 protests or 48 percent out of total. The share of issues on system of payment changing account for 72 protests or 26 percent out of total.

This is followed by the issues workers raised regarding to worsening working conditions which accounted for 65 protests or 23 percent.

The share of issues regarding labor union activity accounted for 45 protests or 16 percent. The highest indicators were in 2009, when the share of trade union issues accounted for 36 percent, and in 2014, when trade union issues made almost half of all issues raised, about 44 percent. In

2009, workers raised concerns regarding prosecution or dismissal of trade union leaders. In 2014, workers were protesting mainly the new law on trade unions adopted in June, 2014.

The share of issues raised against company privatization, for company nationalization accounted to 25 protests or about 9 percent. The highest indicators were in 2008 and accounted for 80 percent, and in 2017 accounted for 66 percent.

The form of labor protests

According to the Labor Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan a strike is “full or partial termination of work in order to meet the social and economic and professional requirements of employees in a collective labor dispute with the employer”. In accordance with article 14 of the Law on Collective Labor Disputes and Strikes, a strike may be considered illegal when it has a political motivation (such as claims to change the constitutional order) or a certain procedure prescribed by law was not observed. According to the article 12 of the Labor Code an employer must be notified in writing about a planned strike and its possible duration by the authorized body not later than fifteen calendar days beforehand.

The Law On the procedure for organizing and holding peaceful assemblies in the Republic of Kazakhstan provides the following types: picketing, marches, meetings, demonstrations. There is also a requirement on local authorities written notification and getting approval to hold an assembly.

Analysis of newspaper articles shows that often it is not clear whether the workers received permission to carry a strike, that is why in this study it is not possible to distinguish between a legal and illegal strike. In this paper, a strike means partial or complete stoppage of work.

In practice, the forms of protest that workers use is much wider than provided by Kazakhstan’s legislation. The study shows that workers use different ways to protest.

For the whole studied period, the most popular forms of protests were partial or complete stoppage of work, which accounted for 37 percent. This is followed by rallies which accounted for 24 percent. Picketing and protests marches accounted for 22 percent. Less used forms are public declarations to the authorities which accounted for 12 percent, stating

demands – 12 percent, hunger strike – 7 percent, sit-down and underground strikes – 11 percent, solidarity strikes – 4 percent and blockades – 3 percent.

The total number is more than 100 percent, as a single protest action included a simultaneous or consecutive use of various forms of protest. Thus, for example, an action might start as a public declaration of demands and then turn into a strike, a hunger strike or something else. The use of more complex forms of protest suggests that the workers have to resort to ever greater force to start a dialogue with employers and state.

Achievement of labor protest demands

The numbers indicate that a majority of labor protests didn't have their demands met. Company management and government did not respond to 53 percent of the total labor protests, accounting for 150 protests. There were 59 protests whose demands were partly met, accounting for 21 percent, while 20 protests had achieved all or most of their claims, accounting for 6 percent. There is no available information about 56 protests gain, which accounted for 20 percent of total protests. Table # 2 shows these figures

Table 2 Labor protest distribution by achievement of demands

#	Were the demands met?	Percentage	Number of protests
1	No gain or very limited gain	53 %	151
2	Partial gain	21 %	59
3	No gain	6 %	20
4	Information n/a	20 %	56
	Total	100 %	282

State and company response

State position was neutral to labor protests in 56 protests, which accounts for 20 percent. Almost the same indicators show companies' response which accounts for 51 protests or 18 percent.

State response was negative, i.e., court made decisions against striking workers, with regard to 14 protests, which accounts for 5 percent, while companies' response was negative, i.e., dismissed workers, in 20 protests, which accounts for 7 percent.

State acted violently, i.e., arrested protesters in 28 protests, which accounts for 10 percent, while companies acted violently, i.e., intimidated workers in 39 protests, which accounts for 14 percent.

Numbers show that in 33% of cases state acted constructively, i.e., the representatives of government departments met with protesters and promised to solve their issues, and 31% of cases when companies also met with the protesters.

The share of 32 percent of state response to labor protests is not covered in newspaper. The same situation is with companies' response, which accounts for 30 percent. Table # 3 shows these figures.

Table 3 State and company response

#	Response	State		Company	
		Percentage	Number of protests	Percentage	Number of protests
1	Constructive	33 %	93	31 %	87
2	Information n/a	32 %	90	30 %	85
3	Neutral	20 %	56	18 %	51
4	Violent	10 %	28	14 %	39
5	Negative	5 %	15	7 %	21
	Total	100 %	282	100 %	282

Company ownership structure

Labor protests, which took place in subcontractor companies are in the first place. They account for 32 percent or 89 protests. Some of these subcontractor companies were previously branches or departments of state-owned enterprises.

For instance, Burgylau LLC, was privatized in 2007 by the order of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev N.A. Previously,

it was a subdivision of a state enterprise Ozenmunaigaz JSC. Now, the main activity of the company is provision of drilling services to Ozenmunaigaz JSC as a subcontractor. According to www.forbes.kz the main owner of the company is not known and registered in Netherlands.

In the second place are labor protests in local private companies, which account for 28.3 percent and comprises 80 protests of the total. Most of these private companies were also privatized and previously had been national enterprises, or their branches and departments.

Often, such restructurizations of companies had resulted in disagreements over changes in the way the salaries were calculated, worsening of labor conditions, dismissals of workers or reduction of salaries. Subcontractor and local private companies start to dismiss workers and hire new ones on a seasonal basis. They connect this decision with reduction of production.

In the third place are protests in foreign companies which account for 13.1 percent or 37 protests.

This is followed by protests in quasi-state enterprises, which accounts for 9.5 percent or 27 protests. An example of such enterprise is KazMunaiGas National Company JSC, which also have foreign participation in ownership structure.

Self-employed, precariat or unemployed workers 7.0 percent or 20 protests. These indicators start to appear and increase starting from 2018. Taxi drivers and couriers protested against changing working conditions and change in the way salaries were calculated.

Table # 4 shows these figures.

Table 4 Types of company ownership, where labor protests took place in Kazakhstan from 2008-2021

#	Company ownership structure	Percentage	Number of protests
1	Subcontractors	32.0 %	89
2	Local private companies	28.3 %	80
3	Foreign companies	13.1 %	37
4	Quasi-state enterprises	9.5 %	27

5	Joint-stock companies with foreign participation	3.1 %	9
6	Municipal enterprises	7.0 %	20
7	Self-employed, precariat, unemployed workers	7.0 %	20
	Total	100 %	282

Discussion

As indicated above the results presented in this paper are preliminary and will be supplemented by printed press. For this reason, the paper provides general characteristics and trends and doesn't include correlation or cluster analysis. When the work on the dataset will be completed, correlation analysis of achievements, issues and state and company response, as well as cluster analysis of issues raised by the workers will be implemented.

Conclusion

The paper shows that the number of labor protests is increasing, especially there is a sharp increase in the last two years. Workers' wages continue to be low, conditions are worsening, trade unions lose their independence and there are less ways for workers to express their grievances. The companies and government take measure only when workers start to use more severe forms of strike.

Labor protests mainly take place in extracting industries, oil and gas enterprises located in western part of Kazakhstan, metal and coal mining enterprises located in central part of the country. There are new industries where labor protests take place, such as transportation and courier services and the geography of protests has been expanding especially the last four years.

The study shows that almost half of the protests registered didn't achieve their goals, though in almost third part of protests companies and the state acted constructively and gave promises.

The usual pattern of modern labor protests develops in a very common scenario: the employer, violates the rights of workers, who, in turn, use well-tried levers of influence (work stoppages, rallies and

pickets, appeals to authorities). Such conflicts often do not find a solution, and the problem is postponed for the future, generating new outbursts of discontent. The same kinds of conflicts repeat, institutional solutions are not found, and, as a result, the general tension grows.

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KAZAKH DIASPORA ACTIVISM BEFORE AND DURING 2022 JANUARY EVENTS: ATTITUDES, MOTIVATIONS AND ACTIONS

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ABSTRACT: *Diaspora is believed to have a certain capacity to impact political processes in their original homelands through diaspora activism, mobilization, and bring democracy. The literature that looks at diaspora political activism perceived it as diaspora actions related to their country or place of origin, which are non-democracies or there is a struggle for independence, sovereignty. Brutal events, revolutions, uprisings, emergencies play the role of triggers of diaspora mobilization.*

The beginning of January of 2022 for Kazakhstan became one of the darkest pages in the history of independence. The peaceful rallies against the policy of the ruling authorities turned to violence and looting that kept people in fear and feeling of helplessness. Demands expressed during rallies included social-economic, as well as political claims. However, the reasons and nature of the January events are still in debate and discussion.

In this period of turbulence in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh diaspora mobilized and tried to help and support their co-ethnics. In this sense, this paper is an attempt to better understand the Kazakh diaspora's activism during and before January of 2022 events, and the overall diaspora's attitude towards political development of homeland. It seeks to understand the factors of mobilization, the types, the motivation, and the barriers for the diaspora's activism. Moreover, one of the aims of this study is to advance understanding of the complexity of the relations between Kazakhstan and its diaspora and make input to broaden the literature on diaspora issues in the Central Asia region as interaction between post-socialist states in Central Asia and their diasporas remain understudied.

The paper uses observations from the cases of Kazakh diaspora activism in Europe and Turkey. The study is mostly based on a qualitative method of data analysis. Using media publications and social media of diaspora organizations and leaders the article tents to answer the main research question of the study: how and why did Kazakh diaspora mobilize during the January events in Kazakhstan?

KEYWORDS: *Kazakh diaspora, diaspora activism, diaspora mobilization, Kazakhstan*

Introduction

The duality of diaspora nature: its preservation ties, feelings of belonging to home country and at the same time identification with, and integration to a host country, makes it valuable tool for both home and host countries internal and foreign policies. However, diaspora should not be seen as inanimate object in the political game. It lives and develops, pursues its own goals in the relations with homeland and host country, internal processes are going on inside the diaspora: formation of groups, their clashes and struggles for power, etc.

Diaspora can play a significant role in home country political development, democratization having impact on configuration of powers, political discourse, and agenda (Carment et al., 2021; Moss, 2020; Toivanen & Baser, 2020). It is called diaspora activism which is determined as the political activities of diaspora members who aim to influence the domestic or foreign policy of their country of origin. The literature on diaspora activism mainly focuses on diaspora actions, and intentions towards homelands that are non-democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian. Usually, such activism is more seen during revolutions, unrests, rallies, emergencies in the country of origin.

The Central Asian diasporas have been understudied in the perspective of diaspora activism. Partly it can be explained by the incompletely formed and consolidated diaspora of Central Asia countries, as well as inner processes of diaspora development, and nature of home country-diaspora relations. However, in recent years Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan actively implement diaspora engagement policy by updating diaspora policy strategies, establishing new institutions that maintain

relations with diasporas, building upgraded system of interaction with co-ethnics and compatriots living abroad, etc.

At the same time Central Asian countries experience significant development, changes in political, economic, social, ideological spheres that impact on state-diaspora relation on one hand, and on another on activation of diaspora mobilization, reaction on situation in home countries.

The January events in Kazakhstan that seemed as one of the stable countries in the region left speechless the world community. Kazakh diaspora in this time of emergency for its home country mobilized in order to support relatives and compatriots. At the same time, it could not to avoid the political agenda of the events in Kazakhstan.

This paper aims to study Kazakh diaspora activism as a reaction to the January events in Kazakhstan, and the overall diaspora's attitude towards political development of homeland. It seeks to understand the factors of mobilization, the types, the motivation, and the barriers for the diaspora's activism.

The paper uses observations from the cases of Kazakh diaspora activism in Europe and Turkey during last 10 years. The study is mostly based on a qualitative method of data analysis. It uses media publications and social media of diaspora organizations and leaders. Moreover, the study is based on author's observations that were collected during the participation in the research project "Kazakh diaspora living in Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Russia, China, Germany, and USA" in 2019; and evidence from her own participation in diaspora in Europe social media, messengers' groups.

History of the Formation of the Kazakh Diaspora

It is estimated that there are approximately 5 million Kazakh diasporas worldwide. The World Kazakh Association provides this figure. According to the 1996 support program for compatriots living abroad, there are 4.2 million Kazakhs. Mendikulova (2017) concludes, based on a field study conducted in 2007-2009, that the majority of the more than 4 million Kazakhs living abroad are an ethnic minority living in border countries formed during the process of dividing the borders, with only about 800,000 Kazakhs attributed to the diaspora.

However, the state considers all ethnic Kazakhs living outside their historical homeland to be part of the diaspora (Law on languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1997).

The origins of the Kazakh diaspora can be traced back to 17-18th centuries political, socioeconomic, and political-economic events, as well as the ups and downs of interstate relations. The nomadic lifestyle of the Kazakhs played an important role in the formation of the diaspora as well. For instance, the history of Kazakh migration to modern-day China and Mongolia is inextricably linked to the 18th-century relationship between the Kazakh Khanate, China, and Russia (Khurmetkhan, 1998). The Dzungarian military raids contributed to resettle a part of the Kazakh tribes into territory of Uzbekistan (Tukumov, 2000; Germonova, 2002).

The history of Kazakhs' migration to Europe and the formation of the diaspora can be divided into several stages: the 1920s; the 1940s; the 1960s; and from the 1990s to present.

The first stage is linked to political changes, specifically the establishment of Soviet power in Kazakh steppe. Those who disagreed with the new government fled, including to Europe, where a specific political emigration center was formed at the time. Mustafa Shokay stands out as a representative of political exiles of that period.

The second stage is related with the settling of Kazakh prisoners of war, as well as those who did not return to Kazakhstan after the liberation of Germany and the victory and remained in the country (Mendikulova, 2014).

The main flow of Kazakhs migrated to the region in the 1960s - 80s during the period of labor migration to European countries from Turkey. According to Mendikulova (2014), more than 100 Kazakh families from Turkey had immigrated to Germany by 1980. From Germany Kazakh emigrants moved to other European countries, including France, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium. As a result, Kazakh communities have sprung up all over Europe. Aside from them, Kazakhs from Xinjiang, Afghanistan, and Iran also lived and worked in Europe, though in smaller numbers.

It is worth noting here that Kazakh migrants from Turkey were part of the Kazakh diaspora, which migrated from China in the 1930-50s due

to political pressure to Afghanistan, India, Iran, and partly settled in Turkey.

Following the demise of the Soviet Union and the ensuing political and economic crisis, as well as the launch of repatriation programs by European countries, a new wave of immigration began in the 1990s. Furthermore, the economic downturn aided in the emigration of highly skilled workers (brain drain). To this day, a certain level of migration to European countries exists, manifested in labor and study migration.

The profile of Kazakh diaspora in Europe

It is difficult to determine exact data on the size of the diaspora in Europe and Turkey because the countries' statistical agencies do not record information on the nationality of residents or migrants. Moreover, there are no comprehensive studies on the size of the diaspora from the Kazakh perspective. Mendikulova (2014) estimates that there are 5,000 Kazakhs living in Europe. Around 700 Kazakh families live in Germany, France, Sweden, and Austria, according to the World Association of Kazakhs (Lahanuly, 2016). However, it should be noted that Kazakhs today live in almost every European country. D. Satpayev (2019), for example, cites Turkish government data in his book, claiming that approximately 17 thousand Kazakhs live in Germany alone.

Same can be said about Kazakh diaspora in Turkey. There is no exact determined data on size of the diaspora. Different sources give various information on 10-15 thousand of Kazakhs living in Turkey (Rakhimbekov, 2009; Ipek & Aktash, 2019). The available data are based on information from representatives of the Turkish diaspora, and do not fully reflect the number of Kazakhs who migrated during the independence of Kazakhstan.

The modern internal structure of the Kazakh diaspora reflects the diaspora's migration history. Within the Kazakh diaspora, two large groups can be distinguished: part formed by Kazakh migrants from Turkey, China, Afghanistan, Iran and the part that migrated from the territory of modern Kazakhstan, that is, they have lived in their historical homeland. The vast majority of the modern 'Turkish' part of diaspora did not live in Soviet or independent Kazakhstan.

The diaspora formed by migrants from Turkey, China, Afghanistan, Iran spans several generations, and they have managed to accumulate some social capital. The majority of Kazakhs are employed; however, there is a layer of businessmen who have benefited from the capital amassed by the first labor immigrants from among the Kazakhs. Furthermore, this part of the diaspora is distinguished by a high educational level and social status, as the first generation of Kazakh immigrants was able to provide their children with an excellent education, and they now work as lawyers, dentists, and engineers (Zhakupova & Alishpayev, 2014).

It is also worth noting the institutionalization, and cohesion of the Kazakh diaspora, which created Associations of Kazakhs and cultural centers in almost every country of residence. In 2008, an umbrella organization Federation of European Kazakh Associations (FEKA) was formed to bring together ten Kazakh cultural centers from eight European countries: Germany, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. As part of its activities, FEKA holds joint celebrations of traditional holidays (Nauryz), Qurultai of the Kazakhs of Europe, and also cooperates with Kazakhstani organizations that implement diaspora policy.

A part of the diaspora, formed of migrants from the Kazakh SSR and independent Kazakhstan, has a diverse range of occupations and social status. It has not yet reached the stage of establishing its own institutions, despite the fact that communication between the active participants has been established, primarily through social networks. Furthermore, the Kazakh diaspora actively interacts with other post-Soviet diasporas, which is facilitated by a common language of communication, values, and social status in the host countries.

One characteristic of this part of the diaspora is maintaining contact with their homeland: many have relatives and friends in Kazakhstan with whom they keep in touch; some travel to their home country; and some have established businesses related to Kazakhstan.

Differences in migration history, values, worldview, and communication language have all contributed to a lack of interaction between the two groups within the diaspora.

Kazakh Diaspora Activism

During the Soviet period, the Kazakh diaspora in European countries took no political positions related to the motherland's political, social situation. This is due to the diaspora's weak consolidation, which was preoccupied with issues of survival and settling in new countries of residence. However, a part of the Kazakh intelligentsia was active in covering history, the situation in the homeland, and the diaspora.

In 1953, the Kazakh intelligentsia in Germany took part in the activities of "Azattyk" radio in Munich. A single editorial office "Turkestan" broadcast in Turkic languages within the framework of the radio. Later, the Kazakh service of Azattyk radio separated from the "Turkestan" editorial office (WKA, 2014). The Kazakh newspaper "Shalkar" was published in Turkey and distributed to Kazakhs in 28 countries (Ualtayeva, n.d.).

Despite the necessity and difficulties of adaptation, the diaspora maintained a strong bond with their motherland and expressed concern for its future. As a result, the diaspora greeted Kazakhstan's proclamation of independence with great excitement. The people's long-held desire for independence has finally been fulfilled. The leaders of the Kazakh diaspora voiced a wish to convene a gathering in their historical homeland during a meeting with the country's presidents N. Nazarbayev in Turkey, which led to the first Qurultai of the Kazakhs in 1992.

On the thrill of such a historic occurrence, the Kazakh diaspora around the world actively participated in establishing relations with the motherland and in the repatriation program in the early years of independence. Kazakhstan was also active in establishing relationships. A program to assist compatriots living abroad was established in 1996. Cultural centers are actively opened throughout the diaspora's places of residence during this time.

However, over time, with the strengthening of the regime, the elimination of the opposition, and the limitation of the diaspora policy to nominal measures in terms of preserving contacts with the diaspora, the policy's instability resulted in a certain level of dissatisfaction among the diaspora.

The lack of initiative of the World Association of Kazakhs, as well as a reduction in the implementation of the diaspora policy following the

program's completion in 2005, contributed to the diaspora's disillusionment with state institutions' actions. It reached to the point when the Kazakh diaspora in Turkey organized its own Qurultai, bypassing the WAK.

Furthermore, with the strengthening of Kazakhstan's super-presidential government, there has been an outflow of opposition activists as well as a rise in liberal-oriented population migration to Western countries, which has added to the diaspora over time. According to an International Organization for Migration report on youth migration in Central Asia, corruption, bureaucracy, ineptitude, and impunity of authorities, as well as inadequate management, are among the key reasons, along with socioeconomic factors (International Organization for Migration, 2019).

Kazakhstan has made headlines in recent years as a result of different political events in the country, mostly related to the population's displeasure with the country's socio-economic position, which is a result of the existing political regime, corruption, injustice, and other factors. The events of 2011 in Zhanaozen, the Land rallies of 2016 and related protests, the power transition and presidential elections of 2019, and the January events of 2022 are among them. These events did not go unnoticed by the Kazakh diaspora, with Kazakhs living in Western countries taking the lead. This can be explained by the cultural and ideological influence of the host countries, as well as maintaining an emotional and identification ties with their historical homeland while accumulating a certain level of dissatisfaction with the situation in Kazakhstan.

At the same time, the Kazakh diaspora in Europe has both an active and passive part; that is, the diaspora cannot be said to be united on the topic of the country's political growth, and there has also been no willingness to take active steps in this regard. It is appropriate to mention the activities of the minority, while the majority of diaspora members stay inactive.

There are several explanations for this, firstly, the isolation of the Turkish part of the diaspora from their historical homeland, the presence of minimal ties, and secondly, members of the diaspora who migrated from Kazakhstan are still under the influence of the Soviet, totalitarian

political culture, and are also still busy adapting to the conditions of the host country. They still have not accumulated enough socio-economic potential to reach the level of free expression of political views. In addition, it is worth noting that part of the diaspora has integrated into the local society and does not have any ties with their historical homeland.

However, in the event of an emergency, such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the January 2022 events, most of the diaspora in Europe and Turkey stepped up to help: fundraising was organized to purchase medical equipment and send it to Kazakhstan; assistance was organized to ensure communication with relatives and friends during the January 2022 events, as well as to coordinate the activities of NGOs in Kazakhstan. The sentimental aspect, the presence of an emotional ties with homeland, as well as the presence of relatives, friends, and acquaintances in Kazakhstan, were the main factors in this case.

Pickets and demonstrations in front of Kazakhstan's embassy or in well-known places are the most common manifestations of Kazakh diaspora political activism, which are accompanied by various posters with slogans and declaring the meeting's goals and demands. Participation takes a small number of participants 20-40 people which is vary from country to country. At the same time, the majority of the attendees are young individuals, most of whom are Kazakhstani students. In addition, members of the diaspora actively give interviews about the events taking place in their historical homeland.

The main topic of the manifestations of discontent and demonstrations is N. Nazarbayev's political regime, governance, and dictatorship, while activists' rhetoric has remained unchanged since his departure from the presidency: corruption, total injustice, lack of freedoms, oppression of the opposition, and so on. However, it is worth noting that a nationalist tendency is particularly noticeable in the rhetoric of the Turkish diaspora: concern about the status and position of Kazakh language and culture, as well as the land question. The fact that this part of the diaspora is defined by a certain ethnic cohesiveness, a concern on the preservation and reproduction of ethnic values, culture, and customs, explains national-patriotic rhetoric. Furthermore, religion has an important role as one of the defining characteristics of ethnic identity (Rakisheva, 2009).

Concerns over the Kazakhs' situation in China are also present in the 'Turkish' part. The Kazakh diaspora, for example, organized a petition to the German Bundestag to introduce the Magnitsky Act, a bill targeted at assisting Muslim communities in China. The petition's main goal is to raise awareness about China's problem of minority mistreatment⁹⁴.

The events of January surprised both the international community and members of the Kazakh diaspora. The study showed two opposite reactions to the events from the Kazakh diaspora in Europe that occurred. One group voiced concern about current events in their historic homeland, urging calm and backing for the president's efforts. The second actively propagated messages against the authorities' culpability, corruption, and the dictatorship of N. Nazarbayev, as well as nationalist calls to elevate the prestige of the Kazakh language and to break free from Russian control. Pickets were held at embassies as they had been in the past, particularly near Russian embassies, because news of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) forces' arrival sparked a wave of anti-Russian rhetoric, fueled by fears of losing independence and strengthening Russia's influence.

As previously stated, the diaspora's activity in Europe and Turkey was not limited to open expression of its own opinion or calls to support the authorities in this matter; the diaspora helped Kazakhstanis stuck in Turkey and Europe, and organized communication channels so that Kazakhstanis and diaspora representatives could communicate with relatives and friends in Kazakhstan. In this direction, there is a high level of mobilization and efficiency among the diaspora as well as migrant groups.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that the Kazakh diaspora in Europe and Turkey is relatively new, and is also subject to constant influxes of new migrants from Kazakhstan, resulting in the emergence of distinct groups within the same community, it has amassed some social, economic, and institutional capital.

⁹⁴ https://epetitionen.bundestag.de/petitionen/2019/10/01/Petition_99914.nc.html

The influence of host country values, the preservation of ties and emotional attachment to the historical homeland, and a certain level of dissatisfaction and disappointment with Kazakhstan's internal political development, particularly its diaspora policy, all play a role in the diaspora's political activism, particularly in Western countries. At the same time, the diaspora has not yet attained, or amassed, a sufficient level of capital and resources to intervene more directly in the motherland's domestic affairs. This is the uniqueness of Kazakhstan's political government, which is fearful of such intrusion, particularly on the ideological front, and attempts to prevent it in any manner possible.

The Kazakh diaspora is characterized by two positions on homeland political development: a neutral and opposed attitude. A part of the diaspora is marked by open nationalist rhetoric.

On the other hand, there is a high potential of the diaspora in the transfer of knowledge, ideas, social initiatives and projects. However, Kazakhstan's diaspora policy is still in its early stages of its development, and the country does not fully exploit it.

Finally, I would like to point out that the Kazakh diaspora, Kazakhstan's diaspora policy, political participation, and diaspora mobilization are understudied. This paper is one of the first attempts to understand diaspora action and mobilization during times of political unrest in the historical homeland.

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ИСТОРИЯ РАЗВИТИЯ ЭТНИЧЕСКОГО ПРЕДПРИНИМАТЕЛЬСТВА Г.КАРАКОЛ В КОНЦЕ 19 И НАЧАЛЕ 20 ВЕКА (НА ОСНОВЕ УСТНЫХ ИСТОРИЙ И ВИЗУАЛЬНЫХ ИСТОЧНИКОВ)

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Абстракт: В статье на основе устных историй и визуальных источников потомков татар, дунган, узбеков и уйгуров, проживающих в данный момент в городе Каракол показано становление и развитие торгово-промышленного развития города в конце 19 и начале 20 века и их влияние на социально-экономическое и социально-культурное, в особенности, на архитектурное наследие города Каракол. В рамках данной статьи представлена торгово-экономическая деятельность татарского этноса города Каракол.

Ключевые слова: этническое предпринимательство, устные истории, визуальные источники, торговля, экономические отношения, культура и архитектура.

Настоящая статья произведена в рамках Мастерской “Живая память” и Исследовательской площадке Эсимде

К истории кыргызско-татарских торгово-экономических и культурных связей

История формирования татарской диаспоры в Кыргызстане началась со времен Великого шёлкового пути, когда существовали тесные торгово-экономические связи у народов Поволжья и Средней Азии. [1, с.3-16]. В период правления Золотой Орды эти связи имели самостоятельный характер в форме меновых отношений. После распада Золотой Орды и образования Казанских,

Астраханских, Сибирских и другие ханств торговые отношения в значительной степени окрепли. [2, с.352].

После присоединения Казанского ханства к Русскому государству русские купцы стали контролировать торговую деятельность татар в этом регионе, чтобы самостоятельно выйти на рынки Средней Азии. Однако татары имели преимущества в этом деле - они хорошо знали язык, культуру, обычаи и традиции местного населения. А также немаловажную роль сыграла религиозная общность татар с народами Средней Азии, которые враждебно относились к иноверцам. Вот как об этом написал М.А.Терентьев: -«так как мусульманское население Средней Азии враждебно относились к иноверцам, т.е. христианским купцам весьма враждебно, то русские купцы всегда старались взять с собой кого-то из числа татар или доверяли караваны приказчикам из татар. Одно имя служило талисманом и способно было охранять караван от кочевников». [3, с.8]. Кроме того, в христианстве платили налог (закат) в размере 5%, а мусульмане только 2,5%. [3, с.25]. Это было важным аргументом в торговом деле и поэтому татары часто выступали проводниками караванов, ввиду выгоды для русского купечества.

С середины 18 века политика Екатерины второй открыла новые возможности и перспективы для татар, которая даровала мусульманскому населению России права и возможности культурного и религиозного развития.

Так, известный туркестановед П.П.Литвинов пишет, что матушка императрица способствовала исламизации кочевников и об этом она говорит следующее: «... что построение там... для главнейших родов мечетей, школ... весьма полезны и нужны... Снабдение разных родов киргизских муллами немалую пользу в наших делах принести может». А для реализации этого курса и мусульманизации кочевников привлекались самые «зрелые» представители ислама в России - татар Поволжья. [2, с.355-356]. Следовательно, не только татарские купцы, но и «религиозные миссионеры в значительной мере утвердили исламское мировоззрение в сознании кочевых народов и упрочили свое влияние на них». [4, с.153].

«Торговая деятельность татар в Туркестане сопровождалась и идеологическим проникновением в их быт, исламизацией кочевого религиозного сознания, внедрением в него начал мусульманского права (шариата), что было выгодно для решения торгово-экономических дел, так как обычное право (адат) кочевников не знало института частной собственности и всех вытекающих из него имущественных отношений» [2, с.355]. Татары оказали сильное влияние на систему образования, духовную культуру местного населения. Они строили мечети, обучали детей арабской грамоте.

В историческом процессе присоединения Кыргызстана в состав Российской империи, в установлении дипломатических отношений активное участие принимали татары. Одним из известных представителей татарского народа Файзулла Сейфулин являлся связующим звеном между кыргызскими и татарскими властями. Его дело продолжил Файзулла Ногаев. Во многих российских миссиях в Среднюю Азию и азиатских миссиях в Россию участвовали татары в качестве купцов, дипломатов, переводчиков и проводников. [5, с.17].

Однако ситуация изменилась после присоединения данной территории к Российской империи. Власти опасались на растущее влияние татар в системе образования и религии, что при необходимости они могут объединиться с местным населением против царской России в регионе и стремились ограничить влияние татар на кочевое население. Так генерал –губернатор К.П.Кауфман в 1868 г. выгнал всех мулл Уфимского муфтията главным образом из Семиреченской области [6, с.357]. Так в сфере образования стали переходить к системе Н.И.Ильминского – повсеместно открывать русско-туземные школы для детей коренных национальностей как альтернативную систему образования существующим новометодным школам.

Со стороны Российской империи борьба за ограничение влияния татар среди кочевников-кыргызов было закреплено в «Положении об управлении Туркестанским краем», утвержденным 12 мая 1886г. Татарам было поставлено непреодолимое препятствие в статье 262, где писалось «приобретение земель и вообще недвижимых имуществ в Туркестанском крае лицам, не принадлежащими к русскому подданству, а равно всем, за

исключениями туземцев, лицам нехристианских исповеданий воспрещается». [7, с.208.].

Это Положение препятствовало торгово-экономическим интересам татар и осуществлению коммерческой деятельности на территории Кыргызстана. Однако к моменту выхода этого Положения многие татары в Кыргызстане владели собственностью и имуществом.

Можно сказать, что «поиск новых рынков сбыта, как и караванных путей в еще малоизведанный Западный Китай и далекую Индию, в целом расширение торговых связей со степными народами Туркестана привел татарских купцов в кыргызские кочевья. Они были одним из первых, кто прибыл в Кыргызстан на постоянное место жительства» [8, с.14].

Первые переселенцы, начиная со второй половины 19 века (1855г.), т.е. с момента присоединения края к Российской империи, поселившиеся вдоль торговых путей - Нарын, Ат-Баши, на берегу озера Иссык-Куль и др. информировали родственников, знакомых о новых землях, о возможностях устройства на данном конкретном месте... Вот одно из писем середины 19 века: «... я лежу на берегу голубого озера, далее луга, на полях зреет пшеница, а в дали видны белоснежные горы...» [9, с.54].

Так на побережье озера Иссык-Куль, в селах Тамга, Шалба, Ак-Суу, в городах Нарын, Токмак появились татарские семьи. Северная часть Кыргызстана была присоединена к России раньше, чем южная и по этой причине первые татары из России стали жить в этой части. А также это было связано с тем, что через север Кыргызстана попадали на рынки Китая в направлении Кашкара и открытие менового рынка в селе Ат-Баши.

Экономическая деятельность города Каракол в конце 19 и начале 20 века

Город Каракол основан на караванном пути 1 июля 1869г. и является один из первых городов в кочевой Средней Азии. Это уникальный город с многонациональным населением.

Уже в 1870 г. в гостином дворе бойко торговали, по городу было разбросано несколько домов и одна из улиц (в направлении на

Иссык-Куль) почти вся застроилась, а еще через два года в городе насчитывалось 80 домов, 52 лавки, 5 мельниц, казармы, построенные из еловых брёвен, срубленных в Каракольском ущелье. Следует отметить, что в 1870 году из 130 человек первооснователей Каракола русские составляли 17 человек, 109 татар, из них 72 мужчины, 37 женщин, основным занятием которых была меновая торговля и отчасти сельское хозяйство [10.с.27-33].

При том, что традиции русской культуры на тот момент были определяющими. В 1872 году насчитывалось 150 человек, большую часть которых составляли татары и узбеки, выходцы из Ташкента и других городов и сёл Туркестана. Начиная с 1875 года темпы роста города несколько увеличились.

К концу 1877 года население городка увеличилось за счёт беженцев-дунган из северо-западного Китая. В 60-70-х годах в районах Северо-Западного Китая восстали дунгане против угнетателей Цинской империи. Дунгане-повстанцы видели спасение в России. Часть дунган во главе с Юсуп-Хазрет в ноябре 1877 года прибыла в Каракол. Они и составили ядро дунганского населения дореволюционного Каракола [18.].

С 1890 года в Караколе начали селиться переселенцы из Украины, губерний Черноземного центра и Поволжья. Особенно большой приток переселенцев в котловину озера Иссык-Куль, в том числе и в Каракол, был после неурожая в ряде губерний европейской части России в начале 90-х.

В 1897 г. было около 8 108 горожан. Пржевальск (город носил это имя с 1889 по 1921 и с 1939 по 1992 г.) стал самым большим городом на территории нынешнего северного Кыргызстана, центром обширного уезда, активно развивавшимся торговым и экономическим фокусом Прииссыккуля [11.]. Транзитная и базарная торговля легла в основу роста обширной купеческой прослойки.

В начале XX в. из 102 торговцев города 78 были татарами. Доходы от торговли составляли 34% бюджета города, в 1907 г. оборот 302 торговых точек достигал 1191 тыс. руб. [11.]. Владельцами разных видов и форм предпринимательской деятельности в городе Каракол были представители разных

национальностей. Согласно данным Иссык-Кульского областного архива перечень фабрик, заводов и торгово-промышленных предприятий в городе Пржевальске на 1912 год с их владельцами выглядел следующим образом:

1.Кожевенные заводы: Тазитдинов и Ф. Сулейманов, С.Мамедбаев, А.Ниязхолжаев, М.Бурхомбеков, А.Шариф-Ходжаев, Ф. Маленьких, С.Диняр-Ходжаев, Ш.Иманов, М.Азам-Ходжаев, И.Осенов, А.Таш-Мухамедов, Х.Абдулвалиев и др.

2.Мельницы: Карымов, Н.Петухов, А.Мануленко, С.Колесник, С. Степанов, А. Захаров, и др.

3.Искусственных вод: Д.Шахворостов, С.Неверов.

4.Кишечные фабрики: Дюршмид.

5.Маслобойные: Бабкин, М. Маджифу, М.Мухтарова, П.Шилин, Т.Шайкин, И.Назаров, Н.Назаров, М.Масыфя, М.Машанло, А.Раджанов, Т.Токтосумбаев и др.

6.Пивоваренные: Торопкин, Бедорев, Котков, Ильин и др.

7.Аптека: Б.Коган.

8.Аптекарские магазины: М.Шишилькевич.

9.Бакалейные: Д.Ильин, Н.Пугасов, А.Каитан, В.Дьяков, братья Идрисовы.

10.Бани: Язовского.

11.Галантерея: Бр.Идрисовы, И.Абрамов, Бр.Давлетдины, Ш.Ибрагимова, Х.Абдулвалиева, Тазитдинов и Сулейманов, Филотов, К.Ахунов, А.Стыценко.

12.Игрушки: А.Кайтан, Торговый дом Пугасов, Бр.Идрисовы.

13.Железо: Торговый дом Г.Шахворостова, М.Хошанло, Бр.Абдны, Г.Идрисова, А.Кайтан.

14.Земледельческие машины и орудия: Товарищество Столь и Ко, торговый дом Г.Шахворостов с С-ми, А Волков, Д.Ильин.

15.Золото и серебро: Торговый дом Н.Пугасов с С-ми.

16.Кожа: Ф.Маленьких, К.Иванов, Е.Зеленин, А.Шарифоджаев, А.Язходжаев.

17.Ковры: М.Турумходжаев; А.Актасманов, А.Абдраимбаев.

18.Керомин: А.Болохов; А.Кайтан, Бр.Идрисовы.

19.Колбасные: И.Ципалов.

- 20.Краски: А.Болохов, Бр. Идрисовы, И.Абдраимов, Х.Абдулвалиев.
- 21.Контора транспортная. Российского общества.
- 22.Лесной склад: И.Морозова.
- 23.Манафактура: Б.Ибрагимов, В.Рафиков, И.Слинджабаев, К.Муллабабаев, А.Шадабаев, Е.Курманбаев, Б.Дальгинбаев, М.Изирбаев, А.Аюряев, М.Исамухамедов, Тазитдинов и Сулейманов, Х.Абдулвалиев.
- 24.Мучной склад: А.Каримов.
- 25.Машины швейные: Зингер и Ко.
- 26.Номера для приезжих: А Кайтан.
- 27.Обувь и галоши: А.Кайтан, Бр. Идрисовы, А.Волохов.
- 28.Посуда и скобяные товары: Д.Ильин, Г.Назаров, Г.Идрисов, А. Каримов, Т.Ниязмагоматов, К.Курбанов.
- 29.Скот: Д.Ильин, А.Каримов, Т.Ниязмагоматов, К.Курбанов.
- 30.Сырье: К.Сальманбаев, А.Разыкджанов.
- 31.Табачные: А.Кайтан, Бр.Идрисовы, Торговый дом Пугасова, Д.Ильин.
- 32.Чай и сахар: Таиббаев [12.].

В своем исследовании на основе устных историй и визуальных источников потомков татар, дунган, узбеков и уйгуров, проживающих в данный момент в городе Каракол будет показано становление и развитие торгово-промышленного развития города в конце 19 и начале 20 века и их влияние на социально-экономическое и социально-культурное, в особенности, на архитектурное наследие города Каракол.

Купцы, в основном татары и узбеки торговали товарами, привезенными из Ташкента и Андижана. А в Караколе и его окрестностях скупали шерсть, кожу, скот, воск, мед, зерно и отправляли в основном в Андижан. В Караколе известными купцами того времени были татары - А.Г. Каримов (владелец мельницы, мучного склада), Ф.Х. Сулайманов (магазины, кожевенный, лесопильный завод и др.), Х. Абдулвалиев (галантерея, кожевенные заводы и др.), братья Урмеевы (кожевенный завод),

братья Идрисовы (бакалейные изделия), В.Г.Рафиков (мануфактурными изделиями), и др.



Фотография из личного архивного фонда Равиля Вахитова, внука Фатиха Сулайманова

«Мой дед Фатих- купец первой гильдии»

Внук купца Фитиха Хадиевича Сулайманова – Равиль Вахитов, известный журналист Кыргызстана, на основе его дневников рассказал о своем знаменитом дедушке.

Становление торгово-предпринимательской деятельности татарского купца Фатиха Хадиевича Сулайманова (1867-1965гг.) в городе Каракол прошло все стадии - начало, расцвет и закат и является уникальным для становления экономики города Каракола. Личность Фатиха Хадиевича Сулайманова была несправедливо забыта временем. Хотя он, как никто другой, заслуживает доброй памяти. Сейчас эту фамилию, знают только те, кто хоть немного знаком с историей города Каракол. Фатих хажи Хадиевич Сулайманов, житель города Пржевальска, был известный в Туркестане купец первой гильдии. Торговый дом под его

руководством поставил на ноги всю городскую торговлю в Пржевальске в начале двадцатого века. В своем дневнике, рассказывает его внук Вахитов Равиль он обращается к своим детям и потомкам и пишет: «Что когда мать отправляла его в дальний путь, она его поцеловала, дала немного денег на дорогу и сказала: «Сынок служи честно, никогда никого не обманывай, не дай Бог свернуть тебе с правильного пути и запятнать свою честь! Если я услышу о тебе что-то дурное, то считай, что в этот черный день умерла твоя мать»».

Эту материнскую заповедь дед Равиля Вахитова пронес через всю жизнь и с благодарностью вспоминал свою маму и ее заповеди,



которые помогали ему в трудные времена. Он завещал своим потомкам никогда не делать то, что противоречит законами религии и государства.

«В то время крестьяне старались одного из детей отправлять на чужбину, чтобы овладеть каким-либо ремеслом. Родители снарядили Фатиха в

город в январе 1886 года, отправив его к родному дяде купцу Исхаку Габдулвалиеву». Так началась самостоятельная жизнь юноши. Вначале он «работал прислугой, накрывал стол, встречал гостей, помогал раздеваться и одеваться, ждал, когда гости разойдутся. А через полгода Фатиха взяли в магазин подметать полы, вытирать посуду, помогать приказчикам. Вскоре он, став лучшим продавцом, начал служить доверенным купца Исхака».

В 1892 году он сказал дяде, что «решил решительно заняться торговлей. Дядя Исхак отнесся к его просьбе неброжелательно. Ему

невыгодно было отпускать такого толкового работника, сильного в бухгалтерии, но все же отпустил. Помогли ему в становлении его братья, которые поддерживали его и давали ему советы. В 1894 году Фатих женился на дочери татарского купца Хадимакзума – Галие. На свадьбу приехали его родители и гости из родного села Маскара. После дела деда Фатиха пошли в гору, он купил в рассрочку дом русского купца Куприя. В 1897 году дед приобрел у местного офицера Смирнова дом, который находился напротив городского сада (парк имени Пушкина)».

О начале торговой деятельности деда Вахитов Равиль рассказывает следующее - «Мой дед Фатих начал свое самостоятельное дело в двадцать пять лет в феврале 1893 года, приехав в Пржевальске из Верного, он открыл лавку на базаре. Вначале жил в гостинице, а затем снял квартиру напротив татарской мечети. Торговую деятельность начал с девятиста двумя рублями в руках, одолженными у токмакского купца Юсуфа и товаром, взятым в долг под реализацию. А в 1914 году его капитал составлял уже свыше трехсот тысяч рублей золотом и большей недвижимостью. По тем временам это была неслыханная сумма». Так основу его благосостояния составляла торговая деятельность, которая была и остается одной из самых доходных сфер бизнеса.

«В 1911 году Фатих Сулайманов, Зайнитдин Тазитдинов, братья Ибрагимовы: Ахтам, Исхак, Ваккас, Габбас организовали торговый дом «Сулайманов и К». Пржевальские купцы объединились сроком на 5 лет. При его организации каждый из его членов внес определенную сумму денег: Фатих, Зайнитдин, Ахтам по 3000 рублей каждый, братья Ваккас, Исхак, Габбас по 600 рублей каждый. Первоначальный капитал составил в общей сложности 160 тысяч рублей золотом».

После открытия торгового дома дела пошли успешно, так «прибыль была ощутимой, к 1914 году оборот капитала достиг одного миллиона рублей». Деятельность торгового предприятия вышла далеко за пределы Туркестана. Так, «успешный предприниматель Фатих умело осуществлял общее руководство; отличающийся предприимчивостью и честностью в отношениях с партнерами Зайнитдин вел бухгалтерский учет; прекрасно владел

русским языком старший из четырех братьев Ахтам, благодаря этому приказчикам не приходилось пользоваться услугами переводчиков; у Исхака был большой круг знакомых в уезде, он в совершенстве знал кыргызский язык, обычаи местного населения, это помогало ему в торговле на далеких джайлоо и стойбищах; постоянно пребывал в разъездах Ваккас, он управлял магазинами в Верном, Чилике и Каркаре; за все ответственные поручения по оптовым закупкам товаров и переговорам по установлению связей с торговыми домами и ярмарками отвечал исполнительный Габбас».

Все они прошли за короткое время путь от обычных провинциальных предпринимателей до известных купцов Туркестана. «У торгового дома было 13 магазинов в своем и соседних уездах: в Пржевальске, Верном, Токмаке, Чилике, Проебраженском, Рыбачьем, Покровке, Кольцовке и Каркаре. Были открыты кожевенный завод в Шаты по изготовлению обуви; завод по переработке мяса в Пржевальске; два лесопильных завода в Большом Жаргылчаке и один в Тамге; были построены и спущены на воду два парусных баркаса для перевозки грузов по Иссык-Кулю; построен склад лесоматериалов, дом, контора, почтовая станция в Жел-Арыке; хоздвор, лесосклад и контора в Пишкеке. Размах у торгового дома был значительный, только в пржевальских магазинах работали тридцать три приказчика. Лично Сулейманову еще принадлежали два больших дома, склад, фруктовый сад в девять десятин в Пржевальске, 47 ульев в Чонташе, три дачи на берегу озера».

В 1913 году на празднование трехсотлетнего юбилея Дома Романовых, ТД «Сулайманов и К» арендовал большой павильон в Верном (ныне Алматы), где представлял достижения Пржевальского уезда: «продукцию, изготовленную кожевенным заводом, различные деликатесы, модели построенных баркасов, выращенных породистых лошадей, за это купцы были награждены почетными грамотами. Около ста английских породистых лошадей Сулайманова участвовали в те дни в престижных скачках. За призовые места рысаки Пальмира, Глория, Аргун получили солидные денежные вознаграждения. А Фатих Сулайманов был награжден золотой и серебряной медалями Императорского двора за то, что сумел вырастить прекрасных скакунов-рекордсменов. За

активное участие в праздновании Пржевальская городская управа отметила ТД «Сулайманов и К» благодарственными письмами».



*Дом купца Сулайманова, сейчас ул. Жамансариева, 166.
(Фотография из Иссык-Кульского областного архива. Коллекция
фотодокументов. Оп. I. п. 21.).*

В дневнике, рассказывает Вахитов Равиль, дед пишет: «...несмотря на такое богатство, мы, этим не довольствуясь, захотели еще большего. Такова, видно, человеческая натура, что имеешь бывает недостаточно, хочется еще большего. Нам захотелось иметь пароходы, которые бороздили бы лазурную гладь озера Иссык-Куля. Эта мечта не давала мне покоя. В 1914 году при посещении ярмарки в Макарьево я заказал два парохода на заводе в Сормово под названием «Тянь-Шань» и «Иссык-Куль». Но моя мечта не осуществилась, началась первая мировая война, немецкие инженеры уехали в Германию».

Но счастливые времена длились недолго. «Начало мировой войны стало началом неудач в деятельности торгового дома, а затем был беспощадный бунт 1916 года, который привел к разорению». Все свое состояние Сулайманов потерял в результате восстания. «Потери во время бунта составили: магазин с товарами в Караколе, три с половиной тысячи баранов, сто голов племенных английских

лошадей, две лесопилки в Жаргылчаке, одна лесопилка в Тамге, два парусных баркаса, шестьдесят лошадей, которые спускали лес с горы Жаргылчака, восемьдесят тысяч плах, хранившихся на складе в Рыбачьем, угнали шестьдесят бричек и шестьдесят лошадей с ними, которые возили лесоматериал из Жел-Арыка в Пишкек, а также шестьдесят волов с бричками. Уничтожили почтовую станцию в Жел-Арыке, забрали десять повозок, тридцать шесть лошадей и оборудование почтовой станции. Все имущество, уничтоженное восставшими, составляло двести пятьдесят тысяч рублей золотом».

У Фатиха Сулейманова остались «два дома в Пржевальске и фруктовый сад. Ему пришлось продать большой сад за двадцать тысяч рублей. Затем он восстановил часть лесопильного завода в Жаргылчаке, купил заново баркас, вновь построил почтовую станцию в Рыбачьем, посеял на 160 десятинах земли пшеницу и снова начал свою коммерческую деятельность».

Однако, «дома, магазины, которые они восстановили после восстания, вскоре были конфискованы большевиками». Эти невзгоды, обрушившиеся на них, Фатих Сулайманов считал божьей карой. И никого не винил. «От бывшего богатства ничего не осталось. Деятельность ТД «Сулайманов и К» оборвалась».

В 1905 году Фатих Сулайманов совершил хадж в саудовскую Аравию. По дороге он пишет дневник и «для каждого из своих сыновей и дочерей он написал историю своей родословной, о неожиданных поворотах своей судьбы, о взлетах и падениях, и о том, что честность, трудолюбие дают возможность человеку управлять своими делами, описал как он выбился в люди благодаря своему труду, природной смекалке, бережливости и усердию».

Дальнейшая судьба учредителей сложилась следующим образом: «Зайнетдин хажи был сослан в Поволжье, после освобождения, по дороге домой заболел и умер, похоронен под Самарой. Ахтам хажи бежал из Пржевальска, когда домой пришли с обыском из ЧК. Дальнейшая его судьба неизвестна. Остальные братья Ибрагимовы, отсидев различные сроки, умерли от болезни. Все их имущество было конфисковано. Сам Фатих Сулайманов был арестован органами ГПУ, отбывал тюремный срок в городе

Ташкенте. День своего освобождения был самым счастливым в его жизни».

В начале своего дневника Фатих Хадиевич Сулайманов написал: «что он задался рассказать, что ему известно о предках, о своей жизни, о наиболее важных событиях, о его взлетах и падении... Так же, как наши предки мы умрем, пусть потомки вспомнят о нас и помолятся за нас». Умер Фатих хаджи Сулайманов в 98 лет в 1965 году и по мусульманским законам похоронили как столетнего [13.].

История купца 1-й гильдии Хамзы Абулвалиева

О влиятельном татарском купце города Каракол Хамзе Абулвалиеве, который был дедушкой по материнской линии поделилась его внучка Роза Айтматова. Устная история о Хамзе



Абдулвалиеве примечательна тем, что он сделал большой вклад в развитие города как меценат и благотворитель, пользовался большим уважением у горожан за свои человеческие качества и гуманность в помощи обездоленным людям того времени.

А если говорить о его торгово-предпринимательской деятельности, то это пример успешного торгового капиталиста, который своим упорством и неустанным трудом добился значительных успехов в разных видах коммерческой деятельности.

Вот как рассказывает Роза Айтматова о его прибытии на Иссык-Куль с целью открытия своего дела. Так, «в один из дней (примерно 1880 г.) Хамза покинул многочисленную родню, молодую жену с сыном и отправился в путешествие вместе с караваном, шедшим по Великому Шелковому пути из Оренбурга в Китай. Он хотел увидеть новые земли, найти новые рынки, обрести новых партнеров и развернуть свою торговлю на международном уровне, чтобы

преумножить свое богатство. Одним из пунктов следования каравана был город Каракол, расположенный на берегу озера Иссык-Куль. Хамза был настолько очарован озером и его природой, что, не раздумывая, отстал от каравана. Оценив обстановку, смекалистый купец решил открыть на первых порах небольшое дело. Для этого он сначала подружился с местными деловыми людьми, изучил спрос, потом открыл свое дело: из России Абдувалиев возил ткани. Переезжая на телегах с одного постоялого двора на другой, ночевал в караван-сараях, менял лошадей, телеги и, наконец, приезжал на кыргызскую землю. Хамза развозил ткани по разным жайлоо. Если раньше местные женщины довольствовались тем товаром, что им привозили из города Каракол отцы или мужья, то теперь у них появилась возможность собственного выбора. Характер у Хамзы был своенравный, крутой, но, поскольку он был человеком дела и чести, слов на ветер не бросал, оттого и приобрел в местных деловых кругах репутацию достойного и справедливого партнера, надежного друга. Благодаря своей предприимчивости и трудолюбию купец Х. Абдувалиев прочно встал на ноги. Пригласил на Иссык-Куль младшего брата и сестру – Ахмедгали и Галию. Теперь братья

Абдувалиевы вели совместное дело. А Галия на Иссык-Куле вышла замуж за самого богатого скотопромышленника Гали ажи Рафикова» [14.].



Хамза (крайний справа) с семьей, Нагима в первом ряду рядом с отцом
г. Каракол, 1909 (?)

“Разнообразные фабрично-заводские изделия продавались в торговых точках, принадлежавших Абдувалиевым: мануфактура и галантерея, железно-скобяные товары, лаки, краски и олифа, волос и щетина. Можно удивляться деловой предприимчивости Хамзы, который, заведя связи с кыргызскими скотопромышленниками, построил кожевенный завод в южной части Каракола. Его продукция находила сбыт в городе и уезде и даже в Центральной России” [15].

Так как Хамза длительное время находился вдали от семьи, по шариату он мог жениться еще раз. «Его вторая жена Газица родилась в знатной татарской семье в Сибири (г. Семипалатинск). Она была сестрой жены Исхакбая, дяди Хамзы. Исхакбай-хажи к этому времени уже достиг высокого положения и стал одним из ярких представителей религиозной элиты Центральной Азии. Он был единственным купцом I гильдии в городе Верном. В высших кругах тогда состоятельные семьи стремились породниться с семьями, имеющими не менее высокое положение в обществе. Тот факт, что Хамза мог жениться на дочери столь представительной семьи, свидетельствует о том, что с ним считались. Это было примерно в 1887 году, ему было уже около 35–37 лет».



Бывший дом купца Абдувалиева Х. - деда кыргызского писателя со стороны матери Ч. Айтматова (галантерейные товары, краски, лаки, олива, скотопромышленник, кожевенные заводы, шерсть, кожа, щетина). Ныне медицинский центр «Медер». ул. Токтогула-Ленина. Современные владельцы изменили облик здания. (Фотография из Иссык-Кульского областного архива. Коллекция фотодокументов. Оп.1. п.142.).

Говорят, рассказывает Роза Айтматова что «Газица была среднего роста, статная, белокожая, овальное лицо с прямым носом, глаза с большим красивым разрезом... Она была воспитана в

религиозных традициях, имела спокойный и ровный характер, и это, по-видимому, помогало ей гасить необузданный темперамент вспыльчивого мужа. Может быть, поэтому им удалось создать большую, состоятельную, благочестивую семью. У них родилось восемь детей – четверо сыновей и четыре дочери: Шариф, Зайнаб, Сабир, Мухаммат, Гульша, Асьма, Нагима, Абдулла» [14.].

Торговые дела Хамзы и его брата шли успешно, связи все более и более укреплялись, и расширялись. Они купили баржу, которая перевозила грузы из Рыбачьего в Каракол и обратно. Построили торговые ряды, напоминавшие “Гостиный двор” в Санкт-Петербурге.



Торговый ряд на улицах Караванной (сейчас Джусаева) и Токтогула, принадлежал Хамзе Абдулвалиеву и его брату. (Фотография из Иссык-Кульского областного архива. Коллекция фотодокументов. Оп.1. п.266.).

В то время информацию о том, какую продукцию и где в Центральной Азии можно приобрести, печатали в “Сибирском торгово-промышленном ежегоднике”. «В частности, самый ранний номер этого журнала, сохранившийся в национальной библиотеке КР, датируется 1896 годом. В нем, а также в ежегодниках за 1901,

1913–1915 годы приводятся адреса магазинов и фабрик, принадлежащих братьям Абдувалиевым, а также перечисляется, что там производится и продается».

Х. Абдувалиев пользовался уважением горожан не только за деловые, но и высокие человеческие качества, за свои принципиальность и гуманность. «Об этом свидетельствует следующий факт: в 1907 году он состоял в числе горожан, имевших право избирать выборщиков в Государственную Думу. В 1908 году, как домовладелец, значился в списке каракольцев, избравших депутатов городского общественного самоуправления. Его недвижимое имущество составляло, по городской оценке, тех лет 1120 рублей золотом, с которого он аккуратно и добросовестно уплачивал сборы и налоги в пользу города» [14].

Занимался Хамза и благотворительностью. «Об этом, пожалуй, лучше всего свидетельствует обращение к имущим людям с призывом оказывать помощь бедствующим кыргызам, неустроенным русским новоселам и голодающим горожанам. Это обращение было опубликовано в весеннем номере газеты “Семиреченские областные ведомости” за 1913 год. Подписали его шесть человек: генерал-майор Я.И. Корольков, член русского географического общества, городской староста Власов и работники торговой системы Х. Абдувалиев, Сулейманов, Ильин и Рафиков».

После рождения Нагимы Хамза решил, «что в этом доме стало тесно его семье, и купил другой, двухэтажный особняк. Он находился на углу улиц Крупской и Октябрьской. Именно в этом доме была известная на весь Каракол девичья гостиная Абдулвалиевых» [14].

С приходом советской власти Абдулвалиев, по рассказам мамы Нагимы, правильно оценил обстановку. Психологически он был подготовлен революционно настроенным старшим сыном Сабиром к переменам в общественном строе и потому был готов к тому, что все его движимое и недвижимое имущество будет муниципализировано и национализировано.

«Так и случилось. Дома, магазины, сады, баржа, средства передвижения для зимнего и летнего периода, а также сбережения, накопленные за всю жизнь, – все это перешло во владение

большевиков. Взамен Хамза получил маленький двухкомнатный домик возле любимого сада. Там они и стали жить с женой. Все дети уже выросли, стали самостоятельными и разъехались. А Хамза занимался своим любимым делом – садоводством, сдавал урожай государству. Яблоневый сад, выращенный Хамзой и его сыновьями, тоже оказал большое влияние на развитие садоводства в Иссык-Кульской области.

В 1930 году Сабир забрал отца с матерью в Ташкент. Через год умерла бабушка Газиза. Теперь дед остался один.словно пара верных лебедей, Хамза с Газизой при жизни никогда не разлучались... Как только любимая покинула этот мир, дедушка, не вынеся одиночества, вскоре тоже умер» [14].


Абдувалиевы одними из первых начали развивать садоводство в регионе, и сейчас на Иссык-Куле нет ни одного двора, в котором не было бы сада. Их сады украшают и без того красивую природу Иссык-Куля, они приумножают благосостояние народа. «Как говорят в народе, “вода течет по тому арыку (руслу), где и раньше вода текла”. Как бы советская власть ни преследовала потомков Хамзы, они унаследовали от него его самые лучшие качества. Все они выросли честными, порядочными, принципиальными людьми, которые могли бы украсить любое общество...» [14].

Как известно, в XIX веке в Каракол приезжали мужественные, не боящиеся трудностей, предприимчивые люди из разных стран. Одним из таких успешных и предприимчивых людей был дедушка по материнской линии Розы Айтматовой - Хамза Абулвалиев. «Своим неустанным трудом они превратили его в крупный уездный и административный центр. Слава о Караколе как о благодатном крае разносилась во все концы Центральной Азии и за ее пределы, деловые люди стремились попасть в этот город» [14].

История татарской мечети в городе Каракол

В 1830-1848 гг. в верхней части селения Каракол казанскими муллами М.Башировым и Х.Темирбулатовым была построена малая мечеть, в которой распространяли сведения об исламе и обучали местных священнослужителей. Трудовая деятельность татар совместно с другими этносами преображала облик

застраивающегося Каракола. В конце 70-х годов 19 века в Каракол из Казани приехал вместе с семьей Мулла Шакир Мужабиров. Он взялся за возведение в уездном центре – Караколе большой деревянной мечети на пожертвования, собранные татарскими купцами.



*Фотография из Иссык-Кульского областного архива.
(Фотография из Иссык-Кульского областного архива. Коллекция
фотодокументов. Оп.1. п.22.).*

Строительство мечети началось летом 1878 году и завершилось через 9 лет в 1887 году. Рядом с мечетью построили здание медресе, в котором проводились занятия по изучению Корана и образовательным предметам. Строительный материал заготавливался на лесопильном заводе татарского купца Фатиха Сулайманова в селениях Джаргылчак и Тамга, а затем на его барскасах перевозился по Иссык-Кулю. В медресе учились дети не только татар, но и кыргызов, уйгуров, узбеков и других мусульман.

В последствии медресе стало новометодной школой Гаспринского, поскольку в ней дети наряду с религиозным

образованием получали светское. В здании мечети могли разместиться более 100 человек. В ней имелись отдельные просторные залы для мужчин, женщин и детей., а также для проведения образовательных мероприятий.

Рядом с мечетью, с северной и южной стороны были сооружены два величественных минарета. Высота одного из них составляла 31 метр, другого 20 метров. При советской власти отношение к религии изменилось. В 30-годы прошлого века мечеть была закрыта. В 1939 году летом при большом скоплении народа и милиции с помощью лебедок разрушены оба минарета.

Вот как об этом рассказывает Рашид Насибулин, руководитель ОО «Татулык»: « Когда сносили Минарет и купол с золотым полумесяцем народ стоял издали и плакал... И как мечеть она проработала до 1935 года. И затем Указом Сталина, который начал уничтожение церквей, мечетей и под закрытие попала татарская мечеть и его передали в Госкино. Так, с 14 мая 1935 года мечеть передали в Госкино и до развала Советского Союза, до конца 1990 года она проработала как кинотеатр «Иссык-Куль».

Потом передали спортшколе и там организовали баскетбольный зал. А в 1992 году по просьбе мусульман города Каракол (еще был Пржевальск), в частности наша татарская диаспора ОО «Татулык» попросили мэрию города Каракол передать мусульманам. И указом мэра Абдурехменовой передали не только мечеть, но и 2-х этажное здание угловое здание Ак-мечеть, где молились женщины. Вот этот весь комплекс передали мусульманам города...» [17].

Современный вид татарской мечети с примитивными деталями и грубым рисунком оконных переплетов не очень выразителен. Однако еще в середине прошлого века, когда это здание использовалось в качестве кинотеатра, здесь сохранялись все первоначальные детали - профилированные стрельчатые арки, необычный аркатурный пояс вверху фасадной стены, лепные наличники и пилястры (нижнее фото).

Татары являются частью полиэтнического населения Кыргызстана и имеют более 175 –летнюю историю проживания на кыргызской земле. Приехав и расселившись в разных частях Кыргызстана, начиная со второй половины 19 века, они считают

Кыргызстан своей Родиной. На данный момент по данным Национального стат. комитета КР на начало 2019г. количество татар составило 26992 чел. (0,4%) населения республики [19].

На разных этапах истории б. СССР татары, как и другие этносы Кыргызстана пережили трудные времена коллективизации, второй мировой войны, годы послевоенного восстановления, эпоху перестройки и рыночных отношений и смогли сохранить свою самоидентификацию в языке, культуре, генеалогическими корнями, приверженностью к мусульманской религии и самоотверженным трудом в разных сферах экономической жизни.

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FIRST BRITISH ANTHROPOLOGIST WOMAN IN TURKESTAN: A. M.B. MEAKIN'S GREAT CONTRIBUTION IN LEARNING WOMEN'S LIFE IN TURKESTAN

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Abstract: *The history of women's life in Turkestan until the beginning of the XX century is one of the understudied topics. There are many reasons such as the deficiency of sources and poor activity of women in political and economic life. The only sources that provide information about Turkestani women are few waqf documents, jung works and some qadi books. These sources mainly disclose the issues connected with women's donation, heir and divorce. Occasionally, the works of poetesses could be sources. Opening the routes to Central Asia by European travelers created a favorable condition for European female scholars and enthusiasts' penetration into Turkestan. This resulted the appearance of historical information about Turkestani women in travelogues and other books.*

Between XVI and early XX centuries, there were no direct participation of women in political and economic policy of the country despite their status. Even female representatives of royal families were aside any state policy. This is also one of the factors why there is very little information about Turkestani women in historical sources.

Being a woman, A. Meakin had an opportunity to be close enough to women's life. One can find hardly any information about women scattered in various sources. For instance, Ujfalvy provides basic description, Mac Gahan gives some information about women's life in Khivan harem, M. Rickmers gives about their housing and etc. Unlike abovementioned authors, A. Meakin gives detailed information about Turkestani women such as their housework, make-up, dressing, appearance and types, women baths, and samples of stories about women. Describing girls'

education, she eliminates the view that all Turkestani women were illiterate and they were not allowed to go to schools.

Keywords: *Annette Meakin, women, waqf, household economy, girls schools, education, bath, cooking, Turkestan*

Though women had great role and influence on political, social and economic life of Turkestan, little was written about them in the sources that were familiar to Europeans in the late XIX – early XX centuries. However, the interest of westerners to oriental women, in particular the women of Turkestan was high due to the highly skilled descriptions of eastern poets. Since eastern poetry started to be translated in western languages, the description of women and expression of love towards them rose the interest in western world. Representations of Muslim women depended on the aesthetic tastes, education, and cultural and socio-political ideas of the observer. Many Europeans imagined oriental women within the dreamy space of the harem (Melentev, 2020. P. 50.). British traveler and state official G.N. Curzon notes as follow: “I have frequently been asked since my return is women. it is the question which an Englishman always seems to ask first what the women of Bokhara were like? I am utterly unable to say. I never saw the features of one between the ages of ten and fifty” (Curzon. 1889. p. 174). The writings of Alexander Burns (Bukhara) might also arise the interest of the westerners to Central Asian women. He stated the well-known couplet of Hafiz, that paints the beautiful Toorkee girl of Shiraz, near Samarcand, ... Roxana, whom Alexander married in Transoxiana, was the most beautiful woman whom the Greeks had seen in Asia, after the wife of Darius (Burns, 1834. P. 265). The marriage of Roxana with Alexander is given many studies.

Although some researches have been held on the women's history in Turkestan in the late XIX – early XX centuries, they do not cover the analyses of the description of female life in the area. Of the contemporaries, D.A. Alimova studied women's life in Central Asia (Alimova, 1991), G. Sultonova and S. Shadmanova (2017) classified and thoroughly analyzed descriptively the sources illustrating women issues. Besides that, D.Kh. Ziyaeva, S. Shadmanova contributed to the study of women's education and medical care in the late XIX – early XX centuries.

However, these sources partly or sometimes hardly any cite to the information given in the works of western travelers.

It should be exceptionally emphasized the works devoted to the role of women in economic and charity works. In particular, N. Khidirova works in family marriage relations, and her and N. Ismatova's researches on women of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand khanates, who endowed their property such as land, stores, handicraftsmanship shops as waqf of madrassas, mosques and other institutions, written on the basis of archival documents, manuscripts and qadi registers are clear example of it.

Furthermore, in the works of foreign scholars, the sense of researches on women of XIX – early XX centuries are considerably distinctive from the ones above. For instance, Melentev attempts to discuss the use of native women in the context of erotic life without the study of local sources. It is seen high exaggeration in the Melentev's work. Though he uses "eroticism" in the title, the text does not fully cover information discussed in the article. Despite this, his article is very good since the author analyzes whether the photos were spontaneous or staged. He notes that it is not difficult to notice that the models are frozen in uncomfortable positions. The appearance of Muslim women, presented with exposed faces and heads covered with only headscarves or skullcaps, and their placement at home, against the background of a plain, clean wall, emphasizes this artificiality (Melentev 2020, p. 54).

Turkestan became one of the destinies where hundreds of Europeans and tens of Americans visited in XIX – early XX centuries and more accurate data is given by S. Gorshenina. According to her, while in the first half of the 19th century (1800-1850) only 36 men visited Central Asia, in the 1890s alone there were 289 (not to mention the numerous tourists, who were not registered by name, but only under the name of their guide, with a brief mention of their approximate number). Among the foreigners travelling around the Bukharan Emirate and Turkestan in the period, 1890-1898, there were: 75 Englishmen, 70 Germans, 57 Frenchmen, 24 citizens of Austria-Hungary, 15 Americans, 7 Danes, 4 Belgians, 4 Italians, 3 Swiss and 1 Spaniard (Gorshenina 2004, p. 78). As a result, there have been published 100 of books, 1000 of articles in in journals and newspapers which was a lot more than all books written on Turkestan by European prior to that (Ziyaeva 2018. p. 8).

Of course, these works provide data and information about almost all issues of Turkestan. One can find ethnographic chapters, trade routes, markets, taxes and customs tariffs, daily life, reception ceremonies, governance, hospitality, native skills of preserving different sources for other seasons, historical buildings, environment, mountains, flora and fauna, peasantry, horticulture, sericulture, stock breeding etc. However, women's issue is one of the least illustrated topics among them. There are several factors of the issue: 1) Most travelers were men and they did not have any chance to have a conversation with women; 2) religious factor; 3) involvement of women in household tasks and to go out under a veil in high need. However, it was only Annette Mary Budgett Meakin among western travelers who was able to overcome these barriers.

Annette Meakin with her mother are described the first British women reaching Japan through the Siberia. She came to Central Asia twice in 1896 and in 1902. She was accompanied by her brother in the former travel and by her mother in the latter. She is the author of more than a dozen of books such as "A Ribbon of Iron" (1901), "In Russian Turkestan: A Garden of Asia" (1903), "Russia Travels and Studies" (1906), "Women in Transition" (1907), "Galicia, the Switzerland of Spain" (1909) etc.

Outdoor dressing was one of the most discussed issues on women in the works of European travelers. Almost all of them spent some words and ink on the issue. The outdoor clothing style of women varied on the basis of the lifestyle they had. Therefore, the description of settled women's fashion and values differed from nomadic people who mostly followed adats [customs]. A. Meakin commences her chapter with the description of women in which she provides an argument with a Russian on their clothing [Meakin 1903. P. 106]. When she rose the question on the future of sart [the term sart was used for the native people living mostly in urban and settled areas] women to her Russian acquaintances, the answer was astonishing. "They can have no future as long as their women are veiled", was the reply. "Russia should have commanded them to unveil their women from the first; now it would be a more difficult matter". This indicates what Russians expected from their government relating to native women. Besides that, the author's contribution on women's clothing on the basis of conversation with an educated mudarris of a madrassa in

Kokand illustrates the viewpoint and thought of native scholars and sharia on the issue. For instance, the mudarris stated that it [veiling] was coming from Muhammad's (pbuh) daughters who had done so. Among the settled Muslim women, only the girls aged under 10 or women aged over 50 could go out unveiled (Curzon 1889, p. 175). Burns, while describing Turkmen women, notes them to be remarkably fair, and often handsome in appearance, the men and women's separately having meals (Burns 2, pp. 61-62). Besides, he states that the customs of the Toorkmuns did not differ from those about Bokhara, only that they more nearly resembled citizens. The women concealed the face below the mouth (Burns 2. 1834. P. 112). Mir Izzat-Ullah coming to Central Asia in 1812-1813 by the request of W. Moorcroft attempted to give a short contribution on women's outdoor clothing. According to him, women were dressed in an under-shirt, open from the neck downwards; this was braided round the edge with black, and over it is a large garment called a "furjee"; their feet were covered with stockings and boots, the latter either of cloth or leather, beautifully embroidered. The hair was worn in two plaits hanging down behind, and a silk handkerchief completes the head-dress. Covered with a large sheet to conceal the face they wander about the town at will either on foot or on horseback (Mir Izzat-Ulloh. 1872. Pp. 67-68)

However, Annette Meakin missed the description of outdoor clothing of nomadic women and settled unveiled women. It could be linked with the areas and means she travelled through and by respectively. Thus, the other sources are supportive on the issue. For example, Ronalshay states that The Kirgiz women were bright and hospitable, and, though Mohammedans, did not cover the face in the presence of a stranger, but, on the contrary, welcomed him and entertained him hospitably (Ronalshay, 1904, p. 218). Mac Gahan provides an unveiled mature women's painting too (Mac Gahan, 1876). It should be noted that it was possible to meet unveiled women in urban areas. It is mostly connected with liulis [gypsies] living or wandering there (Schuyler, 1875, V. I. P. 36; Clarke, 1879. P. 6). Isabelle Phibbs states the Turcoman women to be unveiled (Phibbs, 1889. 69.), but wear a shawl over their heads (Phibbs, 1899. 97.).

Vambery writes that he met women wearing lofty globular turbans, consisting of from fifteen to twenty Russian kerchiefs (Vambery, 1864.

133) and the wearing turbans is also mentioned by E. Schuyler (Schuyler V. I, 1875. p. 36). Meeting women in streets was not frequent and describing their attire required thorough observation and collecting information. Turkmen women dressed themselves for holidays, they were accustomed also to bind a shawl round the waist over their long shift, which hangs down in two slips; high-heeled boots, red or yellow, are also indispensable; but the objects that were most coveted, and that gave them most pleasure, were the trinkets, rings for neck, ear, or nose, and etuis for amulets, and resembling cartouch-boxes, which were often seen hanging down on their left side and on their right: as with us the ribbons which were used in the different orders of knighthood. These accompany every movement of the body with a clear sound, as it were, of bells (Vambéry, 1864. 315). Besides, the women in Khiva Khanate were dressed the same as the men, but had their heads and necks swathed in loose folds of white cotton cloth, so as to make a sort of bib and turban at the same time. There was an influence of women's clothing on the style of girls' attire (Schuyler, 1875, V. I. P. 36).

The education of native women in Turkestan is insufficiently highlighted in the works of most European travelers. It was an obscure until recently due to the ideology of communistic regime since they wanted to justify Russian invasion as civilization bringers. Even it was inappropriately interpreted to western visitors by Russian officials in Turkestan. This could be associated with such factors as the lack of access to direct communication with women, finding their education uninterested for their readers and purposes, Russians' effort to stress and notify discriminating information to the travelers about women's education. However, the third one was not completely efficacious for considerate Europeans.

Education was taught women in different ways such as teaching certain handicraftsmanship, how to read and write at home, at school or at a shop. The information provided by British H. Lansdell matches to the first factor. Being a man and having no wide opportunity to direct communication with native women, he states very rough information. According to him, education among the Mussulman women was at a very low ebb. There were, nevertheless, in most towns one or two bibi-kalfas, whose duty it is to teach girls, for the most part those of the rich (Lansdell

II. Pp. 123). However, A. Meakin, being a woman and breaking many barriers, provides opposite information. Here it becomes clear that Russians misinformed the guests in order to justify their invasion. For instance, when she wanted to get information and native women's school, she was disparagingly answered by many Russians living in Turkestan assuring her that such a thing as a girls' school did not exist among the Sarts (Meakin, 1903. P. 87.).

She could not hide her astonishment when she was shown girls schools in Samarkand and Kokand. One of the factors that surprised her was ladies of the native higher class, that each had been to school in her time, and that some had even kept up their studies after marriage. For example, when she was in Samarkand, she was able to meet the chief qadi whose wife was a schoolmistress. He boasted of his wife to read a lot of books and having read more than 2000 ones. This is a prove that some women in Turkestan acquired considerably deep knowledge.

The author also gives the method how female schoolmistress were prepared and the hierarchy of the system. For instance, the schoolmistress in Samarkand was the daughter of a learned woman, who in her time had a learned mother, who also had kept a school. The profession of schoolmistress passed down from mother to daughter. When a schoolmistress had no daughter of her own, she trained one of her pupils to help her when she grew old, and took her place when she died (Meakin, 1903. P. 87).

There were some occasions that schools were enrolled girls at very early age. This is mostly because it was a preparation, adaptation and foundation period for little girls in that period. They were accustomed to learning school norms and familiarizing with upcoming process. Besides, boys could be met in girl's schools (Meakinn, 1889. P. 88). In this case, boys should nor have reached the age of puberty.

Meakin's experience at girls' school in Kokand also provides interesting information about how fee was paid, schoolmistress's family background and her quick-thinking skills. For instance, the teachers at school did not have any fixed salary. In most cases, teaching fee was not paid in cash. Instead, the fee was paid in presents, clothes and sometimes food. Besides, every success of the boy was granted by presents to

teachers. Having forty five schoolchildren, the schoolmistress in Kokand was paid the tuition fee in clothes (Meakin, 1903. P. 91).

The education in girls' schools normally lasted for 5 years and some studied for 8 years. This is connected with the capability of the attendees (Meakin, 1903. P. 92). Besides that, education was not compulsory. Most girls could halt their education as soon as they married and only some kept studying.

Unfortunately, Meakin does not mention the teachers' names and limits herself with illustrating their qualities. Therefore, it is impossible to bring schoolmistresses' names and we have to use "she". For instance, when she was at schoolmistress in Kokand, she asked her to write a sentence and the teacher did so. After a while, A. Meakin showed it for translation to a Russian who knew local language. The response was that it was very well-written and the translation was "My school has had a visitor to-day". It was surprising for her since she had thought it to be a quotation from Quran (Meakin, 1903. 92). Furthermore, the literacy of women is evidenced by a roundtable conversation of A. Meakin with native girls. When she asked a question, a girl did not just answer, but took books from a pile of books in the room and brought them to her (Meakin, 1903. 101).

The value of Annette Meakin's work in researching women's life in Turkistan is that there are other five chapters directly shedding light the child birth, women's housework, marriage, cooking and most interestingly, baths. The chapter "Childhood" makes us familiar with customs and rituals connected with children. It starts with cradles and cradling. Besides, the chapter gives information about the consequences of early marriages, death of both mothers and babies, the celebration of child birth, inappropriate interpretations of early marriages such as making money of the marriage of young daughters, fears of girls' getting spoiled (Meakin, 1903. 97).

Role of women in house hold economy in both nomads and settled people community was immense in that period. It is clearly seen in the works of many westerners. However, the most written issue is carpet making. However, women were main actors of embroidery, sewing, knitting etc. Evidences of A. Meakin are worth getting information. For instance, a woman she met in Kokand acquired the arts of embroidery and

calligraphy. Despite having a child to care and only at her fourteen, she earned a good deal of money. This also testifies the girl's abilities of reading and writing. Embroidery products of girls were very beautiful and thus were a great demand in Russian cities. Some were used as prayer carpets as well. The design was developed by old aged women who were very skilled. Though only the lowest stratum of women was involved in agriculture, they never did digging or other hard work. They gathered the harvest, and mostly picked cotton (Meakin, 1903. Pp. 102-105). Besides, women could make money of facilities they ran for women. For example, a bath owner allowed his wife to run the bath on women's day and all the money she made was hers (Meakin, 1903. P. 155).

None of the works of western travelers gives a readers such rich information about the design, furniture, arrangement of interior houses (women's residential part), home utensils and behavior as Meakin did. For example, when there were two pairs of shoes outside a wife's room, the husband did not enter.

Another interesting fact is about women's hygiene. When it goes about their washing heads, they mostly used katik or boiled sour milk and the splendid of their hair was admired by Russian women and they adopted the sour-milk process. Besides, their teeth were also well preserved and were beautiful. Because they were used to rubbing their teeth after every meal. A. Meakins states: "I do not think I met one who had not pretty and regular teeth" (Meakin. 1903. P. 123). The complexion of native women in Tashkent was charming although they did not use any kind of powder. When they were asked if they had used any, pretty women never paint, only the ugly ones do, was the answer. The best complexions were in Fergana, where painting the face, except on the marriage-day, was a thing unheard of in respectable families. However, paint and powder were used by Samarkand or Bokhara women (Meakin, 1903. P. 125). It was associated with climatic and environmental conditions. Because, the weather is dry, hot winds in the summer, chilly wind in the winter are frequent in these areas. Besides that, the volume of dust has been higher in these areas comparing with Tashkent and Fergana valley. Henna was a widespread powder to paint fingers and palms.

Women clothes in Turkestan varied in fashion in different parts. In Tashkent and in Namangan, ladies wearing short silk tunics over silken

robes, the, last like those worn by the men; others wore loose jackets with sleeves cut after the fashion of those wide ones. In Bokhara no short overgarment was worn, but the robe was much wider and shorter, and shows a great deal more of the high indoor boots, which were especially elaborate in consequence (Meakin 1903, 31).

The concept that native women in Turkestan had oppressive life in the XIX – early XX centuries and they could hardly any go outside should be denied. As is seen in researches, women were active enough in donation, family economy, education and other spheres in Turkestan. Even some of them had the right of voting in elections in the late XIX century. One more point is that they regularly went to baths on a regular day allowed for them throughout Turkestan. For instance, baths in Turkestan cities such as Samarkand, Bukhara had floors covered with marbles (Meakin, 1903. P. 120).

In conclusion, it is noteworthy to state that Annette Meakin's work is very valuable to study women's life in Turkestan in the late XIX - early XX centuries. Analyzing her book, it becomes clear that Turkestan women were not so illiterate as they were described in colonial and Soviet sources. Their life was not totally framed by their husbands and those, who dealt with handicraftsmanship, contributed to increase their family income. Besides, some of them were not only literate, but they acquired other spheres that were economically beneficial. The existence of women baths, the development of other facilities prove women gatherings in the very period.

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УНИВЕРСИТЕТИНИНГ
30-ЙИЛЛИГИГА БАҒИШЛАНАДИ**

Халқаро Муносабатлар: Сийosat, Иқтисодиёт, Ҳуқуқ
(Илмий-тадқиқот журнали)

Илмий маколалар туплами

Марказий евросий тадқиқотлари жамияти (CESS), европа марказий
осий тадқиқотлари жамияти (ESCAS) ва жаҳон иқтисодиёти ва
дипломатия университети (ЖИДУ) ҳамкорлигида ташкил етилган
еттинчи халқаро конференсия материаллари асосида нашрга
тайерланган (23 - 26 июн 2022)

Мухаррир: У.Хасанов

**ПОСВЯЩАЕТСЯ 30-ЛЕТИЮ УНИВЕРСИТЕТА МИРОВОЙ
ЭКОНОМИКИ И ДИПЛОМАТИИ**

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